City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

CUNY Graduate Center

6-2020

Pre-Report Review of Body-Worn Camera Footage: An
Examination of Stakeholder Beliefs, Laypeople’s Judgments of
Officer Credibility, and the Consequences for Memory
Kristyn A. Jones
The Graduate Center, City University of New York

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3832
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

PRE-REPORT REVIEW OF BODY-WORN CAMERA FOOTAGE: AN EXAMINATION OF
STAKEHOLDER BELIEFS, LAYPEOPLE’S JUDGMENTS OF OFFICER CREDIBILITY,
AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR MEMORY

by

KRISTYN A. JONES

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York
2020

ii

© 2020
KRISTYN A. JONES
All Rights Reserved

iii
Pre-Report Review of Body-Worn Camera Footage: An Examination of Stakeholder Beliefs,
Laypeople’s Judgments of Officer Credibility, and the Consequences for Memory
by
Kristyn A. Jones
This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in the Psychology program
to satisfy the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

___________________
Date

_______________________________________
Deryn Strange
Chair of Examining Committee

___________________
Date

_______________________________________
Richard Bodnar
Executive Officer

Supervisory Committee:
Deryn Strange
Preeti Chauhan
Saul Kassin
Emily Balcetis
Lorraine Hope

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

iv
ABSTRACT
Pre-Report Review of Body-Worn Camera Footage: An Examination of Stakeholder Beliefs,
Laypeople’s Judgments of Officer Credibility, and the Consequences for Memory
by
Kristyn A. Jones
Advisor: Deryn Strange
Aim: This dissertation examines people’s beliefs about police officer access to body-worn
camera footage, people’s judgments of officer credibility as it relates to video footage, and the
consequences that review of footage has on reporting accuracy.
Rationale: With escalating police-civilian tensions in 2014, American police departments
adopted body-worn camera programs. A majority of departments have policies allowing officers
unrestricted access to camera footage. Because officers fear that inconsistencies between reports
and videos could result in suspicion of officer deceit, they argue that officers should have access
to footage before writing their reports to ensure reports match the footage. Yet, because of
practical and psychological reasons, the cameras will never perfectly match an officer’s exact
experience. As such, unrestricted access to footage has legal implications, such as stifling the
independence of evidence and altering officers’ initial perspective of incidents—a critical point
considering that reasonableness of use of force is determined by an officer’s experience and
perspective in the moment of the event (Graham v. Connor, 1989). There are also social
implications to consider: Allowing unrestricted access may unduly enhance officer credibility
instead of promoting accountability and transparency. Moreover, the policies may seem unfair to
civilians who do not have similar access to footage, which could diminish community trust in the

v
police. Alternatively, prohibiting unrestricted officer access to footage could lead officers to
produce reports that differ—in legitimate ways—from the video footage, and these differences
could impugn officers’ credibility in the eyes of the public and the law (Giglio v. United States,
1972). The work presented in this dissertation seeks to dissect these issues.
Methods: In Study 1, stakeholders (lay adults, law enforcement officers, researchers, and college
students) responded to a 27-item survey examining beliefs about review of footage, including
beliefs about officer memory and the strength of visual evidence. Participants also responded to
demographic questions to determine whether individual differences influenced beliefs. In a
vignette design, Study 2 examined the relationship between review policies, evidence
consistency, and people’s self-other overlap with the police to determine whether these factors
influenced beliefs in the credibility of the officer’s report. In this design, participants learned
about a police encounter where the officer non-fatally shot the civilian and read the officer’s
police report, stating that he believed the civilian was carrying a knife. I manipulated whether the
officer provided his report before/after watching the camera footage and whether a knife was
visible/not visible in the footage. Participants indicated the extent to which they trusted the
officer’s report and the video, the extent to which they believed the officer, and they made
punishment decisions. Finally, in Study 3, I conducted a three-group design to determine the
effect that review and knowledge of recording has on reporting accuracy and perceptions of
events. To test the effect of review, participants completed a videogame task that was screen
recorded, and I manipulated whether participants reviewed their screen recording before or after
responding to memory and perception questions it. To test the effect of recording on the accuracy
of participants’ responses, I manipulated whether participants knew their videogame task was
being screen recorded before or after responding to the dependent measures.
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Results: In Study 1, I conducted an exploratory factor analysis (N = 260) to uncover an
underlying structure of the 27 survey items, which produced four discrete factors. I examined
whether the stakeholder groups responded differently to the four factors. Notably, I found that
officers and adults agreed the most with unrestricted access to footage, while researchers
disagreed the most. Adults believed the most strongly in officer memory ability and that
inconsistencies between reports and footage are indications of officer deceit, while researchers
disagreed the most. Study 2 showed that participants (N = 1,372) were not attuned to the issues
of review as it related to officer credibility. However, inconsistent evidence led participants to
trust the officer less and punish him more. In addition, despite not seeing the video, people
trusted the video more than the report to describe what had occurred. Finally, the more
participants reported to identify with police officers, the more they gave the officer the benefit of
the doubt when they learned that the report was inconsistent with the video. Results from 208
participants in Study 3 demonstrated that review of footage did not necessarily guarantee that
reports would perfectly align with what the video showed. Although participants who engaged in
review before responding to the memory and perception questions provided more accurate
responses, the majority of their responses were still significantly different from what occurred as
demonstrated by the screen recording.
Implications: Although people are unaware of the legal and social implications of unrestricted
access to footage, inconsistent evidence undermines people’s trust in officers and leads to greater
punishment for the officer. However, results suggest that review of footage does not necessarily
mean that reports will align with what the video shows. Given these findings, a consequence of
fairer review policies (e.g., limiting officer access to footage) is that officers’ reports will at
times, legitimately differ from videos, which may impugn officer credibility in the eyes of the
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public and may have legal implications for their testimony in court. Police departments should
implement policies that will build overall community trust so that people are less suspicious of
officers when their reports differ in legitimate ways from the video footage. Further, researchers
should examine whether expert testimony and jury instructions can aid fact-finding accuracy—
that is, assist jurors in understanding when they should believe police reports and when they
should not believe police reports when they are discrepant with video footage.
Taken together, these results highlight the complexities of policy decisions by
demonstrating that policy-makers must weigh body-worn camera review policies with an
understanding of people’s beliefs about memory and visual evidence. Without a full appreciation
of these underlying issues, departments and courts may implement policies that obviate the
technology’s promise of improving policing, strengthening police-community relationships, and
enhancing evidence in the legal system.
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Pre-Report Review of Body-Worn Camera Footage: An Examination of Stakeholder Beliefs,
Laypeople’s Judgments of Officer Credibility, and the Consequences for Memory

Heightened media coverage of fraught police-citizen interactions in recent years has
catapulted Body Worn Cameras (BWCs)—a camera fastened to officers’ uniforms—to the
forefront of policing innovations to improve transparency and aid the sometimes-fragile
relationship between police officers and the communities they serve. Indeed, the technology has
been enthusiastically received by community members, politicians, civil liberty groups, and
police officers, alike; in 2015, the Department of Justice pledged to invest $20 million in law
enforcement BWC pilot programs; and almost a quarter of the States have created laws
governing the use of BWCs (National Conference of State Legislature, 2018). Why is there such
unanimous support for the technology? The assumptions of BWCs are that they will curb
illegitimate police behavior, promote police transparency, and reduce frivolous complaints from
citizens, thus cultivating police-community trust. Research is just beginning to address these
assumptions. In this introduction to BWC technology, I first consider the current state of research
regarding the assumptions of BWCs before I identify the current gaps in our knowledge.
The Assumptions and Current State of Research for BWCs
Though BWCs have been a policing technology since the early 2000’s, the large-scale
rollout of BWCs began in 2014, largely in response to the fatal shooting of Michael Brown by a
police officer in Ferguson, Missouri in August of 2014 (Herman & Weiner, 2014). This fatal
shooting was a springboard for debates surrounding the state of police transparency and
accountability. As a result, in December of 2014, President Obama—citing a national problem of
mistrust between police and communities of color—announced his support of BWCs, and called
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for more officers to be outfitted with cameras. Indeed, he proposed new funding to help agencies
pay for the equipment. By September 2015, the United States Department of Justice, committing
to their promise of funding BWCs earlier in the year, had awarded $23 million dollars to local
police agencies to pilot BWCs. Whereas before the shooting, BWCs were a somewhat unpopular
option, used by only a handful of agencies, after the shooting, police departments in large cities
such as, Washington, D.C., New York, and Los Angeles had implemented BWC pilot programs.
A report by the U.S. Department of Justice revealed that in 2016, 47% of the 15,328 law
enforcement agencies in the United States had mandated the use of BWCs (U.S. Department of
Justice, 2016). Another survey found that 95% of police agencies had BWCs or had plans to
introduce the technology (Maciag, 2016). With a video record of police encounters, people
believed that police would be held more accountable for their actions and there would be greater
transparency in terms of how officers interact with civilians.
In the years since 2015, the Justice Department has awarded grants worth nearly $70
million to help agencies finance their BWC programs. Yet, despite these large grants, recent
headlines suggest that some police departments have abandoned or delayed their pilot programs,
citing the immense cost not just for the cameras themselves, but also for the video storage and
the employees needed to help answer people’s requests for the footage and edit the footage to
ensure protection of privacy (Branigin, 2019; Lockhart, 2019). The Department of Justice’s
report on BWCs demonstrated that a majority of the agencies that had yet to implement BWCs
cited the cost of video storage and disposal, hardware, and ongoing maintenance—the
government sponsored grants apparently support agencies’ initial equipment fees but do not
cover the cost of storage and maintenance (Kindy, 2019). Moreover, higher camera resolutions
and frame rates—important features to ensure the clarity of the BWC footage—require more
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storage space (Hung, Babin, & Coberly, 2016). Interestingly, a Washington Post database that
tracks fatal shootings by police found that of the 1,800 departments that reported a fatal officerinvolved shooting since 2015, nearly 1,300 were in smaller departments with 50 or fewer officers
(Fatal Force: 2018 Police Shootings Database). So, the agencies that are potentially the least able
to afford BWC programs because of storage and maintenance costs are arguably in the greatest
need of the accountability and transparency that BWCs may offer.
With regard to public support for BWCs, in 2016, 66% of officers and 93% of the public
favored BWCs (Pew Research Center, 2016). A majority of the public (59%) in this sample also
reported that “BWCs would make the public more likely to cooperate with police officers,”
while only 33% of officers shared the same sentiment. When considering whether “BWCs would
make officers more likely to act appropriately,” 66% of the public agreed, while 50% of officers
agreed (Pew Research Center, 2018). In another poll by the Cato Institute, 55% of Americans
reported that they would be willing to pay higher taxes for their local police department to
implement BWCs. Though support differed by political ideology with 65% of Democrats in
favor and 46% of Republicans in favor (Ekins, 2016).
Support for BWCs is understandable. BWCs have at times provided evidence of
obstruction of justice that would have otherwise gone undetected if the officer had not been
equipped with a camera (Burnett, 2017). BWC footage has also been the sole evidence to
demonstrate the justifiability of an officer’s actions (Cullen, 2018; Yang, 2019). Still, however,
critics have noted the shortcomings of a range of policies departments have adopted regarding
BWCs. For example, officers often have the option to turn their cameras on or off. Having that
option means that critical moments might not be recorded (Mustian, 2018). Moreover, when
footage does exist, some agencies do not release that footage to the public; obviously, such
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policies fail to increase transparency and accountability (Libby, 2014). Further, when police
departments decide to release the footage, they often have discretion to omit or edit portions of
the footage (Geringer-Sameth, 2019; McDonnell-Parry, 2018).
Research on BWCs and police outcomes. In addition to the policies that may limit the
ability of BWCs to improve police transparency and accountability, some research findings have
also impugned these very assumptions. To date, most of the research on BWCs has focused on
whether wearing BWCs improves police and civilian behavior, leads to reduced use of force, and
minimizes unfounded civilian complaints lodged against officers. Studies conducted in Rialto,
CA and Arizona showed that BWCs reduced reports of officer use of force and reduced
complaints against officers (Katz, Choate, Ready, & Nuno, 2014; Ready & Young, 2015). In a
randomized control study, Ariel and colleagues (2016) found that BWCs reduced use of force
but only when departments minimized officer discretion to turn the camera off—a policy that
most police departments do not follow (Police BWCs: A Policy Scorecard, 2017). Another
randomized controlled trial conducted in the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department found
that officers with BWCs had fewer use of force reports and complaints from citizens (Braga,
Coldren, Sousa, Rodriguez, & Alper, 2017). More recently, however, the largest randomized
control trial of BWCs in Washington, D.C. found no evidence that BWCs led to changes in
police behavior (Yokum, Ravishankar, & Coppock, 2017). Interestingly, some research (Urban
Institute, in press) has suggested that officers are more hesitant to engage in activities that may
result in negative interactions with the public, leading officers to instead engage in activities that
are more positive with communities. In sum, the research on the effect that BWCs have on
policing outcomes is clearly mixed and in its infancy; yet to date, the evidence available suggests
that they are not a cure-all (Malm, 2019).
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Psychological Research on BWC footage. The scant empirical evidence on how lay
adults process BWC footage shows that social context can shape interpretations of BWC footage.
In a number of studies, researchers have demonstrated that contextual information, such as a
police report or a news headline, influenced people’s judgments of BWC footage (Jones, Crozier,
& Strange, 2017; Jones, Todd, Strange, & Chauhan, in prep). For example, Jones et al. (2017)
provided people with a misleading police report and the corresponding BWC footage that
showed a police officer hitting a citizen with his baton while he was restrained on the ground.
The police report stated that the civilian was carrying a knife and hit the officer, though this
information was not depicted in the footage. When participants watched the footage and read the
misleading report, Jones et al. (2017) reported that seeing the BWC did not make people immune
to the misleading information contained in the report. Additionally, participant’s shared identity
with the police predicted the extent to which they relied on the officer’s report to make sense of
the encounter. Critically, this finding—that how people identify with the police influences their
interpretation of the evidence—is consistent with other studies that have examined people’s
perceptions of recorded police encounters (Sommers, 2015; Granot, Balcetis, Schneider, &
Tyler, 2014).
In addition, two studies showed that people’s opinions about the justifiability of an
officer’s use of force in a police-involved shooting differed depending on the medium that
participants learned about the incident: People who listened to audio recordings or read
transcripts were more likely to judge the use of force as being more justified than people who
saw the same event unfold via BWC footage. Interestingly though, these researchers found that
BWC footage led to lower ratings of justifiability only after the fatal shooting of Michael
Brown’s in Ferguson, suggesting the political climate is an important factor to consider when
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evaluating how people view BWC footage (Culhane, Boman, & Schweitzer, 2016). Indeed,
conducting the study a year after Ferguson, the researchers found that participants who watched
the BWC were more likely to judge that the shooting was justified (Culhane & Schweitzer,
2016).
The camera perspective of BWCs also influence people’s perceptions of police
encounters. Research demonstrates that people who view BWC footage judge officer’s actions as
having less intent than people who view dash-cam footage of the same encounter (Turner,
Caruso, Dilich, & Roese, 2019). These findings align with the extant literature showing that
visual perspective influences how people attribute causality (Taylor & Fiske, 1975). For
example, the camera perspective bias, describes how people perceive salient suspects in police
interrogations as having a higher likelihood of guilt, in part because they fail to consider the role
of the interrogator who is not visually salient (Lassiter, Geers, Handley, Weiland, & Munhall,
2002). Jones, Crozier, and Strange (2020) partially replicated the findings from Turner et al.
(2019). Results from this study show that the camera perspective is likely to affect people’s
interpretations of BWC footage when an incident involves physical use of force, such as a body
slam or a baton strike. In other words, evidence suggests that people have difficulty
comprehending the severity of force when it is captured by the involved officer’s BWC
compared to different camera perspectives (e.g., surveillance camera; bystander’s camera).
In summary, the current psychological research findings impugn the assumption that
BWCs will provide people with clear-cut, unambiguous evidence. Instead, biases and contextual
information have been shown to affect how people interpret visual footage. Moreover, research
shows that the camera perspective can add ambiguity to the scene. Though the studies presented
thus far are key to understanding the factors that influence the effect of BWCs on behavior and
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the (lack of) objectivity inherent when people watch the footage they produce, they have yet to
examine a key policy question. That is, when should officers review footage of critical incidents?
The goal of this dissertation is to dissect this question.
Pre-Report Review of BWC Footage: The Issue
Most U.S. police departments permit, even require, officers to view footage prior to
writing their reports. In a review of 75 police departments with BWC policies, 55 departments
allowed officers unrestricted footage review, 13 had partial prohibitions, and none had a blanket
policy against pre-report reviewing (Police BWCs: A Policy Scorecard, 2018). In a report
released in 2016, the U.S. Department of Justice found that 60% of law enforcement agencies
allowed officers to have direct access to the footage (U.S. Department of Justice, 2016).
To delineate pre-report review policy, imagine an officer who is wearing a BWC pulls a
young male over for a broken taillight. The officer asks the man to get out of the vehicle so that
he can search him, but the man refuses to comply with the officer’s requests. The man appears to
be reaching in his pocket for something, so the officer uses his baton to subdue and arrest him.
The hypothetical officer works for a police department that requires him to provide an incident
report, describing the interaction in detail. Because the officer was wearing a BWC, the
department also requires that the officer watch the footage before producing his written report.
On its face, such a requirement seems logical and straightforward. But in reality, the timing that
officers review their footage is a point of contention. On one hand police departments support
officers’ unrestricted access to footage to ensure that they provide incident statements that match
what the footage shows. On the other hand, civil liberty groups, researchers, and legal scholars
worry that unrestricted access abrogates independence of evidence, inflates officer credibility,
and fails to capture what an officer experienced in the moment.
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Public support of pre-report review policy.
To my knowledge, there has been only one survey of public opinion on the topic of prereport review. The Cato Institute surveyed a sample of 2,000 Americans, finding that political
ideology, opinions of officers, race/ethnicity, urban density, and income predicted people’s
support of policies that permit pre-report review of BWC footage (Ekins, 2016). People who
were very conservative, Caucasian, living in a suburb or rural area, and households making more
than $50,000 a year were the most likely to agree that “police officers should be allowed to
watch the BWC footage after a violent encounter before making their official statement about the
event.” This survey provides evidence that lay adults see the issue of pre-report review
differently. In the following two sections, I describe the rationale for each view.
Arguments in favor of pre-report review. Police departments that permit pre-report
review argue that review of BWC footage is necessary so that officers produce statements that
are consistent with the BWC footage and that consistency will garner community trust and help
to ensure that officers’ truthfulness and honesty will not be called into question in court during
cross examination by defense attorneys. People in favor of pre-report review maintain that
officer reports will be more accurate after reviewing footage of an incident; after all, the footage
should produce a more objective account of what happened than an account that relies solely on
the limitations of human perception and memory. For example, an executive interviewed for the
Police Executive Research Forum’s (PERF) report on BWCs stated, “When you’re involved in a
tense situation, you don’t necessarily see everything that is going on around you, and it can later
be difficult to remember exactly what happened.” Thus, there is an expectation that police
footage (including from BWC, dash-cams and surveillance cameras) will supplement what an
officer remembers. Although some research shows that stress enhances memory performance,
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other psychological literature supports the idea that stress influences encoding and thus memory
(Cahill, Gorski, & Le, 2003; Morgan et al., 2004), but, as I detail below, it does not support the
solution of pre-report review.
Additionally, in cases in which police memory differs from what the footage shows, prereport review is expected to help avoid inconsistencies that might lead people to suspect that an
officer is lying, question officer credibility, and further exacerbate fraught police-community
relations. For example, another executive interviewed for the PERF report said, “What we are
after is the truth. If you make a statement that you used force because you thought a suspect had
a gun but the video later shows that it was actually a cell phone, it looks like you were lying. An
officer should be given the chance to make a statement using all of the evidence available;
otherwise, it looks like we are just trying to catch an officer in a lie” (Miller, Toliver, & PERF,
2014). Such comments appear to reflect the majority of policy maker’s views within police
departments across the country.
Arguments against pre-report review. By contrast, policy groups have speculated that
pre-report review—a policy that people believe will produce statements that perfectly match
footage—might leave people to be suspicious of a cover-up and question the officer’s credibility.
Others have speculated that pre-report review could lead to diminished community trust by
unduly exaggerating officer credibility and minimizing fairness because citizens do not receive
the same unrestricted opportunities to review the footage (Upturn, 2017). Thus, policy advocates
worry that pre-report review would hamper transparency efforts and reduce community trust by
reducing people’s beliefs in officer credibility.
Some officers also interviewed for the PERF report thought that officers should not
engage in pre-report review so that they could maintain their understanding of what they felt in
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the moment and appear more credible. Indeed, pre-report review may also alter officers’
descriptions of the scene and the sequences of their actions—and ultimately, their memories of
the incident—resulting in reports that are a mere reflection of what is shown in BWC footage
rather than a unique source of information (Grady et al., 2016). Reports that are replicas of what
is shown in the BWC footage would be a problematic consequence given that the U.S. legal
system strives for independence of evidence (Pezdek, 2015). These competing hypotheses in
favor and against pre-report reviewing of BWCs underscore the two true issues at stake in this
policy debate, which I delineate below.
The main issues of pre-report review: An overview. Given the rationales for and
against pre-report review, the first set of questions stemming from the pre-report review debate
are about people’s expectations of officer memory performance: Do people expect officers’
memories to perfectly match BWC footage, or do people expect to see some differences between
the two? And how might lay adults’ beliefs about officer memory differ from those of law
enforcement officers or memory experts? Addressing these questions as they relate to BWC
policy could help police departments adopt policies that lead to improved police-community
relations. Finally, another question stemming from the arguments in favor and against pre-report
review is how does (in)consistency between officers’ reports and BWC footage affect people’s
judgments of officer credibility? Until researchers understand people’s expectations of officer
memory and how it interacts with BWC policy, case outcomes in court could be threatened if
people fail to find officer testimony credible. With plea-bargaining occurring in a majority of
cases (Flanagan & Maguire, 1990; Gramlich, 2019), it is only those cases with the most
ambiguous evidence that go to trial. People’s judgments of officer credibility might be especially
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decisive in such cases. Indeed, jurors could find truly culpable defendants not guilty if they
question the credibility of the officer.
The second set of questions stemming from the pre-report review debate is the practical
effect that reviewing footage will have on an officer’s memory for a critical incident. To date,
there is no empirical evidence to shed light on this issue. Specifically, researchers have yet to
tackle the questions of whether pre-report review will alter what an officer experiences in the
moment of the event or change officers’ descriptions of the scene and the sequences of their
actions. As I describe below, this is a particularly critical point to examine. Although researchers
have yet to examine how pre-report review alters people’s state of mind during an event, one
pilot study tested whether BWCs could improve the accuracy of documentation for paramedics
(Ho et al., 2017). In the paramedics’ (N = 10) initial reports, they made errors that ranged from
moderate (e.g., missing or wrong patient vital signs) to major (e.g., not mentioning a weapon on
the patient). Unsurprisingly, the team of researchers found that after the paramedics reviewed
their BWC footage, their documentation accuracy improved. Yet despite review of the footage,
some errors persisted in their documentation. These preliminary results taken from a small pilot
study, suggest that even people trained in documenting information sometimes fail to provide
details or report them inaccurately. That these paramedics’ reports still contained errors after
viewing the footage also suggests that pre-report review might not result in reports that
identically match the accompanying footage. Finally, these findings led Ho et al. (2017) to
conclude that because wearing BWCs and reviewing footage enhanced accuracy and could result
in more positive outcomes and fewer liability issues, paramedics should consider using BWCs
and engage in pre-report review.
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Though Ho et al.’s (2017) findings are helpful for our understanding of people’s ability to
accurately report events, they are not directly germane to the issue of pre-report review for police
officers. Because of the United States’ Supreme Court decisions regarding use of force
standards, the issue of pre-report review is not simply about the accuracy of reporting but rather
the ability to recount how an officer experienced in the moment at the scene. Thus, because of
current legal standards it is essential that policies safeguard officers’ memory for and perceptions
of critical events.
Use of force legal standards. Officer use of force is judged by the perspective of an
officer on the scene, including the facts and circumstances known and experienced by the officer.
Thus, ensuring that officers’ reports are in accordance with what an “objective” camera captures
during a scene is not the goal, but rather, protecting officers’ perspective—which may differ
from what the camera shows—during the event is paramount. Indeed, in a landmark decision, the
Supreme Court ruled in Graham v. Connor (1989) that the reasonableness of officer use of force
is determined by the “reasonableness standard” of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the
Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
With the reasonableness standard to determine whether an officer’s use of force was excessive or
not, juries must ask themselves whether a reasonable officer would have acted in the same way
given what was known at the time, not “20/20” hindsight. Jurors are required to put themselves
in the perspective of the officer on the scene, with the knowledge that officers are typically
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making a split-second decision when choosing to use force. This moment in time—where the
officer makes a quick decision to use force—which jurors are instructed to consider is legally
known as the “superseding event” (Radiolab, 2017).
The Graham v. Connor (1989) decision demarcates the minimum standard that which
states must comply to satisfactorily protect citizens’ Constitutional rights. Some cities and at
least one state, however, have begun to challenge this ruling and require that their officers
conform to a higher standard, providing citizens with greater protection against officers’ use of
force. California for example has newly passed legislation to update its deadly use of force laws
so that officers would typically be required to wait longer to use force. The legislation would
change the use of force standard from “reasonable” to “necessary” and have jurors consider an
officer’s actions prior to use of force, not only at the superseding moment (California Legislative
Information, 2019; Is Graham v. Connor a Ceiling or a Floor? 2019). With this new bill enacted,
California has the most restrictive use of force laws in the nation (Adler, 2019). Other local
police departments, such as Philadelphia, Seattle, Cleveland, and Camden County (Paul, 2019) to
name a few, have also revised their use of force policies. Some of these policies include
reserving deadly use of force for instances where all other alternatives were exhausted, requiring
de-escalation as a first step, ensuring officers are equipped with a less-lethal weapon, and
banning certain tactics, such as chokeholds (Limits of Use of Force, n.d.). Despite these localized
reforms that provide citizens greater protection in use of force incidents, much of the United
States abides by the reasonableness standard set forth in Graham v. Connor (1989). Thus, in
most of the United States, we determine the reasonableness of officers’ actions based on whether
a reasonable officer would have acted in the same manner given what was known to the officer
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at the time of the event. As such, protecting an officers’ experience and knowledge known at the
time of the event is critical to understanding the reasonableness of officers’ actions.
Reasonableness Standard and BWCs. The Graham v. Connor (1989) decision means
that when considering whether an officer’s use of force was reasonable, an officer’s experience
in the moment with the knowledge known at the time is what matters most, not what is gleaned
after the fact with information, such as BWC footage that might help contextualize the event and
provide 20/20 hindsight. If BWCs produced footage that was identical to officer memory and
perfectly captured an officer’s experience while on the scene, then pre-report review would
likely be a non-issue. However, the camera will never capture the information that will speak to
what an officer experienced or perceived during an incident. Indeed, there are practical reasons
and psychological evidence to suggest that in many situations the camera footage will likely
differ from what an officer perceives.
Potential Issues with Pre-Report Review
Mechanical Constraints of BWCs
First, the anatomy of human vision and the manufacturing of BWCs mean that what an
officer sees and what a camera captures will never be the same. Though human eyes have a
horizontal field of view of 170 to 200 degrees, the widest BWC field of view is 175 degrees. Yet,
the BWC has a wider effective field of view; everything captured by the camera is in focus,
while human vision has 2 degrees of high visual acuity (Stoughton, 2017). The frame rate and
camera resolution of BWCs—which contribute to the clarity of objects and people in videos—
can also be limited (Hung et al., 2016). These discrepancies, coupled with the fact that a BWC
fastens to an officer’s uniform often at chest-level, provides further reason to suspect that even
when a BWC and an officer focus on the same aspect of the scene, the footage will never
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completely replicate an officer’s visual experience. In addition, BWCs—which face outwards—
will be unable to completely record officers’ actions, and therefore miss critical information.
Further, the information that BWCs capture is at times ambiguous because of the camera’s
placement. For example, an officer who raises an arm to engage a weapon could obstruct the
BWC lens, and an officer who runs or engages in a physical altercation will cause the camera to
shake and potentially blur critical visual information.
To summarize, human eyes will sometimes encode more information and other times less
information than what BWCs capture. As a result, what officers originally perceive during an
encounter and what they later encode by watching the BWC footage will likely affect retrieval.
Research on Perception
Selective attention. What an officer encodes and what a camera captures might also
differ because of the limitations of human attention (Mack & Rock, 1998). In a classic study,
Simons and Chabris (1999) demonstrated that people sometimes fail to notice dynamic,
meaningful events if attention is directed elsewhere. Simons and Chabris instructed participants
to count the number of times a group of people passed a basketball. During the interaction, a
person dressed as a gorilla appeared on the screen between 5 and 9 s and walked through the
group. Though the gorilla appeared on screen for nine seconds, only half the participants noticed.
This robust phenomenon—coined inattentional blindness—explains why people sometimes fail
to notice rather large details that appear to be directly in sight and seem obvious to another
observer. Indeed, with the earliest report of inattentional blindness occurring in the 1970’s
(Neisser, 1979; Neisser & Becklen, 1975), the phenomenon has been replicated in many studies.
In these studies, participants focus their attention on an arbitrary task and while doing so, miss an
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obvious but unrelated person or stimulus who passes through the scene (Mack & Rock, 1998,
Most et al., 2001; Simons & Chabris, 1999).
Importantly, inattentional blindness occurs in real-world conditions and affects police
officers too. A Boston police officer was prosecuted and convicted of perjury after claiming he
did not see another officer brutally assaulting a citizen (Lehr & Attersley, 2009). Inspired by this
case, Chabris, Weinberger, Fontaine, and Simons (2011) mimicked the details of the original
scene by instructing participants to chase a confederate past a staged assault. They found that
only 56% of participants noticed the assault during daylight and only 35% of participants noticed
it at night, thus providing evidence that inattentional blindness occurs in real-world conditions.
Although this study extended the inattentional blindness research to a real-world scenario, there
are two limitations to this study: identifying the assault was irrelevant to the participants’ task of
running after a confederate, and failing to notice the assault did not have any real implications
for the participants.
Some researchers have examined whether people experience inattentional blindness for
objects that are critical to the task at hand and if noticed, would change behavior. A few studies
have examined whether these factors affect inattentional blindness in simulated scenarios. Haines
(1991) showed that experienced pilots, participating in a flight simulator, proceeded to land their
aircraft when the runway was obstructed by another plane, noticing the plane when it was too
late and a crash was unavoidable. In another study, participants completed a driving simulator
task where they were told to pay attention to certain colored traffic signals and to ignore others.
While completing the instructed task, an unexpected motorcycle appeared on the screen that
either matched or did not match the color signals to which participants were attending. The
researchers reported that when the motorcycle did not match the traffic signal colors, 36% of
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drivers collided with it. Finally, a study conducted on police academy trainees and police officers
found that 58% of the trainees and 33% of the officers did not notice a gun on a passenger’s
dashboard when they engaged in a simulated traffic stop (Simons & Schlosser, 2017). Thus,
inattentional blindness occurs even for tasks that are familiar, contain threatening and relevant
stimuli, and involve people trained to be vigilant of danger.
These studies on inattentional blindness underscore the fact that officers are unlikely to
encode everything in a given scene, even when the details are seemingly important and in their
direct line of sight. Though the camera—unaffected by attentional deficits or biases—may in
some cases provide a more accurate representation of what really happened in a police
encounter, the footage might be categorically different from what an officer encoded in the
moment.
Bias in visual perception. Even when people successfully attend to a given stimulus,
they may perceive that stimulus in a biased manner. Research on visual perception shows that
top down effects influence visual processing, such that motivated reasoning can influence the
processing of visual information (Balcetis & Dunning, 2006). In other words, though what
people see is a result of the retina converting light into electric impulses sent to the brain via the
optic nerve, perception is affected by factors, including people’s expectations, motivations, and
political ideologies.
Research findings suggest that social information guides how people see the world and
that this is particularly true when visual stimuli are ambiguous. One way researchers have
demonstrated the effect of motivation on perception, dubbed wishful seeing, is through the
phenomenon of binocular rivalry. In binocular rivalry, the eyes receive two competing images
but people are only consciously aware of one image and suppress the other. Balcetis, Dunning,
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and Granot (2012), for example, found that during binocular rivalry, people were more likely to
perceive images associated with rewards than images associated with costs. Likewise, other
studies examining the phenomenon wishful seeing have shown that an ambiguous image can be
interpreted differently depending on people’s preferences. An ambiguous image might look like
a B when it is advantageous to perceive a letter; whereas, the same image may look like a 13
when it is advantageous to perceive a number (Balcetis & Dunning, 2006; 2013). Thus, even
though people generally believe they see the world as it is, research on wishful seeing
demonstrates that people unconsciously see what they want to see (Changizi & Hall, 2001; Cole,
Trope, Balcetis, 2016; Caruso, Mead, & Balcetis, 2009; Radel & Clement-Guillotin, 2012).
Even police officers are susceptible to biased visual representations and sometimes these
biased perceptions have devastating consequences. Take, for example, the scenario in which an
officer fatally shoots a civilian because the officer believed that the civilian—typically a person
of color—was carrying a gun when it was actually a wallet or a cellphone (Cullen, 2017;
Lockhart, 2018). In addition, empirical research examining racial shooter bias has demonstrated
that officers’ racial biases and stereotypes influence their perceptions of objects and their
decisions to shoot (Correll et al., 2007; Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & Davies, 2004, Plant &
Peruche, 2005; cf. Cox, Devine, Plant, & Schwartz, 2014). It is worth noting, however, that
researchers have demonstrated that studies examining the racial shooter bias produce small
effects and that results are mixed depending on whether reaction times or error rates are
considered (Cox et al., 2014). Moreover, officer decisions to shoot are influenced by communitylevel variables, such as states’ gun laws and cities’ proportions of non-Whites and individuallevel variables, such as officers’ years of experience (Mekawi & Bresin, 2015).
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Research on How Body-Worn Cameras Could Alter Memory
In the following sections, I describe the phenomena that demonstrate how officers
encoding might be impacted by wearing BWCs and how officers’ complete and accurate
retrieval could be altered by review.
Photo-taking impairment effect. Some research has suggested that people have worse
memory for details or experiences that they take photos of—a phenomenon known the photo
impairment effect. For example, in one study, participants who received instructions to take
photographs during a museum tour had a reduced ability to recall details of the tour compared to
people who did not take photographs (Henkel, 2014). According to Henkel (2014), people
“cognitively offload” the work of encoding (and thus remembering) when they know that they
can later review images of a given scene (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). This hypothesis is based
largely on the framework of transactive memory, whereby people rely on other people (Wegner,
Guilliano, & Hertel, 1985) or things that “remember” information (Ward, 2013), so that they can
focus on other tasks (Storm & Stone, 2015).
Notably, Soares and Storm (2018) challenged the hypothesis of memory offloading and
instead attributed Henkel’s (2014) findings to an attentional disengagement hypothesis. The
attentional disengagement hypothesis asserts that people in Henkel’s (2014) museum tour had
worse memory for objects or experiences photographed because the act of taking the photos
meant that participants—who were focused on obtaining a photograph—encoded the museum
objects less deeply than those who did not take photos. In support of the attentional
disengagement hypothesis, Soares and Storm (2018) found in a replication study that participants
still exhibited a photo impairment effect even when they knew the pictures would not be
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available for later review (i.e., by taking photos using Snapchat or by manually deleting the
photos immediately after taking them).
The attentional disengagement hypothesis suggests that because officers are not actively
recording encounters, the use of BWCs is unlikely to result in memory impairment effect. On the
other hand, if the cognitive offloading hypothesis is correct, then officers in departments that
permit pre-report review may rely on the BWC footage to remember the event rather than their
own memory, and this may prevent an officer from effectively encoding a critical incident. Put
simply, pre-report review could reduce officers’ motivation to encode, thereby decreasing the
likelihood that critical information outside the range of the camera lens will be reported.
To reiterate, if cameras reduce encoding because officers are relying on the BWC
footage, then this could be problematic for departments with pre-report review policies for at
least two reasons. First, BWC technology is imperfect; sometimes it fails to record and what it
does record might be ambiguous and obstructed. Second, the U.S. court system strives for
independence of evidence; the BWC footage is expected to supplement, not replace, an officer’s
memory. Because of these reasons, it is essential that police departments implement policies that
aim to protect officer memory.
Retrieval induced forgetting. In the case that a BWC fails to capture everything that an
officer saw, an officer who reviews footage will be “practicing” or rehearsing certain details that
are shown in the video at the expense of other details that are not shown in the video. A wellstudied psychological phenomenon called retrieval induced forgetting (RIF), suggests that
rehearsal will have negative consequences for the later retrieval of the unpracticed details
(Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994; Koutstaal, Schacter, Johnson, & Galluccio, 1999; Perfect et
al., 2004). In a study examining RIF in a forensic context, researchers had participants view a
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crime scene and then repeatedly answer questions about what they saw. They found the details
that participants answered questions about were more likely to be remembered than other similar
(and equally important) details (Shaw, Bjork, & Handal, 1995). In a similar manner, reviewing
footage might result in officers inadvertently “rehearsing” details that are shown in the video.
Consequently, pre-report review could hinder officer memory for details that are absent from
BWC footage and potentially lead officers to be less likely to report these details. These
unreported details may be critical to understanding the encounter and in particular, the officer’s
actions.
Post-event information and source monitoring errors. Because memory is malleable,
people uniformly suffer from memory errors (Bartlett, 1920; Patihis et al., 2013). One wellstudied effect relevant to pre-report review is the misinformation effect (Loftus, 2005). The
misinformation effect describes how people incorporate post-event information when recalling a
memory, thereby reducing memory accuracy. Critically, misinformation can distort memories for
stressful events. In one study, Morgan, Southwick, Steffian, and Hazlett (2013) introduced
misinformation to people in the U.S. military during their Survival School training. The training
mimicked a realistic prisoner of war scenario that involved a stressful interrogation, isolation,
and food and sleep deprivation. Morgan et al. (2013) found that although the military personnel
were trained to withstand misinformation, when misinformation was presented to participants
after experiencing the stress from prisoner of war and interrogation scenarios, 27% of
participants reported that misinformation for critical items (such as, information about weapons
being present when none were present). About 80% of participants reported misinformation for
less critical but nonetheless important items, such as information about uniforms or faces.
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The misinformation effect describes how people incorporate inaccurate items into their
memory but more broadly, the misinformation effect demonstrates people’s suggestibility to
post-event information. In the context of pre-report review, the post-event information (i.e., the
BWC footage) could provide a more accurate description of an incident; yet, receiving this
information is problematic given the current reasonableness standard from Graham v. Connor
(1989). For example, consider an officer who in a stressful situation believes that a civilian was
carrying a gun but later watches the footage and sees that the civilian was actually carrying a
crowbar. With pre-report review, the officer would likely incorporate the crowbar into his
statement and, critically, come to remember seeing a crowbar (Grady, Butler, Loftus, 2016).
Even if after review of the BWC footage the officer’s statement becomes more objectively
accurate, it is nonetheless different from what the officer experienced in the moment. The
officer’s experience of seeing a gun likely influenced the decisions made in the moment, and the
introduction of post-even information would mean that his memory for those decisions would be
altered in light of the post-event information.
These examples and dozens of other studies examining the effect of post-event
information highlight the fact that people’s memories are susceptible to incorporating additional
information. This incorporation of post-event information occurs because people have difficulty
monitoring the source of information they learn after an event (Frenda, Nichols, & Loftus, 2011;
Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). According to the source monitoring framework, people
do not store the details of their memories with a tag or label specifying the origins of each detail.
Without careful source monitoring efforts, people can make mistakes, by misremembering
details gleaned in the BWC footage as details that they witnessed first-hand (Lindsay, 2008).
Problematically, people’s suggestibility to post-event information is more likely when the source
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and post-event information are similar (Lindsay, Allen, Chan, & Dahl, 2004) and memory for the
original event is weak (Paz-Alonso & Goodman, 2008; Pezdek & Blandon-Gitlin, 2005).
To summarize, reviewing footage will introduce officers to post-event information and
information introduced after an event can alter memory for what people witness or experience
(Loftus, 2005). Even if the information from the footage is objectively more accurate, it could
nonetheless—for legitimate reasons—be different from what an officer experienced and
remembers. Moreover, as a result of source monitoring errors, officers who review footage prior
to producing a written statement may struggle to accurately discern what was encoded at the time
of the event and what was only encoded after watching the footage (Jones, Crozier, & Strange,
2017; Loftus, 2005).
Police Officers and Memory
Memory Errors and Police Officers
Researchers have found that officers are not immune to memory biases, such as the
misinformation effect. Police officers are just as susceptible to misleading information as
laypeople (Loftus, Levidow, & Duensing, 1992). The effect of stress on memory is also
important to consider (Artwohl, 2002). Stress can increase people’s susceptibility to
misinformation (Morgan et al., 2013) and lead people to report fewer details (Hulse & Memon,
2006). Although the research examining officer memory in use of force incidents is limited, there
are at least two studies that demonstrate the impact of stress on officer memory. In an applied
study of police officers, Hope et al. (2016) found that when officers actively engaged in a
realistic and stressful scenario, one-fifth of officers reported that a perpetrator pointed his
weapon when in reality, the weapon was contained in the perpetrator’s waistband for the
duration of the scenario. Similarly, McClure, McGuire, and Loftus (2019) simulated encounters
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with law enforcement officers as participants and found that physiological stress markers were
correlated with memory, providing evidence of a negative relationship between stress and
memory performance (Deffenbacher, Borstein, Penrod, & McGorty, 2004) Though not all
studies have found a negative relationship with some laboratory designs showing that acute
stress increases memory performance (Shields Sazma, McCullough, & Yonelinas, 2017).
In sum, these research findings provide further evidence for the fact that officers’
memories for events might differ substantially from what police footage shows, especially in
stressful situations. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, most states in the U.S. judge the
reasonableness of an officer’s use of force by what an officer felt in the moment (Graham v.
Connor, 1989). Thus, it is critical that officers produce a report that reflects their memory and
perception at the time of the event, free from external information, such as BWC footage.
Moreover, these findings lay the groundwork for why permitting pre-report review is not
so straightforward. On one hand, permitting pre-report review may alter officer memory for what
was experienced in the moment. On the other hand, prohibiting pre-report review means that
inconsistencies between officer reports and BWC footage will likely arise. How then do lay
adults perceive BWC pre-report review policies that might alter officer memory? And how do
lay adults deem statements that vary in their consistency with BWC footage?
Lay Expectations of Officer Memory
Little is known about people’s expectations of officer memory performance. I was only
able to source two studies, conducted in the 1980s that examine lay adults’ assumptions of
officer memory (Loftus, 1984; Yarmey & Jones, 1983). These studies revealed that people
presume officers to have superior memory ability than the general population. Providing further
evidence for this finding nearly 25 years later, Jones, Crozier, and Strange (2018) showed that
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people consider police officers to have more objective memories for critical events than other lay
adults. In this study, people thought that officers would be immune to biases that would
influence the accuracy of their memories after witnessing criminal events. This finding—the
expectation that officers’ memory abilities will be accurate--suggests that people might be less
tolerant of a mismatch between what an officer says happened and what a video shows. As a
result, less tolerance of discrepancies between officer statements and BWC footage could result
in people rendering harsher punishment decisions for the officer.
However, some people might be more tolerant of discrepancies between BWC footage
and police reports than others. One potential moderating factor is people’s general trust in police.
Previous research has demonstrated that people who report to identify with police rely more on
what the officer says happened to make sense of a police encounter and are less likely to find the
officer guilty for his actions (Jones et al., 2017; Jones et al., 2018; Jones et al., 2020, Sommers,
2015). Indeed, dozens of other studies have demonstrated a relationship between people’s
identities and how they consider evidence and render verdicts. For example, religiosity predicts
punitiveness in insanity cases (Yelderman & Miller, 2017), people more frequently judge
outgroups as being guilty (Leippe, Bergold & Eisenstadt, 2017), and European Americans are
more likely to find undocumented immigrants guilty of crimes (Minero & Espinoza, 2016).
Thus, social identities matter and predict important legal decisions. Likewise, when people
consider discrepancies between BWC footage and officers’ reports, people who identify with
police might be more willing to give the officer the benefit of the doubt or merely trust that what
the officer says is the truth.
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Comparing Memory Experts, Officer, and Lay Beliefs about Memory
Prior studies addressing people’s beliefs about memory have described differences
between laypeople, police officers, and experts. In one survey, 100% of experts disagreed with
the statement that “human memory works like a video camera, accurately recording the events
we see and hear so that we can review and inspect them later”; yet 63% of lay adults agreed with
this statement (Simons & Chabris, 2011). As a result, lay adults may assume that inconsistencies
are the result of officer dishonesty rather than normal memory constraints.
In another survey, Akhtar, Justice, Knott, Kibowski, and Conway’s (2018) found that
laypeople’s memory beliefs were more similar to officer’s beliefs than expert’s beliefs.
Laypeople and officers shared a “commonsense” memory belief system, agreeing—in direct
contradiction to over a century of empirical evidence—that our memories work like video
recorders. In their research, Wise, Safer, and Marco (2011) also found that two thirds of U.S. law
enforcement officers believed that memory worked like a video recorder. These results suggest
that lay adults’ and officers’ beliefs about pre-report review and their expectations of officer
memory will align more than those of experts. This prediction is of particular interest because
some policy groups have noted that communities will find pre-report review policies unfair and a
result, departments who permit pre-report review will experience negative community-policing
relations (Upturn, 2017). However, the finding that police and lay adults share a commonsense
memory belief system demonstrates that police and lay adults may be unaware of the potential
memory issues inherent with pre-report review policies, and thus may not take issue with the
policy.
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Overview of the Studies
Although extant literature suggests that there is reason to expect that pre-report review
will diminish officer’s memory for what was felt in the moment of an event, prohibiting prereport review may also have practical consequences, such as officers producing statements that
are inconsistent with the BWC footage, which the public could interpret as a sign of deceit. I
have designed three studies to tease apart these issues. The goal of these studies is to a)
determine stakeholder beliefs about the concerns surrounding pre-report review of BWC footage
and their general expectations of officer memory and b) determine the real implications of prereport review on memory in an experimental setting.
Study 1 is the first direct comparison of law enforcement officers’, memory experts’, lay
adults’, and college students’ beliefs about pre-report review of BWC footage. Study 2
experimentally investigates lay adults’ expectations of officer memory as it relates to pre-report
review of BWC footage. That is, do people expect officer memory to perfectly match film
footage of an event, or do people expect some inconsistencies to arise between the two forms of
evidence? By having participants engage in a first-person shooter videogame that is screen
captured for subsequent review, Study 3 captures the actual implications that pre-report review
has on memory.
Finally, a note about my commitment to open science: these studies conform to open
science practices; the methodology and analyses are pre-registered on the Open Science
Framework.
Study 1
In 2016, Cato Institute polled people (N = 2,113) on their beliefs about whether officers
should be able to review their police footage before making their official statements. This poll
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found that 52% of respondents indicated that officers should be allowed to watch BWC footage
before making official statements about violent encounters, whereas 48% disagreed with this
statement. Responses varied by respondents’ opinion of the police, political ideology, and race: a
majority of Whites and Republicans favored access to video footage for police, while a majority
of Blacks and Democrats opposed early access to video footage for police.
The Cato Institute’s poll is an important first step in understanding the extent to which
people support policies that allow officer access to BWC footage. Study 1 expands upon the Cato
Institute’s poll to investigate why people support or oppose pre-report review policies. Study 1
examines people’s beliefs about officer memory and the strength of BWC footage by surveying
four groups, including law enforcement officers, memory researchers, lay adults, and students.
Sampling participants from these groups allowed me to compare their beliefs about issues
regarding pre-report review.
Method
Design. This study employed a survey design. I made an a priori estimate of sample size
based on similar “general consensus” surveys (Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001; Akhtar et
al., 2018). Based on the sample sizes described in these extant surveys, I planned to recruit 200
participants for each group of participants, including law enforcement officers, memory
researchers, lay adults, and students.
Participants. In total, there were data from 599 participants for Study 1 analyses (164
law enforcement officers, 611 experts, 200 lay adults, and 174 college students).

1

Although I received more responses from my recruitment of experts, before analyzing data, I chose to include only
the respondents who indicated that their specialty was psychology and law, cognitive science/neuroscience,
memory, or forensic psychology and who at least had a Bachelor’s degree.
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Law enforcement officers. I recruited law enforcement officers from a variety of sources.
First, I collected data from law enforcement officers by working with a retired Police Captain
from Bend, Oregon who is a part-time facilitator for the Oregon Department of Public Safety
Standards and Training. This former Captain and current facilitator shared a recruitment email
with law enforcement officers who were enrolled in either a Supervision Leadership course or an
Organizational Leadership Management course during the summer and fall of 2019. Multiple
police agencies in the state of Oregon also received the recruitment email. I received 28
responses through this recruitment process.
In addition, I recruited law enforcement officers by working with Wicklander-Zulawski
& Associates, Inc. (W-Z), an organization that offers interrogation consulting and training in the
private and public sectors. W-Z sent a recruitment email to a random sample of 8,224 law
enforcement officers who had undergone training with W-Z and who were signed up to receive
emails via the W-Z listserv. Law enforcement officers received the recruitment email in January
2020, and of the officers who received the recruitment email 1,182 opened the email, 253 clicked
the link to the survey, and 53 completed the survey.
I recruited law enforcement officers who were members of the American Society of
Evidence-Based Policing (ASEBP)—a formal organization dedicated to the development and
promotion of evidence-based policing. ASEBP members received the recruiting email via the
ASEBP listserv. Finally, I created a list of 214 police chiefs in the United States whose contact
information was available online. Of these, I sent a recruitment email to a random selection of 53
police chiefs. Recruiting law enforcement officers from the ASEBP listserv and via a random
selection of police chiefs yielded 83 responses.
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The final law enforcement sample consisted of 164 law enforcement officers. Participants
who completed the survey and provided an email address received a $10 Amazon gift card for
their time. These participants were mostly White (83.54%); 3.66% were Black or African
American, 0.61% were American Indian or Alaska Native, and 9.15% identified as Other. The
remaining participants identified as two or more races: 0.61% identified as White and American
Indian or Alaska Native, 1.83% identified as White and Other, and 0.61% identified as White,
American Indian or Alaska Native, and Other. The mean age of the sample was 42.052 (SD =
8.98). The majority of this sample had a Bachelor’s Degree (42.68%); 20.12% had a Master’s
Degree, 19.51% had an Associate’s Degree, 15.24% had a high school diploma or had obtained
their GED, and 2.44% had a Ph.D. The mean number of years of experience in law enforcement
was 15.38 (SD = 8.47, median = 15) and 96.32% were active officers. One hundred sixty of the
participants were officers in the United States, and they resided in Arizona (0.63%), California
(1.25%), Colorado (3.13%), Connecticut (0.63%), Florida (11.25%), Illinois (21.25%), Iowa
(6.25%), Kansas (0.63%), Missouri (2.50%), Nebraska (28.75%), New Jersey (1.88%), New
York (0.63%), Oregon (16.88%), Texas (3.75%), and Washington (0.63%). Of the four
respondents who did not reside in the United States, one resided in Australia, one resided in New
Zealand, one resided in Canada, and one participant did not respond to the question. For agency
size, the mean number of police officers in the respondents’ agencies was 1,576.12 (SD =
4,470.89; median = 240). The smallest agency size was eight and the largest agency size was
38,000.3
Experts. I recruited memory researchers using three different methods. First, I recruited
experts by sending a recruitment email to the 951 members of the Society of Applied Research

2
3

Three participants did not provide valid information about their age.
One participant did not respond.
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on Memory and Cognition (SARMAC) listserv. In addition, I recruited SARMAC participants
by emailing the recruitment text directly to individuals who specialized in memory topics and
who had attended the SARMAC Conference in June 2019. Finally, I recruited experts by
emailing the recruitment text directly to professors who specialized in memory topics,
encouraging them to distribute the survey to other experts in the field and to members of their
research labs. Participants who completed the survey and provided an email received a $10
Amazon gift card.
Of the 61 participants who met the criteria for analyses, 89.83% were White, 1.69% were
Asian, 1.69% were Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, and 3.39% selected Other. The
remaining respondents identified with two races: 1.69% were White and Black or African
American and 1.69% were White and Other. The median age was 38.33 (SD = 12.09). For
education-level, 18.64% of respondents had a Bachelor’s degree, 28.81% had a Master’s degree,
and 52.54% had a Ph.D. The mean number of journal articles published was 13.22 (SD = 19.07,
median = 5), the mean number of law review articles published was 0.70 (SD = 1.09, median =
0), the mean number of books published was 2.07 (SD = 3.68, median = 1), and the mean
number of book chapters published was 0.68, (SD = 1.42, median = 0). The mean response for
political ideology was 5.64 (SD = 1.08), indicating participants on average identified as being
more liberal.
Lay adults. Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) Workers completed the survey through
the TurkPrime platform (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2016). The survey was available to
MTurk Workers residing in the United States who had previously completed 50 or more MTurk
tasks with a 90% or greater approval. The average time to complete the study was 33.60 minutes
(median = 30.10 minutes), and the study had a 53% completion rate and a 7% bounce rate (i.e.,
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the number of MTurk workers who previewed the study but did not participate). To ensure data
quality, I used features to block duplicate IP addresses, block suspicious geocode locations, and
verify worker country location.
Because I used MTurk features to help ensure data quality, I did not include attention
checks for this sample. A review of the literature on administering attention checks has advised
against eliminating respondents based on attention checks (Aduiza & Galais, 2016; Berinsky,
Margolis, & Sances, 2014; 2016). Research has shown that participants who fail the attention
check are not a random subset of the population and that eliminating respondents from the
survey can introduce a bias into the results, particularly for age (Vannette, 2016). Also,
researchers have found that administering attention checks can cause participants to behave
worse later in the survey and can produce Hawthorne effects or socially desirable responding
(Clifford & Jerit, 2015; Vannette, 2016).
Altogether, 200 Workers completed the study and received $1.00 for their time. A
majority of the sample was White (60.0%); 34.50% were Black or African American and 2.00%
were Asian. The remaining participants identified with two or more races (including White and
Black [1.00%], White and Asian [0.50%], White and Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
[0.50%], White and Other [0.50%], and Black and Native American [1.00%]). The mean age of
the sample was 37.24 years old (SD = 11.78)4, and 66.50% were male, 33.0% were female, and
0.50% preferred to not identify their gender. The sample was fairly educated with 50.50%
obtaining a Bachelor’s degree, 27.00% obtaining a Master’s degree, and 1.50% obtaining a Ph.D.
The remaining participants had obtained an Associate’s degree (11.50%) or a high school
diploma or GED (9.50%). The mean response to the political identification question was 4.82

4

Seventeen participants did not provide valid information about their age.
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(SD = 1.80), indicating that on average, the sample was somewhat conservative, somewhat
liberal.
Students. Because research has shown that MTurk workers lack demographic diversity
(Jones, Crozier, Strange, 2018)—with Workers typically being educated and White--I recruited
undergraduate students from a John Jay College’s Psychology Human Subject Pool (SONA).
This college is diverse as it is a Minority-Serving and Hispanic-Serving Institution. One hundred
eighty-nine students completed the survey and received one course credit for their participation. I
excluded 14 participants who failed the embedded attention check that participants responded to
at the end of the survey (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009).5
After these exclusions, there were data from 175 participants for analyses. Of these
participants, 21.84% participants were White, 19.94% were Black or African American, 11.94%
were Asian, 0.57% were Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, and 44.25% identified as Other.
The remaining participants identified with two or more races, including White and Other
(1.72%), Black or African American (0.57%), Black or African American and Asian (0.57%),
Black or African American and Other (2.30%), American Indian or Alaska Native and Other
(0.57%), Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander and Other (0.57%), and White, American Indian or
Alaska Native, and Other (0.57%). The mean age was 20.806 (SD = 3.82). Over half of the
sample were Freshmen (51.72%), 26.44% were Sophomores, 12.64% were Juniors, and 9.20%
were Seniors. The mean response to the political identification question was 5.29 (SD = 1.59),
indicating that on average, the sample was more liberal.

5

Although some research has described the negative outcomes of including an attention check, I nonetheless
included an embedded attention check at the end of the study for two reasons: a) unlike MTurk, the SONA system
does not provide options to ensure data quality and b) in previous research that I conducted using SONA, I found
that a large number of participants did not pay attention to the materials (Jones et al., 2018; Jones et al., 2020).
6
Six participants did not provide valid information about their age.
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Materials.
Questionnaire. The questionnaire consisted of 27 items that examined people’s general
beliefs about officer pre-report review of video footage and some of the concerns that previous
literature has described regarding pre-report review policies (See Appendix A). For example, the
survey included items, “Before providing any statement about an incident, officers should review
any available body worn camera video of the incident” and “Officer memories for incidents
should be similar to body worn camera video recorded during the incident.” I revised these items
several times after receiving feedback from memory researchers, policing researchers, and law
enforcement officers. For each item there were four questions: The first question asked
participants to indicate the extent to which they agreed/disagreed with the statement on a 4-point
scale: strongly disagree, disagree, agree, and strongly agree. The scale also included an “I don’t
know” option. The second question was an optional open-ended prompt that said, “If you’d like,
please briefly explain your answer to the previous statement.” Next, based on the Kassin et al.
(2001) survey, the third question asked participants to reflect on whether their agreement or
disagreement to the issue described in the item was “based on published, peer reviewed,
scientific research” with a dichotomous answer choice (yes or no). Last, the fourth question
asked participants to identify "the percentage of the general population that would have a similar
position as you” on a sliding scale that ranged from 0% to 100%.
Demographic questions. Participants responded to a series of questions about their
background and experiences depending on the sampled group: Memory researchers provided
information about their professional credentials (degrees obtained, primary areas of
specialization) and approximate number of publications in scientific journals, law reviews,
books, chapters, and magazines or newsletters. Law enforcement officers indicated how many
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years of experience they have had as a law enforcement officer, education-level, and the size of
their police agency. Lay adults and students indicated their level of education, occupation,
income, zip code, identification with police (Tyler & Fagan, 2008; described below), and prior
experiences with police.
All participants provided information about their age and race. All participants, except
law enforcement officers, responded to a question about their political ideology (“How would
you describe your political identification?” 1 = extremely conservative to 7 = extremely liberal;
midpoint = somewhat liberal, somewhat conservative).
Identification with police scale. The identification with police scale measures the extent
to which people share similar values with the police (Tyler & Fagan, 2008). I used the shortened,
7-item version described in Granot et al. (2014; Cronbach’s a = .87). The scale includes items,
such as “If you talked to most police officers, you think you would find that they have similar
views to your own on many issues” that participants respond to on a 7-point Likert scale. I
considered it redundant to ask law enforcement officers these questions, so they did not respond
to this scale. Experts also did not respond to this scale because I was primarily interested in
testing how their expertise in memory guided their responses.
Procedure. Participants who received the recruitment email (experts and law
enforcement officers) and clicked on the survey link, or participants who signed up to participate
online (lay adults or students) were directed to a Qualtrics survey. After reading the informed
consent and agreeing to participate, participants received instructions about the survey:
Police departments are adopting the use of body worn cameras across the United States.
These cameras are used to record incidents in real time and the resulting video can be
downloaded for review. One question emerging with respect to body worn camera
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policies is when officers should review their body camera video, if at all. Specifically, if
officers have the option of reviewing police video should they review their video (a)
before producing their written statement or (b) only after they have produced their written
statement? This survey is designed to better understand people’s attitudes and beliefs
regarding body camera video-review policy. You will be presented with a series of
statements. After each statement, you will have the opportunity to explain your answer,
identify whether your response was based on peer reviewed research, and estimate the
percentage of the general public that you believe would agree with your response.
Throughout this survey, you will be unable to go back and adjust your answers. At the
end of this survey, you will answer some demographic questions.
Then, participants received each item and the four questions on a separate, timed page, and
participants could not go back after advancing the page. After responding to all of the questions
associated with each statement, participants provided the demographic information associated
with their respondent group.
Hypotheses
H1. Based on previous memory surveys, I predict that lay adults will respond more
similarly to law enforcement officers than experts.
H2. As shown in Akhtar et al. (2018), I predict that law enforcement officers with more
experience will respond more similarly to experts.
H3. Based on Akhtar et al. (2018), I predict that of the four groups, lay adults and law
enforcement officers will be the least likely to consider pre-report review an issue for officer
memory (i.e., these respondent groups will more strongly agree with Factor 2; see factors below).

37
H4. Based on the findings that self-other overlap results in similar responding, I
hypothesize that responses from lay adults who identify as being more politically conservative
and identify more with police will indicate that officers’ statements/reports are more important
than video evidence (i.e., lay adults will disagree with Factor 1; see factors below).
H5. Similarly, responses from lay adults who identify as being more politically
conservative and identify more with police will demonstrate the belief that officers should be
given the benefit of the doubt when inconsistencies arise between statements/reports and video
evidence (i.e., lay adults will disagree with Factor 1; see factors below)
H6: As in Akhtar et al. (2018), education-level will predict people’s beliefs for both
police and laypeople, such that college educated participants will respond more similarly to
experts than non-college educated participants.
Results
Table 1 shows the percentages of agreement with the 27-statement items for each of the
four groups, and Table 3 shows the percentages of respondents who selected “I don’t know” per
item. I analyzed the data in two ways. First, I analyzed the structure of the dataset and second, I
conducted group-wise analyses. For these analyses, I excluded listwise case responses with “I
don’t know,” leaving 260 responses that had complete data for all of the items, with responses
from 23 experts, 75 law enforcement officers, 115 lay adults, and 47 students to be examined.
I conducted a listwise deletion of “I don’t know” responses because “I don’t know”
response choices are not factorable, and factor analysis procedures require datasets that do not
have missing data. To retain all 600 responses, I conducted a second factor analysis replacing “I
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don’t know” responses for each item with the median value from the respondent group.7 The
results from the median factor analysis is displayed in Appendix B, but for the purposes of this
Results section, I present the findings from the dataset with the listwise case deletion.

7

Another more sophisticated analysis technique to manage missing data is expectation-maximization estimation, but
this analysis tool requires that missing data is missing at random. Treating “I don’t know” responses as missing
meant that the data was not missing at random, making expectation-maximization an unsuitable method.

Table 1
Percentage Agreement with Items as a Function of Respondent Group
Strongly disagree %
Lay
Experts LEOs
Students
Adults

Experts

Disagree %
Lay
LEOs
Adults

Students

Experts

Agree %
Lay
LEOs
Adults

Students

Strongly agree %
Lay
Experts LEOs
Students
Adults

1

36.07

7.93

9.50

8.57

18.03

9.15

5.50

20.00

27.87

21.95

37.50

32.00

11.48

58.54

43.50

36.57

2

18.03

9.76

1.00

2.29

31.15

23.17

2.00

14.29

40.98

50.61

47.00

41.14

6.56

15.24

46.00

32.00

3

40.98

68.29

4.00

2.86

45.90

29.27

17.00

24.00

3.28

1.83

33.50

41.71

4.92

0.61

39.50

20.57

4

44.26

71.95

4.00

2.29

39.34

26.22

14.50

25.71

9.84

0.00

41.50

42.86

0.00

1.22

35.00

16.57

5

26.23

4.27

9.00

13.71

22.95

7.93

7.00

32.00

11.48

16.46

36.50

22.86

27.87

69.51

44.00

25.14

6

24.59

0.61

7.50

10.86

27.87

3.66

9.00

40.57

19.67

37.20

40.00

26.29

22.95

55.49

40.50

14.86

7

1.64

6.10

0.00

1.14

19.67

37.80

5.50

5.14

42.62

34.15

32.50

33.71

29.51

14.63

57.00

54.86

8

9.84

1.83

3.50

3.43

18.03

3.66

8.50

26.86

31.15

40.24

35.50

35.43

21.31

50.00

46.50

25.14

9

0.00

9.15

4.00

5.14

4.92

43.90

11.00

11.43

36.07

26.22

44.00

50.29

57.38

12.80

34.50

24.57

10

3.28

0.61

1.54

0.57

9.84

3.05

2.05

6.29

54.10

42.68

34.36

53.14

24.59

51.22

56.92

30.86

11

1.64

7.32

1.50

1.14

19.67

46.34

11.50

12.00

44.26

24.39

42.50

52.00

22.95

10.37

35.50

22.86

12

39.34

1.22

1.52

2.86

27.87

13.41

5.05

18.29

24.59

52.44

43.43

48.00

4.92

24.39

43.43

13.14

13

6.56

19.51

9.69

8.00

39.34

37.80

15.82

25.71

19.67

20.73

36.73

31.43

18.03

9.15

31.12

22.29

14

0.00

1.22

1.52

2.86

3.28

8.54

7.58

1.71

47.54

46.34

43.94

34.86

47.54

36.59

42.42

57.71

15

21.31

26.83

23.12

36.57

39.34

46.34

13.07

43.43

22.95

14.02

30.65

10.29

6.56

6.10

25.13

1.71

16

6.56

25.93

0.00

4.02

32.79

46.91

5.03

13.22

36.07

14.20

39.70

35.06

14.75

3.09

45.73

27.01

17

1.64

7.32

0.50

0.57

4.92

29.88

5.00

7.43

49.18

43.90

40.50

46.86

36.07

9.15

49.00

34.29

18

0.00

1.83

4.50

2.29

0.00

0.61

5.00

6.86

37.70

10.37

44.50

61.14

60.66

87.20

41.00

21.14

19

9.84

45.73

1.00

1.71

22.95

44.51

8.00

26.29

42.62

6.10

39.00

38.29

18.03

2.44

46.50

22.29

20

44.26

7.32

9.50

18.29

24.59

34.15

13.00

45.14

11.48

30.49

40.00

13.14

3.28

17.68

29.50

4.57

21

45.90

7.32

9.00

17.71

29.51

32.32

11.50

53.14

13.11

32.32

43.50

8.57

9.84

15.24

27.50

1.71

22

3.28

14.02

1.00

0.57

3.28

35.37

2.00

1.71

29.51

32.32

37.00

43.43

63.93

14.63

56.50

49.71

23

26.23

16.46

10.50

16.57

36.07

44.51

15.00

40.00

14.75

10.98

36.00

13.14

9.84

6.71

27.50

4.57

39

24

42.62

56.71

12.50

17.14

40.98

37.20

22.00

60.57

9.84

4.88

32.00

10.86

3.28

1.22

28.50

4.00

25

3.28

1.22

1.50

1.14

1.64

0.00

3.50

5.71

29.51

16.46

50.00

51.43

62.30

81.71

40.50

33.14

26

11.48

50.00

1.50

5.14

34.43

42.68

13.50

26.86

32.79

3.05

33.00

31.43

16.39

1.83

44.00

24.57

27

3.28

1.22

2.50

0.57

8.20

0.61

11.50

15.43

39.34

16.46

38.50

56.00

45.90

81.10

44.50

20.00

Avg

17.49

17.47

5.01

6.96

22.47

25.52

9.26

22.58

28.96

24.10

39.01

35.75

24.10

27.33

40.81

23.92

Note. LEOs = Law Enforcement Officers; Avg. = Average
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Table 2
Percentage of I Don’t Know Responses per Item as a Function of Respondent Group
I Don’t Know
1

Experts
6.56

LEOs
2.44

Adults
4.00

Students
2.86

2

3.28

1.22

4.00

10.29

3

4.92

0.00

6.00

10.86

4

6.56

0.61

5.00

12.57

5

9.84

1.83

3.50

6.29

6

4.92

3.05

3.00

7.43

7

6.56

7.32

5.00

5.14

8

19.67

4.27

6.00

9.14

9

1.64

7.93

6.50

8.57

10

8.20

2.44

5.13

9.14

11

11.48

11.59

9.00

12.00

12

3.28

8.54

6.57

17.71

13

16.39

12.80

6.63

12.57

14

1.64

7.32

4.55

2.86

15

9.84

6.71

8.04

8.00

16

9.84

9.88

9.55

20.69

17

8.20

9.76

5.00

10.86

18

1.64

0.00

5.00

8.57

19

6.56

1.22

5.50

11.43

20

16.39

10.37

8.00

18.86

21

1.64

12.80

8.50

18.86

22

0.00

3.66

3.50

4.57

23

13.11

21.34

11.00

25.71
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24

3.28

0.00

5.00

7.43

25
26
27

3.28
4.92
3.28

0.61
2.44
0.61

4.50
8.00
3.00

8.57
12.00
8.00

Avg.

6.92

5.58

5.91

10.78

Note. LEOs = Law Enforcement Officers; Avg. = Average
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Factor structure of beliefs about pre-report review
I performed an exploratory factor analysis to investigate the latent constructs of beliefs
about pre-report review that underpinned responses to the 27 statement items (Ost, Easton, Hope,
French & Wright, 2016). Before conducting the factor analysis, I conducted tests to assess the
factorability of the data. First, I performed Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity, finding that the test was
statistically significant (p < .001), and therefore indicating that some of the variables were
correlated with each other. I also conducted the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of
sampling adequacy. The KMO produced a Measure of Sampling Adequacy for each item,
demonstrating that each KMO was above the recommended value of 0.60. In addition, the
overall KMO was 0.89, suggesting that the data was adequate for factor analysis.
To determine the number of factors to retain, I conducted a parallel analysis—a
simulation-based method (Sakaluk & Short, 2016)—using a common factor model. I selected a
common factor model because this type of estimation assumes that some variance is error
variance and thus produces smaller eigenvalues. The parallel analysis produced a scree plot (a
graph that visually plots the eigenvalues or variance explained) to help determine the number of
factors necessary to retain for the factor analysis (see Figure 1). Based on the parallel analysis
and the scree plot results, I selected the four factors that had eigenvalues greater than one
(Akhtar et al., 2018).
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Figure 1
Parallel Analysis Scree Plot

Next, I conducted a factor analysis. The 4-factor solution is shown in Figure 2, and the
solution explained a total variance of 51%. Factor 1 included ten items (variance explained =
0.24), Factor 2 included six items (variance explained = 0.11), Factor 3 included four items
(variance explained = 0.06), and Factor 4 included six items (variance explained = 0.10). I
excluded Item 8 and Item 13 because they mapped almost equally onto two of the Factors. Table
3 lists the statement items, and Appendix A lists all of the statements by item number.
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Figure 2
Four-Factor Solution from Factor Analysis

Next, I computed Cronbach’s Alpha for the items associated with each factor (Table 3). I
removed Item 14 and Item 15 to generate acceptable Alpha scores. More specifically, Item 14
did not correlate well with the scale for Factor 3, and removing Item 15 increased the alpha-level
of the scale for Factor 4. Table 1 shows the component loadings of the final 23 items.
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Table 3
Factor Analysis Component Loadings
Factor
1. Trust in BWC
footage over
officer memory;
inconsistencies a
sign of deceit

Cronbach’s
Alpha
0.91

Items (alpha for factor and statement)

Officer memories for incidents should be similar to body worn camera
video recorded during the incident. (0.91)
Differences between an officer’s statement and their body worn camera
video is likely a sign of deceit. (0.90)
Differences between an officer’s statement and their body worn camera
video is likely a sign that officers conspired to create a story about what
happened. (0.90)
Body worn camera video is more accurate than officers’ memories. (0.91)
Reviewing a body worn camera video of an event is likely to alter how an
officer remembers the event. (0.91)
Reviewing a body worn camera video of an event is likely to result in a
statement that is consistent with the contents of the video but not the
officer’s memory. (0.91)
When statements and body worn camera video differ, legal decisionmakers should default to what the video captured. (0.90)
Body worn camera video is more objective than an officer’s memory.
(0.91)
Knowing exactly what happened during an event is more important than
knowing what an officer perceived during an event. (0.90)
Police officers should write statements as soon as safely possible after an
event has taken place. (0.91)
Police statements are often unnecessary when body worn camera video is
available. (0.91)
When determining whether an officer’s use of force was appropriate, it’s
most important to look at what was captured on body worn camera video
rather than learning about the event from the officer’s statement. (0.90)
2. Acceptance of
Pre-Report
Review

0.80
Before providing any statement about an incident, officers should review
any available body worn camera video of the incident. (0.75)

47
Factor

Cronbach’s
Alpha

Items (alpha for factor and statement)
Officers should be able to review their body worn camera video before
producing a statement for stressful events (i.e., events involving a physical
confrontation and/or weapon). (0.71)
Officers should be able to review their body worn camera video before
producing a statement for less stressful events (i.e., events not involving a
physical confrontation or weapon). (0.72)
Officers’ statements will more accurately reflect what actually happened in
an event after they review camera video.
Reviewing a body worn camera video will help officers remember more
about what happened in an event. (0.80)
Officers will be able to differentiate between what they remember from an
event and what was later seen in the body worn camera video. (0.79)

3. Inaccuracy of
BWC Footage

0.60
Body worn camera videos might sometimes fail to show what an officer
perceived during an event. (0.55)
Because of limitations with the technology, body worn cameras might
sometimes fail to capture the full scene. (0.49)
When determining an officer’s use of force was appropriate, it’s important
to bear in mind that the body worn camera video will not show how the
officer perceived the event. (0.48)

4. Expectation
that officers’
memories are
reliable

0.83

Police officers have better memory ability than members of the general
public with no law enforcement training. (0.73)
Police officers’ memories are more reliable than members of the general
public with no law enforcement training. (0.67)
Police officers’ memories are more accurate for stressful events (i.e., events
involving a physical confrontation and/or weapon) than less stressful events
(i.e., events not involving a physical confrontation and/or weapon). (0.88)

The 4-factor solution reflected four different themes surrounding beliefs about pre-report
reviewing. Factor 1 was associated with trust in BWC footage (higher scores indicating stronger
agreement that BWC should be trusted more than officer memory and stronger agreement that
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inconsistencies between an officer’s report and BWC footage are a sign of deceit), Factor 2 was
associated with the general acceptance of pre-report review (higher scores indicating stronger
agreement that officers should be able to review their BWC footage before providing a
statement), Factor 3 was associated with BWC footage inaccuracy or incompleteness (higher
scores indicating stronger agreement that BWC footage can be inaccurate or incomplete), and
Factor 4 was associated with expectation that officer memory is reliable (higher scores indicating
stronger agreement with the reliability of officer memory ability more than the general public
without law enforcement training).
Beliefs about pre-report review amongst the four groups: law enforcement, lay people,
college students, and experts
To provide a visual overview of answering patterns amongst the three groups, I
conducted a principal component analysis (PCA). The score plot, shown in Figure 3, details the
responses given to all items, identified as a function of respondent group. This figure shows that
there was overlap between students’ and experts’ responses, as well as, students’ and lay adults’
responses, whereas law enforcement officers’ responses clustered separately. Moreover, lay
adults’ responses and experts’ responses clustered separately.
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Figure 3
Principal Component Analysis Score Plot

To test for differences across groups per factor, I conducted four one-way ANOVAs with
participant group the independent variable and factor composite score the dependent variable.
When possible, I conducted pairwise comparisons with Tukey correction. These analyses
revealed that the four groups’ responses differed on each of the factors; however, pairwise
comparisons demonstrated that not all groups for each factor differed to a statistically significant
degree.8
Factor 1 (trust in BWC footage more than officer memory and inconsistencies between
the two are a sign of officer deceit). There was a significant main effect of Participant Type.

8

Prior to analyses, I chose to analyze the lay adult and student sample groups separately. I analyzed these groups
separately because the final sample sizes of these groups were roughly equal. Combining these groups would have
resulted in more disproportionate sample sizes between the respondent groups.
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Pairwise comparisons demonstrated that each groups’ responses differed from one another. Lay
adults agreed the most with this factor, while law enforcement officers disagreed the most (see
Tables 4 and 5).
Table 4
ANOVA Results Using Factor 1 Composite Score as the Criterion
2
Sum
partial η
Mean
2
Predictor
of
df
F
p
90% CI
partial η
Square
Squares
[LL, UL]
(Intercept)
162.22 1
162.22 1045.00 < .001
Participant Type
76.87 3
25.62
165.06 < .001
.66
[.60, .70]
Error
39.74 256
0.16
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval,
respectively.

Table 5
Factor 1 Composite Score Means, Standard Deviations, and d-values [with Confidence
Intervals]
Variable

M

SD

1. Experts

2.66

0.46

2. Law Enforcement
Officers

2.05

0.35

1

2

3

1.59*
[1.07, 2.11]

3. Lay adults

3.34

0.37

1.77*
[1.28, 2.26]

3.54*
[3.08, 4.00]

4. Students

2.91

0.47

0.55
[0.04, 1.05]

2.15*
[1.69, 2.60]

1.08*
[0.72, 1.43]

Note. M indicates mean. SD indicates standard deviation. d-values are estimates calculated using
formulas 4.18 and 4.19 from Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein (2009).
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Factor 2 (acceptance of pre-report review policies). There was a main effect of
Participant Type. Pairwise comparisons showed that law enforcement officers and lay adults
responded similarly and had the strongest agreement, while experts disagreed the most strongly
(see Tables 6 and 7).
Table 6
ANOVA Results Using Factor 2 Composite Score as the Criterion
2
Sum
partial η
Mean
2
Predictor
of
df
F
p
90% CI
partial η
Square
Squares
[LL, UL]
(Intercept)
135.38 1
135.38
467.11 < .001
Participant Type
30.76 3
10.25
35.38 < .001
.29
[.21, .36]
Error
74.19 256
0.29
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval,
respectively.

Table 7
Factor 2 Composite Score Means, Standard Deviations, and d-values [with Confidence
Intervals]
Variable

M

SD

1. Experts

2.43

0.83

2. Law Enforcement
Officers

3.47

0.48

1

2

3

1.78*
[1.26, 2.32]

3. Lay adults

3.40

0.47

4. Students

2.82

0.60

1.77*
[1.28, 2.27]
0.56*
[0.06,1.08]

0.15
[-0.14, 0.44]
1.22*

1.13*

[0.83, 1.62]

[0.77, 1.50]

Note. M indicates mean. SD indicates standard deviation. d-values are estimates calculated using
formulas 4.18 and 4.19 from Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein (2009).
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Factor 3 (the potential for BWC footage to be inaccurate or incomplete). For Factor 3
there was a main effect of Participant Type. Pairwise comparisons showed that all respondent
groups overlapped to an extent. Students disagreed the most with this factor, but their responses
were not significantly different from lay adults’ responses. Lay adults’ responses were not
significantly different from experts’ responses. In addition, experts’ responses were not
significantly different from law enforcement officers’ responses. Overall, students disagreed the
most, while law enforcement officers agreed the most (see Tables 8 and 9).
Table 8
ANOVA Results Using Factor 3 Composite Score as the Criterion
2
Sum
partial η
Mean
2
Predictor
of
df
F
p
90% CI
partial η
Square
Squares
[LL, UL]
(Intercept)
289.98 1
289.98 1452.04 < .001
Participant Type
16.69 3
5.56
27.85 < .001
.25
[.17, .31]
Error
51.12 256
0.20
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval,
respectively.

Table 9
Factor 3 Composite Score Means, Standard Deviations, and d-values [with Confidence
Intervals]
Variable

M

SD

1. Experts

3.55

0.45

2. Law Enforcement
Officers

3.82

0.33

1

2

3

0.75
[0.26, 1.22]

3. Lay adults

3.33

0.50

0.45
[0.00, 0.90]

1.11*
[0.80, 1.42]

4. Students

3.13

0.48

0.89*
[0.36, 1.40]

1.74*
[1.32, 2.17]

0.40
[0.05, 0.74]
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Note. M indicates mean. SD indicates standard deviation. d-values are estimates calculated using
formulas 4.18 and 4.19 from Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein (2009).
Factor 4 (expectation that officer memory is more reliable than other groups without
training). For Factor 4, there was a significant main effect of Participant Type. Pairwise
comparisons showed that experts and students indicated the strongest disagreement, followed by
law enforcement officers. Lay adults reported the strongest agreement with this factor (see
Tables 10 and 11).
Table 10
ANOVA Results Using Factor 4 Composite Score as the Criterion
2
Sum
partial η
Mean
2
Predicto
of
df
F
p
90% CI
partial η
Square
Squares
[LL, UL]
(Intercept)
71.90 1
71.90
144.30 < .001
Participant Type
62.42 3
20.81
41.76 < .001
.33
[.25, .39]
Error
127.56 256
0.50
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval,
respectively

Table 11
Factor 4 Composite Score Means, Standard Deviations, and d-values [with Confidence
Intervals]
Variable

M

SD

1. Experts

1.77

0.92

2. Law Enforcement
Officers

2.45

0.70

1

2

3

0.90*
[0.42, 1.38]

3. Lay adults

3.11

0.72

1.77*
[1.27, 2.26]

0.92*
[0.61, 1.22]

4. Students

2.04

0.53

0.35
[-0.15, 0.85]

0.65*
[0.28, 1.03]

1.60*
[1.23, 1.99]
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Note. M indicates mean. SD indicates standard deviation. d-values are estimates calculated using
formulas 4.18 and 4.19 from Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein (2009).
Beliefs about pre-report review amongst the four groups’ demographic information
Because I excluded a large number of responses from the dataset to conduct the factor
analysis—which required complete cases—I was unable to adequately power analyses to test my
hypothesis that the education-level of lay adults and law enforcement officers would predict
differences in participants’ responses.
However, questions relevant to my hypotheses that I could more adequately power for
were: whether lay adults’ and students’ identification with police scores, political ideologies, and
race predicted their responses to the four factors. To test whether these predictors impacted
participants’ responses, I combined both lay adult and student responses. I also recoded the
demographic variable, so that I could compare White participant responses (n = 75) to all other
race categories (n = 87). I entered identification with police scores, political ideology, and the
new recoded race variable as predictors into four regression models—one for each factor
composite score.
Tables 12 through 15 show the results from the regressions. Identification with the police
was a statistically significant predictor in each analysis; greater identification with the police
predicted stronger agreement with each of the factors. Political ideology was only significant for
Factor 1—trust in BWC footage over officer memory and inconsistencies between the two is a
sign of deceit—and demonstrated that the more politically liberal participants were, the more
they agreed with this factor. Finally, race was a significant predictor for Factor 2—acceptance of
pre-report review policies. Compared to White participants, participants of other race categories
less strongly agreed that officers should be able to engage in pre-report review practices.
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Finally, I examined whether years of experience shaped how law enforcement officers
responded to the four factors. Recall, that I predicted that officers with more years of experience
would respond more similarly to experts. To examine this question, I ran four regressions—one
for each factor—with years of experience the independent variable. None of these regressions
showed a statistically significant relationship between years of experience and law enforcement
officers’ responses (p’s > .4)

Table 12
Factor 1 Composite Score Regression Results
Predictor
(Intercept)
Identification
with police
Political
ideology
Race (ref. =
White)

b

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]

beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

sr

2

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

r

2.32**

[1.88, 2.76]

0.10**

[0.03, 0.16]

0.21

[0.07, 0.36]

.05

[-.02, .11]

.23**

0.04*

[0.00, 0.08]

0.16

[0.00, 0.31]

.02

[-.02, .07]

.18*

0.12

[-0.02, 0.25]

0.13

[-0.02, 0.28]

.02

[-.02, .06]

.15

Fit

R2 = .098**
95% CI[.02,.18]

Note. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized regression weights. beta
indicates the standardized regression weights. sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. r represents the zero-order correlation. LL and UL indicate the
lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively.
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.
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Table 13
Factor 2 Composite Score Regression Results
Predictor
(Intercept)
Identification
with police
Political
ideology
Race (ref. =
White)

b

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]

beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

sr

2

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

r

2.16**

[1.63, 2.69]

0.23**

[0.15, 0.31]

0.41

[0.27, 0.55]

.17

[.06, .27]

0.03

[-0.02, 0.08]

0.09

[-0.05, 0.23]

.01

[-.02, .03]

.10

-0.20*

[-0.37, -0.04]

-0.18

[-0.32, -0.04]

.03

[-.02, .08]

-.16*

Fit

.41**

R2 = .204**
95% CI[.09,.30]

Note. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized regression weights. beta
indicates the standardized regression weights. sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. r represents the zero-order correlation. LL and UL indicate the
lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively.
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.
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Table 14
Factor 3 Composite Score Regression Results
Predictor
(Intercept)
Identification
with police
Political
ideology
Race (ref. =
White)

b

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]

beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

sr

2

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

r

2.22**

[1.74, 2.70]

0.18**

[0.11, 0.26]

0.37

[0.22, 0.52]

.14

[.04, .23]

0.01

[-0.04, 0.05]

0.03

[-0.12, 0.17]

.00

[-.01, .01]

.06

0.03

[-0.12, 0.17]

0.03

[-0.12, 0.17]

.00

[-.01, .01]

.04

Fit

.37**

R2 = .140**
95% CI[.04,.23]

Note. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized regression weights. beta
indicates the standardized regression weights. sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. r represents the zero-order correlation. LL and UL indicate the
lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively.
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.
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Table 15
Factor 4 Composite Score Regression Results
Predictor
(Intercept)
Identification
with police
Political
ideology
Race (ref. =
White)

b
0.45
0.44**

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]

beta

beta
95% CI
[LL, UL]

sr

2

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

r

Fit

[-0.27, 1.18]
[0.33, 0.55]

0.53

[0.40, 0.66]

.28

[.16, .40]

.53**

0.02

[-0.05, 0.09]

0.04

[-0.10, 0.17]

.00

[-.01, .01]

.07

-0.04

[-0.26, 0.19]

-0.02

[-0.16, 0.11]

.00

[-.01, .01]

-.01
R2 = .284**
95% CI[.16,.38]

Note. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents unstandardized regression weights. beta
indicates the standardized regression weights. sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. r represents the zero-order correlation. LL and UL indicate the
lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively.
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.
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Responses to the additional item questions
In addition to reporting the extent to which participants agreed or disagreed with the 27
survey items, participants provided an optional written response to explain their response choice.
Participants also provided an estimate of the population that they believed would agree with their
response, and they indicated whether their response was based on published, peer reviewed, and
scientific evidence. Table 16 demonstrates the percentage of respondents—per each respondent
group and item—who reported that the population would agree with their response. Table 16
also shows the percentage of participants who indicated that their response was based on
scientific evidence.
Open-ended responses. Because the free response explanations were optional for
participants, in the following sections, I provide summaries of participants’ free response
descriptions per factor.
Experts’ free response.
Factor 1. Experts mentioned a number of common themes, including the idea that video
footage may be more accurate, but it too will need to be interpreted because quality, viewpoint,
and context matter. Experts indicated that there should be similarities between officer’s
statements and BWC footage, but they would also expect variation, especially for high stress
incidents. They also mentioned that the time between an incident and report will influence the
degree of consistency and suggested that immediate recall would best preserve officer memory.
When determining whether inconsistencies between officer statements and BWC footage is a
result of officer deceit, experts indicated that what the differences are and the extent to which the
two differ are important to consider.
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Factor 2. Most expert responses suggested reasons for why officers should not review
their BWC footage before providing a statement. Experts suggested that officers may struggle to
recall information that is not visible in the video and that pre-report review may lead officers to
engage in cognitive offloading. They also mentioned that because of poor source monitoring,
officers would struggle to distinguish between details in the video from details from their own
memory. Some experts also suggested the pre-report review could reinforce officer credibility
because officers would have the opportunity to ensure their statements are consistent with the
footage.
Factor 3. Many expert respondents indicated that officer perception will differ from
objective reality and that the point of view of BWCs (being on an officer’s chest) may lead the
camera to fail to capture everything. In addition, experts mentioned that officers have access to
more than just visual cues, such as scent or feelings of force, which BWCs will fail to capture.
Factor 4. Expert respondents indicated that officers’ memories are unlikely to be more
accurate than the general population; however, their training may help them to remember what to
focus on. In addition, expert respondents indicated that stressful events are likely to alter officer
memory.
Law enforcement officers’ free response.
Factor 1. Law enforcement responses shared a few common themes. This participant
group indicated that both officer memory and the BWC footage should be considered to
determine whether officer’s use of force is appropriate, and although stress and trauma may
impact officer memory and BWCs may fail to capture the full scene, officer memory and BWC
footage should be similar. Moreover, they indicated that obtaining statements from involved
officers is important even when BWC footage is available because statements provide
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information about officers’ perception during the time of the event. Many law enforcement
officers indicated that reviewing BWC footage would help officers remember details of events
but would not alter their memories and that when BWC footage and officer statements differ,
legal decision-makers should consider the “totality of the circumstances.” For the item about
when officers should provide a statement, many respondents indicated that officers should have
24 to 48 hours following a critical incident before they describe details about what happened.
Factor 2. Reponses to Factor 2 items were mixed. Some respondents indicated that
reviewing BWC footage would alter officers’ perceptions for why they acted the way they did or
why they used force during incidents. Other law enforcement respondents, however, indicated
that officers should have full access to the footage of the cameras because they are required to
wear them and that BWCs are a tool, not an “oversight device.”
Factor 3. Law enforcement officers overwhelmingly agreed with this factor, citing that
BWCs have limited fields of view and lack context without a statement of what occurred. Law
enforcement officers also stated that the camera only considers audio and visual information,
might be covered or pointing in the wrong direction, or fall off of the officer’s uniform during an
altercation.
Factor 4. For Factor 4, many respondents indicated that officers’ memories for highly
stressful events may be less accurate because of “tunnel vision.” Responses to the items about
whether officers’ memories are better than the general public were mixed. Some respondents
indicated that officers’ memories would be better because paying attention to detail is a part of
their daily jobs, while others indicated that although they may be more observant, they would not
have a better memory than the general public.
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Lay adults’ free response.
Factor 1. For this Factor, lay adult respondents indicated that big differences between
BWC footage and officer statements is a sign of deceit, whereas, small differences between the
two are more expected. Moreover, most respondents indicated that officers should provide a
statement of what occurred as soon as safely possible so that officers’ memories do not fade.
Factor 2. The majority of lay adult respondents indicated that officers should have access
to their BWC footage so that it can help them remember details that they may not have noticed.
Factor 3. Examining lay adults’ responses to this factor revealed that many respondents
believed that BWC technology was imperfect. However, some respondents indicated that for the
most part, cameras should capture everything.
Factor 4. For this Factor, responses were mixed. Some lay adults indicated that officers
should have better memories, while others indicated that “people are people” and training will
not improve memory. Moreover, some respondents indicated that memories for stressful events
would be more accurate than less stressful events, while others indicated that memories for
stressful events would be less accurate.
Students’ free response.
Factor 1. Students’ responses stated the BWC footage would be more objective than
officer memory but when determining whether officer use of force is appropriate, it is important
to consider both an officer’s statement and what is shown in the BWC footage. For the item
about whether BWC footage should be similar to officer statements, responses were mixed.
Some students believed that they should be identical, while some students believed that there
might be small differences.
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Factor 2. Many student respondents indicated that pre-report review will allow
statements to be more accurate. However, some respondents indicated that pre-report review
could allow officers to change their statements so that they fit with what the videos show.
Factor 3. Student respondents indicated that although BWC footage may not show what
was on an officer’s mind, it will show whether an officer acted appropriately or inappropriately
and whether an officer used excessive force.
Factor 4. Most students indicated that memory ability is more about the brain than
specific training. Some respondents indicated that because stressful events are more important
and emotional, people will remember them more. In addition, they indicated that people’s
abilities to recall stressful events depend on the individual.
Percentage of the population that would agree with response. Table 16 demonstrates
that on average, lay adults reported the highest percentages of the population that would agree
with their responses to the 27 survey items, while experts reported the lowest percentages of the
population that would agree with their responses to the 27 survey items.
I conducted an ANOVA to examine whether on average (across all items) participants’
responses differed by respondent group. Table 17 shows a significant main effect of Participant
Type, and Table 18 shows that pairwise comparisons with Tukey correction revealed statistically
significant differences between each group’s responses. Thus, there is statistical evidence that lay
adults believed that their responses were more in line with the rest of the population than all
other respondent groups.
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Table 16
Respondents’ Responses to Percent of Population that Would Agree and Percentage of
Respondents who Believed Response was Based on Scientific Evidence

% of
Pop.

% Based
on
Science

1

49.54

68.85

Law Enforcement
Officers
%
% of
Based
Pop.
on
Science
61.35
17.07

2

47.64

78.69

61.42

3

37.92

85.25

4

38.49

5

Experts

Lay adults

Students

66.81

%
Based
on
Science
52.00

59.28

%
Based
on
Science
11.43

28.66

71.42

50.00

61.77

13.14

51.19

36.59

67.89

49.50

59.57

19.43

68.85

49.66

28.40

68.92

50.25

57.93

20.81

44.20

68.85

60.91

26.22

69.06

48.50

62.14

12.57

6

41.61

72.13

61.71

12.80

69.58

47.50

58.52

11.43

7

49.43

67.21

61.42

19.51

74.19

51.50

73.20

25.14

8

43.85

63.93

66.65

17.68

72.03

53.50

63.34

10.86

9

48.34

80.33

59.15

21.88

69.50

51.27

61.61

15.12

10

54.59

73.77

69.95

21.95

73.86

49.00

65.60

16.57

11

49.67

65.57

56.84

16.46

69.82

49.50

61.34

12.57

12

39.05

85.25

57.87

14.63

68.20

50.50

56.16

9.71

13

52.70

24.59

65.74

8.54

69.19

48.50

63.16

10.29

14

64.77

40.98

72.99

7.93

73.71

50.50

74.66

16.57

15

58.02

27.87

70.40

7.32

73.84

47.50

71.81

9.14

16

50.10

42.62

53.90

10.37

72.06

51.00

65.49

8.57

17

58.43

65.57

63.73

13.41

73.77

51.50

67.73

14.29

18

55.72

54.10

62.07

23.78

70.95

49.00

63.43

9.71

19

52.08

32.79

52.05

14.02

70.44

48.00

60.25

10.29

20

46.84

58.33

56.52

12.66

71.33

50.51

61.94

8.05

21

46.11

56.67

56.02

11.73

71.17

50.00

63.93

12.14

22

61.84

86.89

57.42

29.01

74.29

53.57

72.13

14.94

23

42.52

78.69

56.51

20.86

70.22

50.51

62.58

17.14

24

47.20

36.07

57.91

9.82

71.34

47.47

63.50

9.77

25

60.82

36.07

65.68

20.63

72.93

51.26

67.71

15.61

26

47.77

68.85

54.16

17.07

70.51

50.09

66.74

13.41

27

48.57

78.69

57.49

28.66

71.38

52.00

61.27

11.43

Avg.

49.55

60.80

60.03

18.08

71.05

50.00

63.96

13.14

% of
Pop.

% of
Pop.
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Note. Avg. = Average; Pop. = population

Table 17
ANOVA Results Using Percent of the Population that Would Agree with Participant Response
as the Criterion
Predictor
(Intercept)
Participant Type

Sum
of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

841725.90

1

841725.90

1728.70 < .001

172977.18

3

57659.06

118.42 < .001

110.67

1

110.67

0.23

3541.11

3

1180.37

2.42

Factor
Participant Type*Factor

F

p

2

2
partial η

partial η

90% CI
[LL, UL]

.03

[.02, .03]

.634

.00

[.00, .00]

.064

.00

[.00, .00]

Error 6715488.92 13792
486.91
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, respectively.

Table 18
Means, Standard Deviations, and d-values (with Confidence Intervals) for Percent of the
Population that Would Agree with Participant Response
Variable

M

SD

1

2

1. Experts

49.55

23.60

2. Law Enforcement Officers

60.03

25.24

0.44*
[0.37, 0.48]

3. Lay adults

71.05

18.83

1.06*
[1.00, 1.12]

0.50*
[0.46, 0.54]

4. Students

63.95

21.69

0.65*
[0.59, 0.71]

0.17*
[0.13, 0.21]

3

0.35*
[0.31, 0.39]

Note. M indicates mean. SD indicates standard deviation. d-values are estimates calculated using formulas 4.18 and
4.19 from Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein (2009).

Belief that response was based on scientific findings. When determining whether
participants believed that their responses were based on scientific evidence, Table 16 shows that
on average, experts had the most respondents who indicated that their responses were based on
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scientific evidence. Conversely, students had the fewest respondents who indicated their
responses were based on scientific evidence.
I conducted a logistic regression to determine whether the frequency of the number of yes
responses and no responses differed by participant group. The regression revealed a significant
main effect of Participant Type (see Table 19). Compared to experts, all other respondent groups
were less likely to indicate that their responses were based on scientific evidence. Interestingly,
however, the odds ratio between lay adults and experts was the smallest, suggesting that lay
adults responded more similarly to experts than students or law enforcement officers. This
finding is supported by the average response row in Table 16: across all items, experts indicated
that 60.80% of their responses were based on scientific evidence, and lay adults indicated that
50% of their responses were based on scientific evidence.
Table 19
Logistic Regression Results Using Belief that Response was Based on Scientific Evidence as the
Criterion
Predictor
Constant

B
-0.37

SE(B)
0.05

OR
0.68 [0.62, 0.76]

W
-7.406

p
<.001

Law enforcement officers

1.89

0.06

6.65 [5.87, 7.54]

29.72

<.001

Lay adults

0.37

0.05

1.44 [1.29, 1.61]

6.64

<.001

2.24

0.07

9.37 [8.24, 10.67]

33.93

<.001

Participant Type (Ref. = Expert)

Students
Note. Ref. = Reference

Summary
Four respondent groups, including experts, law enforcement officers, lay adults, and
students responded to 27-items about issues concerning pre-report review policies. An
exploratory factor analysis demonstrated that these 27-items mapped onto four discrete factors.
Factor 1 was associated with trust in BWC footage over officer memory and the belief that
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inconsistencies between the two forms of evidence are likely a result of officer deceit. Factor 2
was associated with general support of policies that allow pre-report review. Factor 3 was
associated with the potential for BWC footage to be inaccurate. Factor 4 was associated with the
belief that officer’s memories are more reliable than those of the general population. ANOVAs
demonstrated that agreement with these four factors differed by respondent group. For example,
lay adults agreed the most with Factor 1. Law enforcement officers and lay adults agreed the
most with Factor 2, while experts disagreed the most. Experts and law enforcement officers
responded similarly to Factor 3. Lay adults agreed the most with Factor 4. Overall, results
showed that in contrast to predictions, lay adults’ responses did not map onto law enforcement
officers’ responses. However, the prediction that law enforcement officers and lay adults would
be the least likely of the respondent groups to take issue with pre-report review was supported.
When examining lay adults’ and students’ demographic characteristics, regression
analyses demonstrated that identification with the police was a significant predictor for each
factor. For each factor, greater identification with the police predicted stronger agreement. These
results provide some support for the hypothesis that participants who more strongly identified
with police would respond more similarly to law enforcement officers. A positive relationship
between participant’s identification with the police and their responses to Factor 2 and 3
demonstrates that identification with the police led to greater alignment with law enforcement
officers’ responses. However, the positive relationship between participants’ identification with
the police and their responses to Factors 1 and 4 did not demonstrate the same alignment with
officer’s responses.
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Although not predicted a priori, when examining race, there was a significant difference
between White respondents and all other races for Factor 2. Compared to White respondents, all
other races agreed less strongly that officers should have access to their BWC footage.
Finally, participants’ responses to the exploratory questions about the percent of the
population that would agree with their response and whether their response was based on
scientific evidence also differed by group. Lay adults provided the highest percentages for the
question about the percent of the population that would agree with their response choice. For the
question about whether responses were based on scientific evidence, experts were more likely to
respond in the affirmative.
Study 2
Given that in Study 1 lay adults believed that inconsistencies between officer reports and
BWC footage are a sign of deceit, and they supported pre-report review, Study 2 experimentally
tested how people consider pre-report review policies when an officer’s report is consistent or
inconsistent with the BWC footage. To examine the effect (if any) that these factors have on
people’s trust in an officer’s statement, participants read experimentally manipulated vignettes.
The vignettes described an officer who non-fatally shot a civilian because he (the officer)
believed that the civilian was carrying a knife and was going to harm him. Participants learned
that the officer watched his BWC footage of the encounter before or after writing a report about
what occurred. Participants also learned that the officer’s report was consistent or inconsistent
with what was visible in the BWC footage (i.e., a knife was visible or was not visible in the
video). After reading the vignette, participants evaluated their trust in the officer’s report and the
accuracy of the report to describe what really happened, and they rendered punishment decisions
for the officer. Participants also evaluated their trust in the BWC footage, the accuracy of the
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BWC footage to show what really happened, and the accuracy of the BWC footage to show what
the officer saw. In addition, I measured the extent to which participants identified with the police
to determine whether identification with the police influenced participants’ ratings of the
officer’s report when it described a detail that was inconsistent with the BWC footage.
Method
Design. The design conformed to a 2 (BWC Footage Review: Pre-Report or After
Report) x 2 (Consistency: Report Consistent with BWC Footage vs. Report Inconsistent with
BWC Footage)9 full-factorial between-subject design. Participants randomly assigned to the
BWC Footage Review Pre-Report condition learned that the officer reviewed the BWC footage
before writing a report describing the incident. Conversely, participants randomly assigned to the
BWC Footage Review After Report condition learned that the officer reviewed the BWC footage
after providing a report describing the incident. Participants randomly assigned to the Report
Consistent with BWC Footage condition learned that the officer’s report was consistent with
what was visible in the BWC video; whereas, participants randomly assigned to the Report
Inconsistent with BWC Footage condition learned that the officer’s report was inconsistent with
what was visible in the BWC video. Thus, the design of this study resulted in four conditions that
enabled me to investigate whether lay adults are attuned to policy that prescribes officers to
review BWC footage before they write an incident report and whether people’s beliefs about prereport review policy shift as a function of the consistency between the BWC video and the
officer’s report.
9

To ensure adequate power to test my main research questions of interest, I changed the design from what I had
initially proposed. In the Participants section, I describe how 250 participants per condition is needed to obtain 89%
power to detect a small to medium interaction effect. In the original proposal, I had 32 conditions, which would
require 8,000 participants to test for interaction effects. Although I could have powered main effects, my proposed
manipulations were of interest only in the context of an interaction. So, I condensed my design to examine the most
important factors: pre-report review and consistency between the report and BWC, resulting in the current 2 x 2
design.
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Participants. MTurk Workers served as participants through the TurkPrime platform
(Litman et al., 2016). For a power analysis, I conducted a Monte Carlo simulation to determine
the number of participants needed to detect an interaction effect. This simulation demonstrated
that 250 participants per cell was sufficient to obtain 89% power to detect a medium-sized
interaction effect (f = .247).
The survey was available to MTurk Workers residing in the United States who had
previously completed 50 or more MTurk tasks with a 90% or greater approval. The average time
to complete the study was 19.20 minutes (median = 12.20 minutes), and the study had a 71%
completion rate and a 34% bounce rate (a metric used to determine the percentage of Workers
who viewed the study description but did not accept it). To ensure data quality, I used features to
block duplicate IP addresses, block suspicious geocode locations, and verify worker country
location.
A total of 1,756 MTurk Workers completed the study and received $1.00 for their time.
Of these participants, I excluded 384 because they had failed at least one of the two manipulation
checks (described below). The final dataset consisted of 1,372 participants and was 41.69%
female (57.87% male and 0.44% nonbinary). The sample had a mean age of 40.60 (SD = 13.19),
and 75.29% identified as White, 5.54% identified as Hispanic or Latino, 11.37% identified as
Black or African American, 5.69% identified as Asian, 0.29% identified as Hawaiian or Pacific
Islander, and 1.82% selected Other. Of the sample, 41.69% obtained a Bachelor’s degree,
29.15% completed high school, 15.73% obtained a Master’s degree or Ph.D., 12.68% obtained
an Associate’s degree, and 0.73% had not finished high school.
Measures. To ensure that the nuances of my dependent measures were clear to
participants, I bolded some aspects of the questions. Unless stated otherwise, participants
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responded to the dependent measures using a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7
(completely).
Trust in the officer’s report and BWC footage. Participants responded to two questions
to discern their trust in the officer’s report and BWC footage to describe the encounter: “How
much do you trust that the officer’s statement described what actually happened?” and “How
much do you trust that the body camera footage showed what actually happened?”
Accuracy of the officer’s report and BWC footage. Participants responded to two
questions to discern their beliefs that the BWC footage and officer’s report represented what the
officer saw happen: “To what extent does the officer’s statement match what the officer saw
happen?” and “To what extent does the body camera footage match what the officer saw
happen?” Participants also responded to two questions to determine their beliefs that the officer’s
report and BWC footage matched the encounter: “To what extent does the body camera footage
match the actual encounter?” and “To what extent does the officer’s statement match the
actual encounter?”
Extent that the officer’s report represents the officer’s experience. To understand the
extent to which participants believed that the officer was telling the truth, participants answered,
“To what extent do you think the officer is telling the truth about what he saw happen in the
encounter?” and “The officer said that the civilian looked like he was going to lunge at him. How
much do you believe that this is an accurate representation of what the officer experienced?”
In addition to these questions, participants in the Report Inconsistent with Video
condition “rank[ed] in order, the most likely reasons that the officer said that there was a knife
but no knife was visible in the video.” Specifically, participants rank ordered the following
reasons: “The officer is lying about what he saw”, “The officer thought he saw a knife”, “The
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officer incorrectly remembered seeing a knife”, and “The officer was correct about seeing a knife
but the knife wasn’t visible in the video (e.g., because of poor lighting, poor quality of the video,
or the angle of the recording, etc.).”
Officer punishment decisions. Participants responded to three questions about the
officer’s punishment. The first question, “To what extent do you agree with the following
statement? The officer should be charged and tried in Court for his actions in the encounter?”
had a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The next
question, “If the officer is put on trial for his actions in the encounter, should he be found
guilty?” had a dichotomous answer choice (yes vs. no). Finally, participants responded to the
question, “When making punishment decisions, which piece of evidence should jurors take into
consideration the most?” with “what the officer said happened” and “what the body camera
footage showed” as response choices.
Reasonableness of pre-report review policy. Depending on the pre-report review
condition, I asked participants to indicate, “How reasonable was it that the officer was [wasn’t]
able to review his body camera footage before writing his statement?” This was an exploratory
question designed to understand people’s opinions about the reasonableness of procedures that
allow officers to review the BWC footage.
Identification with police scale. See Study 1 for a description of the scale.
Manipulation checks. Participants responded to two manipulation checks—one
associated with each manipulation. The first manipulation check was, “Did the officer write his
statement first or watch the body camera video first?” and had he wrote his statement first, he
wrote his statement after, and not sure as answer choices. The second manipulation check was,
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“The officer said there was a knife. Was a knife visible in the video?” with answer choices yes,
no, and not sure.
Procedure. After consenting to participate, participants received instructions about the purpose
of the study and instructions about what they would be ask to do. Specifically, participants read:
In the information that follows, you will learn about a police-civilian interaction between
an officer named William O’Brian and a civilian named Ryan Perkins. You will read
background information about the encounter and then you will read the involved officer’s
statement describing the encounter. Your task is to carefully read all of the information
presented to you because you will later answer questions about the encounter and the
credibility of the officer’s statement. Finally, you will be asked what the legal outcomes
should be for the officer involved.
Next, participants received the Review manipulation. Participants randomly assigned to the BWC
Footage Review Pre-Report condition read:
On a summer night in a mid-sized city in the northeast of the United States, Officer
O’Brian encountered a civilian named Ryan Perkins. The encounter ended when the
officer non-fatally shot the civilian, Perkins, to arrest him. Per the department procedure,
officers who have engaged in any use of force are required to provide an account of the
encounter after they watch their body camera footage. On the following pages, you will
read the officer’s statement that he provided the night of the encounter, after he watched
his body camera footage.
Participants randomly assigned to the BWC Footage Review After Report read the same
description, but the underlined words stated “before.”
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After receiving the Review manipulation, all participants read the same police report that
described a non-fatal use of force in which an officer shot the civilian because he thought that the
civilian carrying a knife (see Appendix C for the full report). After reading the report,
participants received the Consistency manipulation. Participants randomly assigned to receive
the Report and BWC Footage Consistent condition read:
The Winston Police department reviewed Officer O'Brian's statement (which he
provided after [or before] he watched the body camera footage). In addition, the
department reviewed the body camera footage. In their review of the incident, the
department found that the officer’s statement was consistent with the body camera
footage: The officer’s statement said that he saw a knife, and a knife was visible in the
video.
Participants randomly assigned to the Report and BWC Footage Inconsistent condition read the
same description but the last sentence was changed to read, “In their review of the incident, the
department found that the officer’s statement was inconsistent with the body camera footage:
The officer’s statement said that he saw a knife, but no knife was visible in the video."
After reading this information, participants completed the dependent measures, answered
manipulation checks, responded to the identification with police scale, and provided
demographic information.
Hypotheses
H1. Overall, participants will trust the BWC footage more and provide higher accuracy
ratings for the BWC footage compared to the officer’s report.
H2. Trust in the officer’s report and ratings of report accuracy will depend on when the
officer reviewed the BWC footage. Participants who learn that the officer reviewed the BWC
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footage before writing his report will trust the officer’s report less and indicate that the report is
less accurate than participants who learn that the officer reviewed the BWC footage after writing
his report.
H3. Trust in the officer’s report, ratings of report accuracy, and officer punishment
decisions will depend on the consistency between the report and the BWC video. Participants
who learn that the officer’s report is consistent with the BWC footage will trust the officer’s
report more than participants who learn that the officer’s report is inconsistent with the BWC
footage. Participants in the Report Consistent with BWC Footage condition will also indicate
greater report accuracy and punish the officer less compared to participants in the Report
Inconsistent with BWC Footage condition.
H4. There will be an interaction between the Review manipulation and the Consistency
manipulation. Overall, participants will trust the officer’s report and the accuracy of the report
more when there is consistency between the BWC video and officer’s report compared to when
there is inconsistency between the BWC video and the officer’s report. However, trust in the
officer’s report and the accuracy of the report will be the highest when participants learn that
there is consistency between the report and video, and they learn that the officer wrote his report
before watching the BWC video. Although inconsistency between the officer’s report and BWC
video will result in participants providing lower trust ratings of the officer’s report and rating the
report as being more inaccurate, participants will be more trusting of the inconsistencies when
they learn that the officer reviewed the BWC footage before writing his report.
H5. There will be a statistically significant interaction between the Consistency
manipulation and participant’s identification with the police. Participants who more strongly
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identify with the police will trust the officer’s report and the accuracy of the report even when it
is inconsistent with the video.
Results
Ratings of trust in the BWC footage and the officer’s report as a function of Review
and Consistency. To examine participants’ trust in the BWC footage and the officer’s report, I
combined the two questions about trust in the BWC footage and in the officer’s report to
show/describe what actually happened to form a within-subject variable. I entered this withinsubject variable (Evidence Type: Report vs. Video) into a mixed ANOVA along with the
between-subject variables Review (Before vs. After) and Consistency (Consistent vs.
Inconsistent) to test whether these factors influenced participants’ responses. As shown in Table
20, the mixed ANOVA revealed a statistically significant main effect of Consistency, a
statistically significant main effect of Evidence Type, and a statistically significant interaction
between Consistency and Evidence Type. The main effect of Consistency showed that
participants reported higher trust ratings when the Report and Video were consistent than when
they were inconsistent (Mdiff = 1.31, p < .001, d = 0.92). The main effect of Evidence Type
showed that participants reported higher trust ratings for the video compared to the report (Mdiff =
1.28, p < .001, d = 0.71). The interaction demonstrated that the finding that participants indicated
greater trust in the BWC footage to show what really happened was exacerbated in the
Inconsistent condition (Mdiff = –2.17, p < .001, d = 1.11) compared to the Consistent condition
(Mdiff = –0.39, p < .001, d = 0.39).
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Table 20
ANOVA Results for Trust that the Report Described and the Video Showed What Really Happened

Predictor
(Intercept)
Review
Consistency
Evidence Type
Review x Consistency
Review x Evidence Type
Consistency x Evidence Type
Review x Consistency x
Evidence Type

dfNum
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

dfDen
1368
1368
1368
1368
1368
1368
1368

1 1368

SSNum
78931.70
1.75
1173.60
1114.74
1.77
0.86
543.23

SSDen
F
2312.36 46696.22
2312.36
1.04
2312.36
694.31
1593.07
957.25
2312.36
1.05
1593.07
0.74
1593.07
466.48

0.12 1593.07

0.10

p
.000
.309
.000
.000
.307
.391
.000

η2g
.95
.00
.23
.22
.00
.00
.12

.753

.00

Note. dfNum indicates degrees of freedom numerator. dfDen indicates degrees of freedom denominator.
SSNum indicates sum of squares numerator. SSDen indicates sum of squares denominator. η2g indicates
generalized eta-squared.

Ratings that the BWC footage and the officer’s report matched what the officer saw
happen as a function of Review and Consistency. I combined the two dependent measures
about the extent to which the BWC footage and officer’s report matched what the officer saw
happen to form a within-subject variable (Evidence Type: Report vs. Video). I entered this
within-subject variable into a mixed ANOVA along with the between-subject variables Review
(Before vs. After) and Consistency (Consistent vs. Inconsistent). The ANOVA results (in Table
21) revealed a statistically significant main effect of Consistency, a statistically significant main
effect of Evidence Type, and a statistically significant interaction between Consistency and
Evidence Type. The main effect of Consistency showed that participants reported higher
accuracy ratings when the evidence was consistent than when it was inconsistent (Mdiff = 2.39, p
< .001, d = 1.84). The main effect of Evidence Type showed that participants provided higher
ratings for the officer’s report compared to the BWC footage (Mdiff = 0.12, p < .001, d = 0.09).
Finally, the interaction revealed that in the Inconsistent condition, participants provided higher
ratings that the officer’s report matched what the officer saw happen (Mdiff = 0.36, p < .001, d =
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0.14); whereas, in the Consistent condition, participants provided higher ratings that the BWC
footage matched what the officer saw happen (Mdiff = –0.12, p = .007, d = 0.25).
Table 21
ANOVA Results for the Extent to Which the Evidence Matched What the Officer Saw Happen
Predictor
dfNum dfDen
SSNum
SSDen
F
p
(Intercept)
1
1368
64830.08 3634.25 24403.27 .000
Review
1
1368
0.67 3634.25
0.25
.614
Consistency
1
1368
3899.12 3634.25 1467.70
.000
Evidence Type
1
1368
9.69 917.74
14.44
.000
Review x Consistency
1
1368
6.12 3634.25
2.30
.129
Review x Evidence Type
1
1368
0.29 917.74
0.43
.512
Consistency x Evidence Type
1
1368
38.70 917.74
57.69
.000
Review x Consistency x
1
1368
0.27 917.74
0.40
.528
Evidence Type
Note. dfNum indicates degrees of freedom numerator. dfDen indicates degrees of freedom
denominator. SSNum indicates sum of squares numerator. SSDen indicates sum of squares
denominator. η2g indicates generalized eta-squared.

η2g
.93
.00
.46
.00
.00
.00
.01
.00

Comparison of ratings that the BWC footage and the officer’s report matched what
really happened as a function of Review and Consistency.
I combined the two dependent measures about the extent to which the BWC footage and
officer’s report matched what actually happened to create a within-subject variable (Evidence
Type: Report vs. Video). I entered this within-subject variable into a mixed ANOVA along with
the between-subject variables Review (Before vs. After) and Consistency (Consistent vs.
Inconsistent). Again, the ANOVA results (see Table 22) revealed a statistically significant main
effect of Consistency, a statistically significant main effect of Evidence Type, and a statistically
significant interaction between Consistency and Evidence Type. The main effect of Consistency
showed that participants provided higher ratings in the Consistent condition than the Inconsistent
condition (Mdiff = 2.02, p < .001, d = 1.47). The main effect of Evidence Type showed that
participants provided higher ratings for the BWC footage matching what really happened than
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the officer’s report (Mdiff = 0.54, p < .001, d = 0.34). Finally, the interaction demonstrated that
for the Consistent condition, there was no statistically significant difference between
participant’s ratings of the officer’s report and the BWC video (Mdiff = –0.02, p = .785, d = 0.02).
However, for the Inconsistent condition, participants provided higher ratings that the BWC
footage matched what really happened than the officer’s report (Mdiff = –1.07, p < .001, d =
0.55).
Table 22
ANOVA Results for the Extent to Which the Evidence Matched What Actually Happened
Predictor
dfNum dfDen
SSNum
SSDen
F
p
(Intercept)
1
1368
70555.30 3377.90 28573.88 .000
Review
1
1368
1.49 3377.90
0.60
.437
Consistency
1
1368
2801.08 3377.90 1134.40
.000
Evidence Type
1
1368
201.07 1451.24 189.54
.000
Review x Consistency
1
1368
4.30 3377.90
1.74
.187
Review x Evidence Type
1
1368
0.19 1451.24
0.18
.673
Consistency x Evidence Type
1
1368
190.11 1451.24 179.20
.000
Review x Consistency x
1
1368
0.94 1451.24
0.88
.347
Evidence Type
Note. dfNum indicates degrees of freedom numerator. dfDen indicates degrees of freedom
denominator. SSNum indicates sum of squares numerator. SSDen indicates sum of squares
denominator. η2g indicates generalized eta-squared.

η2g
.94
.00
.37
.04
.00
.00
.04
.00

Effect of Review, Consistency, and Identification with the Police Scale on officer
report ratings. Next, I conducted a series of regressions to determine whether Review,
Consistency, or participants’ identification with the police influenced ratings of the officer’s
report. Thus, these regressions included five predictors: Review, Consistency, identification with
police, the interaction between Review and Consistency, and the interaction between
Consistency and identification with police. These regression analyses examined the two Likertscale dependent measures about participants’ beliefs that the officer’s report was an accurate
representation of the officer’s experience, the dependent measure about participants’ trust that
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the officer’s report described what happened, the dependent measure about participants’ belief
that the officer’s report matched what the officer saw happen, and the dependent measure about
participants’ belief that the officer’s report matched what really happened.
The five regression analyses, shown in Tables 23-27, all follow a similar pattern, and all
have an R2 of 40% or greater. For each analysis, Consistency was a statistically significant
predictor, identification with the police was a statistically significant predictor, and the
interaction between Consistency and identification with the police was statistically significant.
Further, these statistically significant predictors were significant with a Bonferroni adjusted pvalue (p = .01).10
The results revealed that for each dependent variable, compared to participants in the
Consistent condition, participants in the Inconsistent condition provided less favorable ratings of
the officer’s report. Participants with greater identification in the police, however, provided more
favorable ratings of the officer’s report. Finally, the interaction revealed that participants who
more strongly identified with the police provided more favorable ratings of the officer’s report in
the Inconsistent condition than participants who less strongly identified with the police.

10

Despite the number of tests, I am confident that these results provide strong evidence for the significant effects
because a) the p-values are statistically significant with Bonferroni adjustment, b) lower p-values provide stronger
evidence that the null hypothesis is false than higher p values, especially in well-powered studies (Lakens & Evers,
2014), and c) each analysis revealed the same pattern of results.

82
Table 23
Regression Results for Trust that the Officer’s Report Described What Happened
Predictor

b

(Intercept)

3.69**

Review (ref. = Before)

0.05

Consistency (ref. = Consistent)

-2.94**

Identification with police

0.43**

Review*Consistency

0.00

Consistency* Identification
with Police

0.17**

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[3.31,
4.06]
[-0.13,
0.22]
[-3.47, 2.41]
[0.35,
0.50]
[-0.25,
0.25]
[0.07,
0.28]

sr2

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

.00

[-.00, .00]

.04

[.03, .05]

.04

[.03, .06]

.00

[-.00, .00]

.00

[-.00, .01]

Fit

R2 =
.545**
95%
CI[.51,.57]
Note. A significant b-weight indicates the semi-partial correlation is also significant. b represents
unstandardized regression weights. sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. LL and UL
indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively.
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.
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Table 24
Regression Results for Belief that the Officer Was Telling the Truth
Predictor

b

(Intercept)

3.98**

Review (ref. = Before)

0.06

Consistency (ref. = Consistent)

-3.06**

Identification with police

0.40**

Review*Consistency

0.05

Consistency* Identification
with Police

0.21**

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[3.57,
4.38]
[-0.13,
0.24]
[-3.63, 2.50]
[0.32,
0.48]
[-0.21,
0.31]
[0.10,
0.32]

sr2

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

.00

[-.00, .00]

.04

[.03, .06]

.04

[.02, .05]

.00

[-.00, .00]

.01

[-.00, .01]

Fit

R2 =
.494**
95%
CI[.46,.52]
Note. A significant b-weight indicates the semi-partial correlation is also significant. b represents
unstandardized regression weights. sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. LL and UL
indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively.
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.
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Table 25
Regression Results for Belief that the Officer Saw the Civilian Lunge at Him
Predictor

b

(Intercept)

3.29**

Review (ref. = Before)

0.06

Consistency (ref. = Consistent)
Identification with police
Review*Consistency
Consistency* Identification
with Police

-2.33**
0.47**
-0.01
0.19**

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[2.88,
3.71]
[-0.12,
0.25]
[-2.91, 1.75]
[0.39,
0.55]
[-0.28,
0.26]
[0.07,
0.30]

sr2

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

.00

[-.00, .00]

.03

[.01, .04]

.06

[.04, .08]

.00

[-.00, .00]

.00

[-.00, .01]

Fit

R2 =
.398**
95%
CI[.36,.43]
Note. A significant b-weight indicates the semi-partial correlation is also significant. b represents
unstandardized regression weights. sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. LL and UL
indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively.
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.
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Table 26
Regression Results for the Belief that the Officer’s Report Matched What the Officer Saw
Predictor

b

(Intercept)

4.22**

Review (ref. = Before)

0.04

Consistency (ref. = Consistent)
Identification with police
Review*Consistency
Consistency* Identification
with Police

-2.80**
0.35**
-0.12
0.16**

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[3.82,
4.63]
[-0.15,
0.22]
[-3.37, 2.24]
[0.28,
0.43]
[-0.38,
0.14]
[0.06,
0.27]

sr2

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

.00

[-.00, .00]

.04

[.02, .05]

.03

[.02, .04]

.00

[-.00, .00]

.00

[-.00, .01]

Fit

R2 =
.488**
95%
CI[.45,.52]
Note. A significant b-weight indicates the semi-partial correlation is also significant. b represents
unstandardized regression weights. sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. LL and UL
indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively.
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.
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Table 27
Regression Results for the Belief that the Officer’s Report Matched What Actually Happened
Predictor

b

(Intercept)

4.56**

Review (ref. = Before)

0.12

Consistency (ref. =
Consistent)
Identification with police
Review*Consistency
Consistency* Identification
with Police

-3.26**
0.29**
-0.13
0.18**

B
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[4.19,
4.92]
[-0.04,
0.29]
[-3.77, 2.75]
[0.22,
0.36]
[-0.37,
0.10]
[0.08,
0.27]

sr2

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

.00

[-.00, .00]

.05

[.03, .06]

.02

[.01, .03]

.00

[-.00, .00]

.00

[-.00, .01]

Fit

R2 = .600**
95% CI[.57,.62]
Note. A significant b-weight indicates the semi-partial correlation is also significant. b represents
unstandardized regression weights. sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. LL and UL
indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively.
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.
Effect of Review, Consistency, and dentification with the police on officer
punishment ratings and decisions. To determine whether Review, Consistency, or
identification with the police scores influenced participants’ agreement that the officer should be
charged and tried in Court for his actions or participants’ judgments of the officer’s guilt, I
conducted two regressions with same model as above.
First, for the question about participants’ agreement that the officer should be charged
and tried in Court, as shown in Table 28, the regression revealed a pattern of results similar to the
previous analyses: a statistically significant effect of Consistency, a statistically significant effect
of identification with the police, and a statistically significant interaction between Consistency
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and identification with the police. Compared to participants in the Consistent condition,
participants in the Inconsistent condition agreed more strongly that the officer should be tried in
Court for his actions, while participants with greater identification with the police agreed less
strongly. The interaction showed that in the Inconsistent condition, participants who more
strongly identified with the police agreed less strongly that the officer should be charged and
tried in Court than participants who less strongly identified with the police.
Table 28
Regression Results for the Belief that the Officer Should be Charged and Tried in Court
Predictor

b

(Intercept)

3.77**

Review (ref. = Before)
Consistency (ref. = Consistent)
Identification with police
Review*Consistency
Consistency*Identification with
Police

-0.16
2.59**
-0.21**
0.21
-0.27**

b
95% CI
[LL, UL]
[3.20,
4.33]
[-0.42,
0.09]
[1.79,
3.38]
[-0.32, 0.10]
[-0.16,
0.58]
[-0.42, 0.12]

2

sr

sr2
95% CI
[LL, UL]

.00

[-.00, .00]

.02

[.01, .04]

.01

[-.00, .02]

.00

[-.00, .00]

.01

[-.00, .01]

Fit

R2 =
.196**
95%
CI[.16,.23]
Note. A significant b-weight indicates the semi-partial correlation is also significant. b represents
unstandardized regression weights. sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. LL and UL
indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively.
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01
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For the question about participants’ guilt judgments, I performed a binomial logistic
regression. The regression results showed a statistically significant effect of Consistency and a
statistically significant interaction between Consistency and identification with the police. The
officer received higher odds of being found guilty in the Inconsistent condition compared to the
Consistent condition. However, the interaction effect showed that participants who more strongly
identified with the police reduced the odds that the officer should be punished in the Inconsistent
condition.
Table 29
Logistic Regression Results for Officer Guilt Decisions
Predictor
Constant
Review (ref. = Before)
Consistency (ref. = Consistent)
Identification with police
Review*Consistency
Consistency*Identification with
police

B

SE(B)

OR

W

p

–1.21

0.42

0.30 [0.13, 0.67]

–2.86

.004

–0.15

0.19

0.86 [0.58, 1.26]

–0.79

.429

4.63

0.59

102.06 [32.50, 333.56]

7.79

< .001

–0.04

0.08

0.96 [0.82, 1.13]

–0.52

.602

0.13

0.26

1.13 [0.69, 1.89]

0.50

.618

–0.70

0.12

0.50 [0.40, 0.62]

–6.04

< .001

Note. Ref. = Reference

Exploratory analyses.
Reasoning for inconsistency. I examined whether the order of participants’ reasoning for
why the officer saw a knife but no knife was visible in the video differed as a function of Review
with four chi-square analyses—one for each rank order. All four analyses resulted in p-values
that were greater than .28, and thus indicated no statistically significant relationship between
Review condition and rank order. Table 30 demonstrates participants’ ranking of the four
explanations that were provided to them and shows that approximately half of the sample
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indicated that the number one reason for the inconsistency between the BWC video and report
was because the officer thought he saw a knife. In comparison, the explanation with the largest
percentage receiving the last rank was, “The officer is lying about what he saw.”
Table 30
Percentage of Explanations for the Inconsistency per Ranking
Reasoning

Rank 1

Rank 2

Rank 3

Rank 4

The officer thought he saw a knife

51.98%

32.28%

12.83%

2.91%

19.97%

10.98%

20.63%

48.41%

7.14%

28.84%

45.50%

18.52%

20.90%

27.91%

21.03%

30.16%

The officer is lying about what he saw
The officer incorrectly remembered
seeing a knife
The officer was correct about seeing a
knife but the knife wasn’t visible in the
vide (e.g., because of poor lighting,
poor quality of the video, or the angle
of the recording, etc.).

Reasonableness of pre-report review policy. I ran an independent samples t-test to
determine whether participants indicated that it was more reasonable that the officer was able to
review the BWC footage before his report or whether they indicated that it was more reasonable
that the officer was not able to review the BWC footage before his report. The t-test was
statistically significant and showed that participants indicated that it was more reasonable that
the officer was able to engage in pre-report review (M = 6.08) than not engage in pre-report
review (M = 4.22; t(872.40) = –16.76, p < .001).
Evidence essential to determine punishment decisions. Overall, 86.59% thought it was
most important to have the BWC footage when jurors make punishment decisions. A logistic
regression showed (see Table 31) that identification with the police significantly predicted
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participants’ responses with participants who more strongly identified with the police being more
likely to indicate that the officer’s report is more important when determining punishment
decisions.
Table 31
Logistic Regression Results for Evidence that Jurors Should Consider Most
Predictor
Constant
Identification with police

B

SE(B) OR

W

p

4.86

0.45

129.37 [55.08, 321.80]

10.81

< .001

–0.58

0.08

0.56 [0.47, 0.65]

–7.09

< .001

Summary
Study 2 employed an experimental vignette design to determine whether participants’
trust and belief in the accuracy of BWC footage and an officer’s report shifted as a function of
pre-report review and the consistency of evidence. Results from this study provided evidence for
the prediction that compared to the officer’s report, participants would trust the BWC footage
more and believe that the BWC footage more accurately matches the event. Although not
predicted, differences between participants’ ratings of their trust in the BWC footage and the
accuracy of the BWC footage compared to their ratings of the officer’s report was dependent
upon the Consistency manipulation. When the officer’s report was consistent with the BWC
footage, participants’ ratings of the report were more similar to their ratings of the video than
when the officer’s report was inconsistent with the BWC footage.
In support of my predictions, participants’ ratings of the officer’s report and their
punishment decisions for the officer were dependent upon the consistency between the report
and the BWC video and participants’ identification with the police. Overall, participants
provided more favorable ratings of the officer’s report and were less likely to punish the officer
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when his report was consistent with the BWC video. This pattern held true for participants who
more strongly identified with the police. The significant interactions between Consistency and
identification with the police supported the prediction that some individuals would be more
tolerant of discrepancies between the officer’s report and BWC footage. Indeed, participants who
learned about the inconsistency and more strongly identified with the police rated the officer’s
report more favorably and punished the officer less than participants who also learned about the
inconsistency but less strongly identified with the police.
Finally, results did not support my prediction that pre-report review would influence
participants’ ratings of the officer’s report.
Study 3
Proponents of pre-report review state that review will enable officers to produce reports
that are more accurate and consistent with BWC footage. Proponents of pre-report review worry
that without review, officers will fail to provide accurate accounts of what occurred, and
potentially lead people to question the officers’ credibility (Miller et al., 2014). Certainly, results
from Study 2 support the idea that lay adults value consistency of evidence. Indeed, in Study 2,
the consistency manipulation impacted nearly every dependent variable, including people’s trust
in the officer’s report and their punishment decisions for the officer. However, the issue of prereport review encompasses more than accuracy and consistency of evidence. Legal guidelines
have established the importance of understanding what an officer felt in the moment of an event
to determine the reasonableness of the officer’s actions. Although policies that permit pre-report
review could enhance the consistency between officers’ statements and BWC footage, review
could also provide post-event information that differs from what officers experienced in the
event and thus alter officers’ memory. The goal of Study 3 then was to determine the extent to
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which pre-report review affects what people report in relation to what the video shows and to
examine how pre-report review impacts people’s perceptions of events. To test these questions, I
recruited participants to play a first-person shooter videogame, and I screen recorded their
gameplays for later review. Although all participants reviewed their screen captured gameplay, I
manipulated when they reviewed it in relation to when they answered questions about the
gameplay. By manipulating when participants reviewed their screen recording, I could examine
the effect that review had on participants’ memory and perception of the event. I also
manipulated whether knowledge of being recorded would influence the accuracy of participants’
responses. According to a study conducted by Kassin, Kukucka, Lawson, and DeCarlo (2017),
officers’ memory reporting errors regarding interrogation tactics were not random but were
dependent upon knowledge of recording. Importantly, inaccuracies in their reporting led to
mistaken observer impressions and inferences regarding the interrogation. Thus, I was interested
in examining whether participants who knew they were being recorded would be motivated to
respond more accurately. After all, research demonstrates that motivation enhances encoding
(Murty & Dickerson, 2017).
Method
Design. Study 3 employed a three-group design: Double Report and Informed of Screen
Recording, Double Report and Uninformed of Screen Recording, and Single Report and
Informed of Screen Recording (see Figure 4).11 Participants in either of the Double Report
conditions completed the dependent variables twice (before and after reviewing their gameplay),
11

The design of Study 1 differed from the dissertation proposal to more adequately examine the effect of pre-report
review. For example, a within-subject design was originally proposed, but a member of my committee after my
proposal defense drew attention to the fact that practice effects could limit my ability to detect memorial changes.
As a result, I changed the design to between-subject. Also, to examine the role of misinformation in a betweensubject design required a prohibitive sample size (N = 265) for one semester of data collection, so I instead tested
another important facet of pre-report review: motivation. That is, are people who know that they are being recorded
motivated to provide more accurate responses?
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while participants in the Single Report completed the dependent variables just once (only after
reviewing their gameplay). Of the Double Report participants, half were told that their gameplay
would be recorded (Informed), while half were uniformed that their gameplay would be recorded
(Uniformed). All participants randomly assigned to the Single Report condition were informed
that their gameplay would be recorded.

Figure 4
Three-Group Design

Participants. In total, 217 participants completed the experiment. I excluded nine
participants who experienced technical difficulties (i.e., the computer froze or the participant’s
gameplay failed to record). After these exclusions, there were data from 208 participants for
analyses. According to a G*Power analysis, a sample of 195 (or 65 per group) was necessary to
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detect an effect size of d = 0.50 with 80% power at an alpha-level of .05 for an independent
groups t-test. A sample size of 195 was also sufficient to detect an effect size of d = 0.50 with
80% power at an alpha-level of .05 for mixed ANOVAs and repeated measures t-tests. I selected
an effect size of Cohen’s d = 0.50 based on the a priori determination that a 1-point difference
(with a 2-point standard deviation) on a 7-point Likert scale was a meaningful difference for the
dependent variables of interest.
The study was titled “Decision-Making and Memory,” and participants recruited to
participate were students attending John Jay College who were at least 18 years old. I recruited
participants three different ways: a) through the John Jay College’s SONA system, b) through
flyers (see Appendix D) posted around John Jay College’s campus, and c) through research
assistants who asked students near the laboratory if they wanted to participate in a research
study. Participants recruited via SONA or via the flyers completed a screening questionnaire to
determine whether they had previously played the Grand Theft Auto 5 (GTA 5) Prologue.
Participants who had previously played the GTA 5 Prologue learned that they were ineligible to
select a timeslot to participate, while participants who had not previously played the GTA 5
Prologue learned that they were eligible to select a timeslot to participate. When research
assistants recruited participants who had not signed up via SONA or via the flyers, they asked
students whether they had ever played the GTA 5 Prologue Mission. Students who responded in
the affirmative learned that they were ineligible to participate in the study.
The study took approximately 45 minutes to complete, and participants recruited via
SONA received two course credits, and participants recruited via the flyers or via the research
assistants received $15. The mean participant age was 19.9912 (SD = 3.59), and 25.48%

12

Two participants did not provide information about their age.
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identified as male, 73.56% identified as female, 0.48% identified as nonbinary or Queer, and
0.48% indicated that they would rather not say. Of these participants, 30.37% identified as
White, 17.28% identified as Black or African American, 14.14% identified as Asian, 0.01%
identified as American Indian or Alaska Native, and 37.17% identified as Other. For educationlevel, 76.44% had obtained a high school diploma, 4.81% had obtained the equivalent to a high
school degree (e.g., GED), 11.54% had obtained an Associate’s degree, 3.37% had obtained a
Bachelor’s degree, 2.88% had obtained a Master’s degree, 0.48% had obtained a professional
degree, and 0.48% had obtained a Ph.D. On average, participants had played 2.91 (SD = 8.97)13
hours of videogames in past seven days and 7.21 (SD = 17.15) hours of videogames in the past
month. A majority of participants had previously played first-person shooter games (62.80%),
but 70.53% indicated that their videogame proficiency-level was at the beginner level, while
24.14% reported an intermediate proficiency-level, and 5.31% reported an advanced proficiencylevel.
Materials.
Videogame. Participants played the GTA 5 Prologue. I selected this mission for a number
of reasons. First, the Prologue is the first mission in GTA 5, and a result, the game provides
players with detailed instructions on the screen to successfully complete the mission. Further, the
Prologue is a single-player game that is the same for each player each time it is played. Finally, I
selected the Prologue because it is played from the first-person perspective.
The Prologue takes place in a cash storage facility and begins with the participant being
instructed to lock several hostages in a room. Next, the participant receives instructions to
detonate an explosive via a cellphone and, with his accomplices, steal money from the facility.

13

One participant did not provide a response.
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Then during the escape, the participant is held at gunpoint by a security guard. The participant
receives an instruction to switch players in order to shoot the security guard. After shooting the
security guard, the participant receives another instruction to detonate an explosive to open the
door to exit. Finally, when leaving the storage facility, the participant is swarmed by local law
enforcement officers and a shootout ensues. Each participant spent approximately 35 seconds in
the shootout before a research assistant ended the game.
Failing the mission. Because some participants were inexperienced at playing
videogames, there were participants who failed the mission. They either failed the mission
because they shot the wrong person when they received the instruction to shoot the security
guard, or because they were shot at excessively during the shootout scene. For participants who
failed the mission, the Prologue restarted where they left off, just before the failure. There were
77 (37.02%) participants who failed the mission, and 131 participants who did not fail the
mission. Of the participants who failed the mission, 22.71% failed one time, 22.71% failed two
times, 0.97% failed three times, 1.45% failed four times, and 1.45% failed five times.
Double Report Time 1 Questionnaire. Only Double Report, Informed (n = 71) and
Double Report, Uniformed (n = 67) received this questionnaire.
Recall Task. The recall task had a total of 12 questions. Eight were open-ended questions
that asked participants to provide numerical information about their gameplay. These questions
included, “How many hostages were there?” and “How many times did you reload your gun?”
One question asked participants to describe what one of the characters in the mission was
wearing. Two questions asked participants, “Who fired the first shot?” and “Who fired the last
shot?” For each of these questions, participants selected “me” or “the police.” Finally,
participants responded to the question, “How confident are you in the overall accuracy of your
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memory for this mission?” on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all confident) to 7 (extremely
confident) with a midpoint of somewhat confident. See Appendix E for the Recall Task.
Sequence Task. The Sequence Task asked participants to label eight tasks from the
videogame mission with a number corresponding to the order in which it was completed. The
first task (“Went to the guard”) and the last task (“Shot at the police officers”) were completed
for each participant. See Appendix F for the Sequence Task.
Rating Task. The Rating Task instructed participants to rate the stressfulness of each task
described in the Sequence Task. For the Rating Task, participants received the instruction,
“When considering the stressfulness of each task, think about each task as if you were in the
mission completing it, rather than the stress that you may have experienced as a result of trying
to understand how to complete the mission.” The Rating Task was on a Likert scale with one
labeled not at all stressful, four labeled somewhat stressful, and seven labeled extremely
stressful. See Appendix G for the Rating Task.
Experience Task. The Experience Task consisted of eight questions designed to test
participants’ perception of the mission and perception of their memory accuracy. There were five
questions related to participants’ perception of the mission, including, “How guilty did you feel
in shooting the guard?”, “How quickly did time feel like it was moving during the mission?”, and
“How intense was the shootout with the police?” Participants responded to these questions using
7-point Likert scales, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).
The three questions related to memory performance included, “How accurate is your
recollection of the mission?” (1 = not at all accurate, 4 = somewhat accurate, and 7 = extremely
accurate). I included two questions from Rubin, Schrauf, and Greenberg’s (2003)
Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire. These questions were, “To what extent is your
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memory of the mission distorted by your beliefs, motives, and expectations rather than an
accurate reflection of the event as a neutral observer would report it?” using a scale 1 (100%
distorted) to 7 (100% accurate), and “If another witness to the event, who you generally trusted,
existed and told you a very different account of the event, to what extent could you be persuaded
that your memory was wrong?” using a scale where 1 = not at all, 2 = in some details, 5 = in
some main points, and 7 = completely. See Appendix H for the Experience Task.
Additional questions. The final three questions asked participants about the stress they
experienced playing the GTA 5 Prologue Mission, how engaged they were while completing the
mission, and how motivated they were to complete mission. Participants responded to these
questions using 7-point Likert scales, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).
Double Report Time 2 Questionnaire. Only Double Report, Informed (n = 71) and
Double Report, Uniformed (n = 67) received this questionnaire.
The Double Report Time 2 Questionnaire was identical to Double Report Time 1
Questionnaire except for a few differences. First, participants received the instruction, “When
answering these questions, think back to when you were playing the mission, not when you
reviewed the mission.” Second, participants responded to an additional question: “How similar
do you think your responses to this questionnaire are to your responses to the first
questionnaire?” using a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (not at all similar) to 7 (extremely
similar) with a midpoint of somewhat similar.
Participants also provided demographic information, including their age, gender,
race/ethnicity, and education-level. Participants indicated how many hours of videogames they
played in the past seven days and in the last month. Participants indicated whether they
previously played first-person shooter video games and if yes, how many hours they played in
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the past seven days and how many hours in the past month. Finally, participants responded to the
question, “What is your proficiency-level in playing videogames?” with the following response
options beginner, intermediate, and advanced.
Single Report Time 1 Questionnaire. Only participants in the Single Report condition (n
= 70) received this questionnaire.
The Single Report Questionnaire was identical to the Double Report Time 2
Questionnaire except that participants did not respond to the question, “How similar do you think
your responses to this questionnaire are to your responses to the first questionnaire?”
Procedure. When a participant (recruited via SONA or via the flyers) entered the
laboratory, a research assistant confirmed that they had completed the screening questionnaire.
When a participant indicated they that had not already completed the screening questionnaire, the
research assistant verbally asked whether they had previously played the Prologue Mission of
GTA 5. A participant who indicated that they had previously played the videogame was told that
they were ineligible to participate. All other participants (i.e., individuals who completed the
screening questionnaire prior to arriving at the laboratory and individuals who indicated that they
had not previously played the videogame) received the consent form. After a participant
provided consent, the research assistant began reading aloud from the research script (see
Appendices I, J, and K for the scripts per experimental condition).
The script described the purpose of the study, stating that the study was designed to test
intelligence by examining one’s ability to understand and recall information and that in order to
examine one’s ability to understand and recall information, participants would complete a
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videogame task and then answer questions about the task.14 The script also described the
videogame task stating, “In the videogame mission, you will play the role of a criminal who is
robbing a storage facility. You will have to steal money from the facility and escape the police
without being harmed.”
Critically, the script read aloud to participants randomly assigned to the Double Report,
Informed condition and the Single Report condition explained that their gameplay would be
screen recorded to better assess their response accuracy and thus determine their ability to
understand and recall information. This instruction specifically stated:
Then after you complete the mission, you are going to answer specific questions about
what you did in the mission that will test your ability to understand and recall
information. Importantly, I will be screen recording your gameplay to this laptop (point
to laptop). By recording your gameplay, I will be able to determine your ability to recall
information and recall it accurately. Therefore, while completing the mission, you should
try to remember everything that happens as accurately as possible.
Participants randomly assigned to the Double Report, Uniformed condition only received part of
this instruction: “Then after you complete the mission, you are going to answer specific
questions about what you did in the mission that will test your ability to understand and recall
information.”
Next, the script instructed participants about the videogame task and the eight buttons
that were essential for completing the mission. Finally, participants received a brief recap of the
instructions and an informal quiz on the functions of the eight different buttons. Then, the

14

Although this instruction was not described in the proposal, I added it to enhance participants’ motivations to
accurately remember their gameplay. This goal of this instruction was to model the motivation that police officers
experience to accurately recall critical incidents.
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research assistant turned on the game and told the participant, “It will take a minute or two to
load. Then the game will begin” and gave the participant a set of headphones to wear. After
loading the game for the participant, the research assistant began screen recording the videogame
on a nearby laptop.
After the participant completed the videogame, the research assistant provided the
participant with a 5-minute line maze drawing delay task with the instruction, “Now I’d like you
to complete this next task. In this task, you will complete line mazes. Enter the maze at the top
arrow and try to exit the maze at the bottom arrow. I’ll let you know when it’s time to move on.”
The instructions participants received after this first delay task differed depending on
their experimental condition.
Double Report Participants. After completing the first line maze delay task, participants
in either of the Double Report conditions completed the Time 1 Double Report Questionnaire.
Next, participants completed a second 5-minute line tracing maze delay task, and then they
reviewed the screen capture of their gameplay.
For Double Report, Informed participants, the research assistant said “As I mentioned
earlier, while you were playing the mission, I screen recorded it to this laptop. So, I have a copy
of your gameplay, and now I’d like you to watch it.” For Double Report, Uninformed
participants, the research assistant said, “As you were playing the mission, I actually screen
recorded it to this laptop. So, I have a copy of your gameplay, and now I’d like you to watch it.”
For all participants, before the research assistant pressed play and allowed the participant to
watch their gameplay, the research assistant said, “Please watch your gameplay carefully because
after watching your gameplay, you will answer questions about it.”
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After reviewing the screen recorded gameplay, participants completed a third 5-minute
line maze task, and then they completed the Time 2 Double Report Questionnaire.
Finally, participants were thanked, debriefed, and compensated.
Single Report Participants. After completing the first line maze delay task, participants
in the Single Report condition received an instruction identical to the participants in the Double
Report, Informed condition: “As I mentioned earlier, while you were playing the mission, I
screen recorded it to this laptop. So, I have a copy of your gameplay, and now I’d like you to
watch it.” Before pressing play and allowing the participant to watch their gameplay, the
research assistant said, “Please watch your gameplay carefully because after watching your
gameplay, you will answer questions about the mission.”
After reviewing the screen recorded gameplay, participants completed a second 5-minute
line maze task, and then they completed the Single Report Questionnaire.
Finally, participants were thanked, debriefed, and compensated.
Preparation of Data for Analysis
Correct Response to the Recall Task Questions. To determine the accuracy of
participants’ responses to the numerical free response questions in the Recall Task, research
assistants watched participants’ screen recorded gameplays and coded for the correct response.
Because of difficulty accurately counting the number of shots, research assistants did not code
how many shots a participant fired or how many shots were fired at the participant. Thus, raters
coded seven questions from the Recall Task: number of hostages, number of times the
participant reloaded their weapon, number of police cars at the final scene, number of police
officers at the final scene, length of gameplay, who fired the first shot, and who fired the last
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shot. In the following section, I refer to the actual number as determined by research assistants’
coding of the screen recordings as the “Correct Response.”
Sequence Task Score. To determine the accuracy of participants’ responses to the
Sequence Task, I counted the number of tasks labeled in the correct order. Thus, the Sequence
Task Score ranged from zero to six. A score of zero indicated that a participant did not label any
of the tasks in the correct order, while a score of six indicated that a participant labeled all of the
tasks in the correct order.
Rating Task Score. To determine participants’ overall ratings of the stressfulness of the
mission, I created a composite Rating Task Score for each participant by averaging participants’
responses to the eight Rating Score questions. Scores ranged from 1 to 7 with higher scores
indicating that a participant experienced more stress while completing the tasks in the Prologue
mission.
Hypotheses
H1. Because of the research on motivational encoding, I hypothesized that participants
who are informed of the screen capture will report responses to the Recall Task questions that
differ from participants who are not informed of the screen capture.
H1a. Participants who are informed of the recording will provide responses that are more
accurate. Thus, for the Recall Task questions with Correct Responses, participants who are
informed of the recording will provide responses at Time 1 that are more similar to the Correct
Response than participants who are not informed of the recording.
H1b. Because I predict that participants who are informed of the recording will have
responses that are more accurate at Time 1, I also predict that their responses will differ less
before and after reviewing the gameplay. As a result, participants from who are informed of the
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recording will have responses that differ less between Time 1 and Time 2 than participants who
are not informed of the recording.
H2. Participants who are informed of the screen capture will respond more accurately to
the Sequence Task at Time 1 compared to participants who are not informed of the screen
capture.
H2a. Participants who are informed of the screen capture will have scores associated with
the Sequence Task at Time 1 that differ from Time 2 to a smaller degree than participants who
were not informed of the recording.
H3. Because I predicted that the knowledge of recoding manipulation would impact
encoding, participants who are informed of the screen capture recording will not have responses
to the Rating Task and the Experience Task that are statistically significantly different from
participants who are uninformed of the screen capture.
H4. For the Rating Task and the Experience Task, both participants who are informed of
the screen capture and participants who are uniformed of the screen capture will provide
responses at Time 1 that are statistically significantly different from responses at Time 2—in
other words, participants’ perceptions of their gameplay will differ pre- and post-review of their
screen capture.
H4a. If participants are motivated to view their behavior as justified, then participants
may view the scene as more dangerous post-review compared to pre-review of the gameplay.
H5. I hypothesized that participants who review their gameplay before responding to the
questionnaire will respond differently to the Recall Task questions than participants who review
their gameplay after responding to the questionnaire.
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H5a. For the Recall Task questions with Correct Responses, participants who review
their gameplay will provide responses at Time 1 that are more similar to the Correct Response
than participants who do not review their gameplay.
H5b. For the Recall Task questions without Correct Reponses, participants who review
their gameplay before responding to the questionnaire will respond differently than participants
who review their gameplay after responding to the questionnaire.
H6. Participants who review their gameplay before Time 1 will complete the Sequence
Task compared to participants who review their gameplay after Time 1.
H7. For the Rating Task and Experience Task, participants who review their gameplay
before responding to Time 1 will have responses that differ from participants who review their
gameplay after responding to Time 1.
Results15
I conducted a series of mixed ANOVAs and independent t-tests to examine the effect of
knowledge of recording and timing of review on participants’ responses to the dependent
variables.
Comparisons between Recording Informed and Recording Uninformed
Participants. These comparisons were conducted to determine whether participants who were
aware of their gameplay being screen recording responded differently than participants who were
unaware of the gameplay being screen recording.
Examination of Before Review Responses, After Review Responses, and Correct
Responses as a function of Knowledge of Recording. For these analyses, I conducted mixed

15

The analyses in the Results section differ from the dissertation proposal. When possible, I conducted mixed
ANOVAs to capture the differences in participants’ responses over time and as they related to the correct response
demonstrated by the screen capture, while also capturing differences between groups.
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ANOVAs with Response Type (Before Review, After Review, and Correct Response) the
within-subject variable and Knowledge of Recording (Yes vs. No) the between-subject variable.
The dependent measures were participants’ responses to the five Recall Task questions where
Correct Responses could be obtained from the screen recordings.
The analyses revealed statistically significant main effects of Response Type on number
of hostages, number of reloads, number of police cars, and length of mission, but not for number
of officers (see Table 32). For number of hostages and number of reloads, pairwise comparisons
with Tukey correction showed statistically significant differences between Before Review, After
Review, and the Correct Response. For these dependent variables, although responses After
Review were more in line with the Correct Response, they were still statistically significantly
different from one another. For questions about the number of police cars and length of mission,
pairwise comparisons with Tukey correction showed statistically significant differences between
Before Review Responses and the Correct Response. Thus, for these two dependent variables,
After Review Responses were not statistically significantly different from Before Review
Responses or the Correct Response.
The Knowledge of Recording variable did not produce a statistically significant main
effect for any of the dependent variables, and there were no statistically significant interactions
between Response Type and Knowledge of Recording.
For the questions about who fired the first shot and who fired the last shot, an
examination of the frequency of participants’ responses revealed that Before Review, 51.45%
indicated that they fired the first shot, while After Review, 49.28% indicated that they fired the
first shot. In reality—according to the participants’ screen capture, only 14.60% of participants
fired the first shot. Before Review, 50% of participants indicated that they fired the last shot, and
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After Review, 40.58% indicated that they fired the last shot. In comparison, participants’ screen
captures showed that 45.26% fired the last shot.
Table 32
Mixed ANOVA Results, Means, and Cohen’s d’s Examining Participants’ Responses Pre- and
Post-Review in Comparison to the Correct Response as a Function of Knowledge of Recording
Dependent
Variable

Knowledge
of
Recording
F value
(p value)

Response
Type
F value
(p value)

Mean
Response
Type:
Before
Review
(SE)

Mean
Response
Type:
After
Review
(SE)

Mean
Response
Type:
Correct
Response
(SE)

22.98
(<.001)

Knowledge
of
Recording*
Response
Type
F value
(p value)
0.65
(.521)

Number of
Hostages

0.45
(.504)

3.50
(0.05)a

3.77
(0.05)b

4.00
(0.05)c

Number of
Reloads

0.04
(.837)

12.20
(<.001)

0.85
(.430)

1.32
(0.13)a

1.25
(0.13)b

0.66
(0.13)c

Number of
Police
Cars

3.32
(.071)

4.43
(.013)

0.19
(.824)

3.32
(0.08)a

3.20
(0.08)

3.04
(0.08)b

Number of
Officers

1.08
(.300)

0.78
(.459)

1.08
(.341)

6.37
(0.20)

6.28
(0.20)

6.56
(0.20)

Length of
Mission
(s)

0.19
(.663)

8.03
(< .001)

0.66
(.518)

367
(15.50)a

338
(15.50)

305
(15.50)b

Before
Review
vs.
After
Review
Cohen’s
d
0.27

Before
Review
vs.
Correct
Cohen’s d

After
Review
vs.
Correct
Cohen’s
d

0.53

0.39

0.04

0.33

0.50

0.23

0.31

Note. Rows with differing subscripts represent pairwise comparisons with Tukey correction that
were less than < .05.
Examination of Before Review responses and After Review Responses as a function of
Knowledge of Recording. For these analyses, I conducted mixed ANOVAs with Response Type
(Before Review, After Review) the within-subject variable and Knowledge of Recording (Yes
vs. No) the between-subject variable. These mixed ANOVAs examined participants’ responses
to the remaining Recall Task items where no Correct Response was possible to obtain from the
screen recordings. These analyses also included participants’ Sequence Task Scores,
participants’ Rating Task Scores, and participants’ responses to the Experience Task items (see
Table 33).
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Recall Task. A statistically significant main effect of Response Type appeared for the
question about confidence in recall accuracy. A pairwise comparison showed that participants
reported that they were more confident in their recall accuracy After Review than Before
Review.
Rating Task Score. There were no statistically significant effects for the Rating Task
Score.
Experience Task. For the Experience Task, there were statistically significant main
effects of Response Type for the question about intensity of the shootout and for the question
about participants’ beliefs in the accuracy of their recollection. Pairwise comparisons showed
that participants reported that the shootout was more intense After Review than Before Review.
Pairwise comparisons for accuracy of recollection showed that participants thought they were
more accurate After Review compared to Before Review. Finally, there was a significant main
effect of Knowledge of Recording on the question about participant engagement. Participants
who were informed that their gameplay would be screen recorded reported a higher level of
engagement than participants who were uniformed that their gameplay would be screen
recorded.
Exploratory analysis. For the question about how similar participants in the withinsubject design thought their responses to the Time 2 questionnaire were to the Time 1
questionnaire, participants’ responses hovered near the midpoint (somewhat similar) with a mean
of 4.24 (SD = 1.13). An independent t-test showed that participants’ responses to this question
differed by the Knowledge of Review manipulation with participants informed of the recording
reporting more similarity (M = 4.24) between their reports than participants uninformed of the
recording (M = 1.49; t(188.93) = 26.15, p < .001).
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Table 33
Mixed ANOVA Results, Means, and Cohen’s d’s Examining Participants’ Responses Pre- and
Post-Review as a Function of Knowledge of Recording
Knowledge
of
Recording
F value
(p value)

Response
Type
F value
(p value)

Knowledge of
Recording*Response
Type
F value
(p value)

Number of
Shots Fired
by
Participant

2.79
(.097)

0.07
(.793)

0.02
(.889)

Number of
Officers
Who Shot at
Participant

0.07
(.403)

1.73
(0.190)

2.60
(.109)

Shots in
Total Fired
at
Participant

2.45
(.120)

0.96
(.330)

0.70
(.405)

Confidence
in Accuracy
to Recall
Questions

0.26
(.614)

51.47
(<.001)

Sequence
Task Score

0.58
(.449)

Rating Task
Score

Mean
Knowledge
of
Recording:
Yes
(SE)

Mean
Knowledge
of
Recording:
No
(SE)

Mean
Response
Type:
Before
(SE)

Mean
Response
Type:
After
(SE)

0.00
(0.95)

3.67
(0.09)

4.25
(0.09)

0.61

26.34
(<.001)

0.36
(.549)

3.72
(0.17)

4.71
(0.17)

0.44

0.14
(.709)

1.10
(.295)

0.01
(.916)

0.00
(0.950)

1.0
(.320)

0.00
(0.976)

Guilt from
Shooting
Guard

0.05
(0.817)

1.35
(.248)

1.35
(.248)

Intensity of
Shootout

0.15
(.702)

13.80
(<.001)

0.02
(.880)

5.21
(0.14)

5.52
(0.14)

0.32

Likelihood
of Being
Shot

2.01
(.159)

1.80
(.182)

0.00
(.969)

Time
Movement

2.57
(0.11)

0.38
(.536)

0.06
(.802)

Accuracy of
Recollection

0.00
(.948)

15.28
(<.001)

0.73
(.393)

3.90
(0.10)

4.24
(0.10)

0.33

Dependent
Variable

Likelihood
Guard
Would
Shoot

Cohen’s
d
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Knowledge
of
Recording
F value
(p value)

Response
Type
F value
(p value)

Knowledge of
Recording*Response
Type
F value
(p value)

Memory
Distortion

0.00
(.964)

0.68
(.412)

0.44
(.507)

Memory
Persuasion

0.28
(.600)

1.47
(.228)

1.47
(.228)

Stress
Playing
Mission

0.17
(.678)

3.36
(.069)

0.07
(.800)

Motivation

2.98
(.087)

0.65
(.421)

0.34
(.559)

Engagement

5.34
(.022)

0.00
(.951)

1.88
(.172)

Dependent
Variable

Mean
Response
Type:
Before
(SE)

Mean
Response
Type:
After
(SE)

Mean
Knowledge
of
Recording:
Yes
(SE)

Mean
Knowledge
of
Recording:
No
(SE)

5.97
(0.16)

5.59
(0.16)

Cohen’s
d

0.37

Comparison of Double Report and Single Report Participants. I conducted these
comparisons to determine whether pre-report review influenced participant’s responses. For
these analyses, I compared responses from participants who engaged in pre-report review to
participants who did not engage in pre-report review. In other words, I compared Single Report
participants to Double Report participants (combined across the Knowledge of Recording
manipulation).
Examination of Time 1 Responses and Actual as a function of review. I conducted
mixed ANOVAs with Response Type (Time 1 vs. Correct Response) the within-subject variable
and Review (Before Review [Double Report responses] vs. After Review [Single Report
responses]) the between-subject variable. These mixed ANOVAs examined participants’
responses to the five Recall Task questions where it was possible to obtain the Correct Response
determined by the screen recording. These analyses show statistically significant main effects of
Response Type on the questions about the number of reloads, the number of police cars, and the
length of the mission. For each of these measures, participants’ responses at Time 1 statistically
significantly differed from the Correct Response (see Table 34).
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In addition, there was a statistically significant main effect of Review and a statistically
significant interaction between Type of Response and Review for the question about the number
of hostages. The main effect of Review demonstrated that participants who engaged in pre-report
review provided responses that were statistically significantly different from participants who did
not engage in pre-report review. The statistically significant interaction between the two factors
demonstrated that participants who engaged in pre-report review (i.e., Single Report participants)
reported a mean number of hostages that was not statistically significantly different from the
Correct Response (Mdiff = 0.17, p = .109, d = 0.43). Conversely, participants who did not engage
in pre-report review (i.e., Double Report participants) reported a number of hostages that was
statistically significantly different from the Correct Response (Mdiff = 0.5, p < .001, d = 0.53).
For the questions about who fired the first shot and who fired the last shot, I compared
participants’ responses at Time 1 to the Correct Response. At Time 1, 51.92% indicated that they
fired the first shot, while 17.87% of participants actually fired the first shot according to the
screen capture. At Time 1, 50.72% of participants indicated that they fired the last shot, while
48.86% of participants fired the last shot according to their screen recording.
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Table 34
Mixed ANOVA Results, Means, and Cohen’s d’s Examining Participants’ Responses in
Comparison to the Correct Response as a Function of Knowledge of Recording and Pre-Report
Review
Review
F value
(p
value)

Response
Type
F value
(p value)

Review*
Response
Type
F value
(p value)

Mean of
Response
Type:
Time 1
(SE)

Number of
Hostages

6.47
(.012)

26.72
(<.001)

6.47
(.012)

3.64
(.05)

Mean of
Response
Type:
Correct
Response
(SE)
3.97
(.05)

Number of
Reloads

0.19
(.660)

25.01
(<.001)

0.44
(.504)

1.40
(.12)

0.63
(.12)

0.35

Number of
Police Cars

0.67
(.414)

6.11
(.014)

0.65
(.422)

3.26
(.06)

3.04
(.06)

0.20

Number of
Officers

0.10
(.752)

0.35
(.556)

2.15
(.145)

Length of
Mission (s)

0.03
(.870)

8.47
(.004)

0.48
(.487)

362
(12.6)

312
(12.6)

0.23

Dependent
Variable

Mean of
Review:
Before
(SE)

Mean of
Review:
After
(SE)

3.89
(.05)

3.72
(.05)

Review
Cohen’s
d

Response
Type
Cohen’s
d

0.35

0.43

Examination of Time 1 Responses as a function of Review. For these analyses, I
conducted independent t-tests to compare the responses of participants who engaged in prereport review (Single Report) to the responses of participants who did not engage in pre-report
review (Double Report). These tests examined participants’ responses to the remaining Recall
Task items where no Correct Response was possible to obtain from the screen recordings. They
also included participants’ Sequence Task Scores, participants’ Rating Task Scores, and
participants’ responses to the Experience Task items (see Table 35).
Recall Task. For the Recall Task, participants’ responses were not statistically
significantly different dependent on whether (or not) they engaged in pre-report review.
Sequence Task Score. For the Sequence Task, there was a statistically significant main
effect of Review. Participants who engaged in pre-report review reported more sequences tasks
in the correct order than participants who did not engage in pre-report review.
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Rating Task Score. For the Rating Task, there were no statistically significant differences
between participants who engaged in pre-report review and participants who did not.
Experience Task. The only statistically significant difference in responses as a function of
pre-report review was for the question about memory persuasion. Participants who engaged in
pre-report review reported that their memory of the mission would be more persuaded by another
person than participants who did not engage in pre-report review.
Table 35
Independent T-test Results, Means, and Cohen’s d’s Examining the Effect of Pre-Report Review
on Participant’s Responses
Mean of Review:
Before
(SD)
33.86 (95.84)

Mean of Review:
After
(SD)
17.65 (29.36)

Number of Officers Who Shot
at Participant

3.22 (2.90)

2.99 (2.10)

0.66 (.512)

Shots in Total Fired at
Participant

9.26 (9.67)

7.80 (11.44)

0.89 (.375)

Confidence in Accuracy to
Recall Questions

3.67 (1.02)

3.67 (1.00)

0.03 (.974)

Sequence Task Score

4.51 (1.86)

3.73 (2.06)

2.67 (.008)

Rating Task Score

3.38 (1.20)

3.29 (1.24)

0.51 (.612)

Likelihood Guard Would
Shoot

3.49 (1.96)

3.47 (1.93)

0.05 (.969)

Guilt from Shooting Guard

3.73 (2.08)

3.64 (2.14)

0.29 (.770)

Likelihood of Being Shot

5.57 (1.68)

5.88 (1.55)

–1.33 (.183)

Time Movement

5.27 (1.66)

5.41 (1.61)

–0.56 (.575)

Accuracy of Recollection

4.16 (1.12)

3.90 (1.13)

1.56 (.120)

Memory Distortion*

4.31 (1.51)

4.17 (1.23)

0.67 (.502)

Memory Persuasion

3.21 (1.14)

3.56 (1.06)

–2.15 (.032)

Stress Playing

4.33 (1.74)

4.50 (1.72)

–0.69 (.490)

Dependent
Variable
Number of Shots Fired
by Participant

t-value (p-value)

Cohen’s
d

1.80 (.073)

0.39

0.32
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Mean of Review:
Before
(SD)

Mean of Review:
After
(SD)

t-value (p-value)

Motivation

5.46 (1.39)

5.75 (1.38)

–1.45 (.149)

Engagement

5.63 (1.14)

5.75 (1.19)

–0.72 (.475)

Dependent
Variable

Cohen’s
d

Mission

* Conducted Welch’s t-test because Levene’s test of homogeneity was < .05
Summary
Results from Study 3 provide some support for my hypotheses. Namely, there was
support for the prediction that participants who engaged in pre-report review would respond
more accurately. However, although participants’ responses after review were more similar to
the Correct Response, many of these responses did not perfectly match the screen recording. For
example, after review, participants correctly labeled more tasks in the Sequence Task, but the
mean number of correct tasks was 4.71. (A perfect score would have been 6.)
There was little support for my hypothesis that being informed of the screen capture recording
would influence participants’ responses—with the only exception being participants’ responses
to the question about engagement while playing the mission. There was also little support for my
hypothesis that review would influence participants’ responses about their perceptions of the
event—with the only exception being participants’ responses to the question about the intensity
of the shootout. Moreover, participants who responded to the dependent measures both before
and after review (i.e., the within-subject design) indicated that they were more confident in their
accuracy of their memories after review. However, these results were not replicated in the
between-subject analysis, suggesting that the difference in participants’ beliefs about their
memory performance was a result of practice effects rather than an effect of review.
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General Discussion
BWCs have been widely implemented across the United States as a panacea—a tool to
increase police transparency and accountability, curb unlawful actions, enhance evidence to
prosecute crimes, and improve community trust in the police. Problematically, however, the
research needed to determine whether the evidence supports these extensive claims has been
incommensurate. Rather, people’s belief in the idea that a camera would have objectively and
neutrally showed what occurred on the night of Michael Brown’s death led people to support
BWCs and spend millions of dollars to fund pilot programs (Aton, 2016; Nunes, 2016; Sanburn,
2014; Smith, 2019). Indeed, the rhetoric surrounding BWCs—the strong belief that they are the
solution to combating all future incidents of police misconduct—has been described as a
potential moral panic or at the least a disproportionate response (Wasserman, 2014). To ensure
that BWCs adequately address the problem and meet people’s expectations, there must be a
recognition of the limitations of BWCs and a consideration of the policies surrounding the use
and employment of BWCs. The overarching goal of the three studies described in this
dissertation was to address one complex BWC policy—when officers should review their BWC
footage. These studies were designed to examine stakeholders’ beliefs about pre-report review
policy, the effect that pre-report review and evidence consistency have on people’s willingness to
trust officer incident reports, and the consequences of pre-report review on memory and
perception.
Study 1 Conclusions
Study 1 employed a survey design that consisted of 27-items general items about prereport review. These items were designed to also explore stakeholders’ (including experts, law
enforcement officers, lay adults, and college students) beliefs about officer memory ability, the
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evidence strength of officer incident reports in comparison to BWC footage, and inconsistencies
between officer incident reports and BWC footage. I conducted a factor analysis that categorized
the 27-items into four distinct factors: belief in BWC footage more than officer reports and that
inconsistencies between the two forms of evidence are a sign of deceit, support of pre-report
review policies, belief that BWC footage can be incomplete, and expectation that officer memory
is better than that of the general population.
I conducted analyses to examine whether the four stakeholder groups’ responses to the
factors differed from one another. Results from the analyses provided mixed support for my
hypotheses. For example, based on findings from a previous survey (Akhtar et al., 2018), I
hypothesized that lay adults’ responses would align more with law enforcement officers’
responses than experts’ responses. This hypothesis was unsupported for three of the four factors.
Only the factor about acceptance of pre-report review policies—Factor 2—revealed similar
responses between lay adults and law enforcement officers. Indeed, in support of another
hypothesis, both lay adults and law enforcement officers were in the strongest agreement that
officers should have access to the BWC footage before they provide incident statements. In
contrast, experts disagreed the most strongly with pre-report review practices.
For Factor 1 (belief in BWC footage more than officer reports and that inconsistencies
are a sign of deceit), lay adults agreed the most strongly, and their responses significantly
differed from both experts’ and law enforcement officers’ (who disagreed the most strongly)
responses. Interestingly, students’ responses did not significantly differ from experts’ responses.
For Factor 3 (belief that BWCs are sometimes inaccurate), law enforcement officers agreed the
most strongly, and their responses were significantly different from lay adults’ responses.
Finally, for Factor 4 (expectation that officer memory ability is better than the general
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population), lay adults were in the strongest agreement, and their responses significantly differed
from law enforcement officers’ responses.
I also hypothesized that participants who more strongly identified with police and
participants who were more politically conservative would agree more strongly that officer’s
incident reports are more important than BWC footage when examining use of force incidents—
a belief that mapped onto Factor 1. Regression results with Factor 1 as the dependent variable
revealed support for the hypothesis concerning the latter group: participants who were more
politically conservative agreed less strongly with Factor 1. However, regression results showed
that the former group—participants who identified with police—agreed more strongly with
Factor 1. There are a few potential explanations for this unexpected result. For one, it is possible
that when forced to decide whether to rely on BWC footage or an officer’s report following use
of force incidents, even people who identify with police want access to BWC footage. Another
explanation is that participants who identified with police may have more strongly agreed with
Factor 1 items that encompassed trust in officer memories for incidents, such as “Officer
memories for incidents should be similar to body worn camera video recorded during the
incident,” and this contributed to the overall positive relationship.
Participants who more strongly agreed with police also more strongly agreed with each of
the remaining factors: support of pre-report review policies, potential inaccuracy of BWC
footage, and the reliability of officer memory. These findings are unsurprising; however, there is
an interesting caveat: Participants who strongly identified with police agreed more strongly that
officer memory is better than the general population (Factor 4). Recall, lay adult respondents as a
whole also agreed more strongly with this Factor than law enforcement officers. In this case,
then, identification with police did not predict alignment of beliefs between law enforcement
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officers and the lay adults who identified with them. This result runs contrary to the expectation
that lay adults and law enforcement officers beliefs would align (Akhtar et al., 2018).
In the context of inconsistencies between officer reports and BWC footage, people who
identify with the police and consequently have the highest expectations of officer memory
performance could be more likely to assume that inconsistencies between an officer’s report and
BWC footage are indications of deceit—an additional explanation for the positive relationship
between Factor 1 and identification with police. Alternatively, to make sense of inconsistencies,
people who identify strongly with the police—and likely want to see officers in a positive light—
may be motivated to alter their attitudes about the evidence strength of BWC footage (Elliot &
Devine, 1994; Festinger, 1957). Indeed, in support of this hypothesis, a regression analysis
showed that participants who more strongly identified with the police also more strongly agreed
that BWCs can be fallible (Factor 3).
Finally, although not predicted a priori, race was a significant predictor of participant’s
agreement with pre-report review practices: participants who identified as non-White less
strongly agreed with pre-report review practices than participants who identified as White. That
race predicted people’s support of pre-report review policies aligns with the survey conducted by
the Cato Institute in 2016, and it is particularly problematic. BWCs were implemented to assuage
people’s—especially communities of color—mistrust of law enforcement officers. If a majority
of police departments implement a policy with which communities of color disagree, then
BWCs may fail to build that trust (Center for Policing Equity, 2018).
In addition, although the two additional questions for each item were exploratory, they
revealed interesting results. The first question, “What percentage of the population would agree
with your response?” showed that across the 27-items, lay adults provided the highest
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percentages. On average, lay adults believed that the majority of the population would agree with
how they responded, despite the fact that their responses to each Factor differed from the other
participant groups’ responses. This finding aligns with the well-studied false consensus effect or
the idea that people perceive their choices as relatively common (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977).
Finally, responses to the question, “Is your response based on scientific peer-reviewed
evidence?” revealed that experts were the most likely to respond in the affirmative. The odds
ratio comparing lay adults’ responses to experts’ responses was 1.44, indicating that lay adults
were only slightly more likely to report that their responses were not based on scientific evidence
than experts.
Lay adults indicated that others would share the same conclusions as them and that their
responses were based on scientific evidence. These results suggest that when considering their
beliefs about pre-report review, lay adults responded with naïve realism or the belief that their
views are without bias (Robinson, Keltner, Ward, & Ross, 1995; Ward, Ross, Reed, Turiel, &
Brown, 1997). As a result, lay adults may believe that people who hold differing views are
biased (Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002). Naïve realism could also induce false polarization and lead
lay adults to overestimate the differences between themselves and people who hold differing
views and lead to the belief that those with differing views have beliefs that are more extreme
(Monin & Norton, 2003; Robinson et al. 1995).
There are a number of issues to consider when investigating people’s beliefs about prereport review policy. These include an examination of people’s beliefs about officer memory, the
fallibility of BWC footage, the strength of BWC footage as it compares to officers’ reports, and
inconsistencies between reports and videos. If I had examined law enforcement officers’ beliefs
and lay adults’ beliefs merely about pre-report review policy, I would have concluded that these
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two groups share similar beliefs. Although these two groups (with the exception of people of
color) share similar beliefs about access to pre-report review, this would have been an erroneous
conclusion because for every other factor these two groups diverged. Compared to law
enforcement officers, lay adults more strongly agreed that officers have a better memory ability
than the rest of the population, and they more strongly agreed that the BWC footage is more
important than officers’ reports and that discrepancies between the two are a sign of deceit.
These findings suggest that although lay adults expect that officer memory is less fallible
than other people without law enforcement training (Jones et al., 2018) lay adults believe that
BWC footage is more important than officers’ reports. As a result, people may trust BWC
footage more than officers’ reports because they believe that BWC footage will more objectively
show what happened compared to an officer’s account who could be motivated to lie. Lay adults
then might not take issue with pre-report review because they believe that BWC footage is a
superior form of evidence that should be relied upon the most and because they believe that
officer memory for events will not differ from what the cameras show.
What is interesting, however, is that lay adults appear to believe that inconsistencies are
diagnostic of officer deceit; yet, they do not consider that officers who review their footage could
produce reports that replicate what the BWC footage shows. Given this context, lay adults are
likely to believe that officer memory for events will be identical to what BWC videos show and
as a result, the only plausible explanation for discrepancies between the two is officer dishonesty,
rather than more benign memory errors.
Taken together, officers appear to hold a special status. Lay adults believe in officers’
memory abilities more than those of the general population. Consequently, however, when
officer memory is inconsistent with other evidence, people more strongly believe this is because
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of a motivation to lie, rather than a memory error. Unfortunately, these lay beliefs are likely to
have negative consequences for the outcome of cases when officers are on trial. Indeed, these
findings align with decades of research demonstrating that lay beliefs about memory do not
reference the psychological literature (Simons & Chabris, 2011).
It is worth noting, however, that this special status attributed to officers was not shared by
experts or students as indicated by their response patterns to the four factors. For example,
experts and students disagreed the most with pre-report review practices and disagreed the most
that officers would have better memories compared to others without law enforcement training.
In addition, aligning more closely with law enforcement officers’ responses, experts and students
more strongly agreed that BWC footage can be fallible, less strongly agreed that BWC footage is
more important than officer’s reports, and less strongly agreed that discrepancies between the
two are a sign of deceit.
Limitations and future directions. Although this survey provides insight into people’s
beliefs on a range of issues surrounding officer access to BWC footage, there are several
limitations. One limitation is the listwise case deletion of missing data that was necessary to
conduct the factor analysis. Because “I don’t know” is not a factorable response, I treated these
responses as missing, which excluded a large number of participants who otherwise provided
valid data. To rectify this issue, I conducted a second factor analysis using a dataset where for “I
don’t know” responses, I inserted the median response of each respondent group. This factor
analysis produced factors that did not map on well to discrete factors, and I had no reason to
expect that—without the option to respond “I don’t know”— participants who responded “I
don’t know” would have provided responses that were equal to the median. Thus, for the
purposes of the results, I focused on the factor analysis using listwise case deletion dataset.
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Despite the listwise case deletion, the sample was nonetheless adequate for a factor analysis (de
Winter, Dodou, & Wieringa, 2009; Mundfrom, Shaw, & Ke, 2005).
In addition, the exclusion of participants who responded “I don’t know” was a limitation
for the analyses that I conducted to examine the differences in responding by participant group
and by the participant group’s demographic characteristics. As a result, I was limited in the
analyses I could conduct to examine how various demographic characteristics predicted
responses. The limited sample size was particularly an issue for the expert sample, which only
had 61 valid responses before the listwise case deletion. With the listwise case deletion, there
were 23 responses for the ANOVA tests and pairwise comparisons.
Another limitation of this study was the recruitment criteria for experts and law
enforcement officers. Given constrained time and resources, I included in the sample experts
who had obtained their Bachelor’s degree and specialized in psychology and law topics in
addition to memory. I also included in the sample law enforcement officers who were not
currently active police officers and law enforcement officers who did not have BWCs employed
in their departments. As a result, the participants in this sample might have failed to represent the
beliefs of experts with more experience examining memory and the beliefs of police officers who
actively use BWC technology. Moreover, all participants were recruited through convenience
sampling, and a result, statements about differences as a function of social group membership are
limited in this quasi-experimental design.
Research should further examine the potential consequences of the “special status” that
lay adults attribute to officers. Although the belief that officer memory will outperform other
people’s memory on its face seems to be a positive attribution, there can be negative
consequences of this unrealistic expectation, such as the assumption that officer memory should
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perfectly match BWC footage and that a mismatch is a result of a coverup or lie. Research
should also examine how this issue might be addressed in practice, through for example expert
testimony or jury instructions. Yet, some research examining jury instructions for eyewitness
testimony has shown that they do not enhance evidence evaluation (Dillon, Jones, Bergold, Huo,
& Penrod, 2017).
Study 2 Conclusions
Study 2 extended the results of Study 1 by experimentally manipulating the consistency
between an officer’s incident report and the BWC footage, as well as, the department’s prereport review policy. Participants learned about a police-civilian encounter that resulted in a nonfatal use of force, and they read the officer’s report that stated that he (the officer) feared for his
life because he believed that the civilian was carrying a knife. Some participants learned that a
knife was visible in the BWC footage, while some participants learned that a knife was not
visible in the BWC footage. Further, some participants learned that the department policy
required the officer to write his incident report before reviewing the BWC footage, while some
participants learned that the department policy required the officer to write his incident report
after reviewing the BWC footage.
Broadly, the results supported my hypotheses. There was an exception, however.
Contrary to hypotheses, the timing of when the officer wrote the report (before or after reviewing
the BWC footage) failed to significantly affect participants’ responses as a main effect or in an
interaction effect. One explanation for the null interaction effect between the Review and
Consistency manipulations that I had hypothesized could be a consequence of the sample size.
The true interaction effect could be smaller than I had hypothesized (f = .247) and as a result, the
analysis would have been underpowered to detect it. There is also an alternative explanation:
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because the vignette stated that the officer was following procedure when he reviewed the BWC
footage before/after producing his statement, participants may not have altered how they viewed
the individual officer. Had the vignette stated that the officer himself chose to watch the video
before producing his incident report, then participants might have intuited that he was motivated
to engage in pre-report review to ensure that his report matched the video. In this hypothetical
scenario, the pre-report review manipulation may have produced a significant effect, with
participants reducing their trust in the officer’s report to describe what really happened and their
belief that the officer was telling the truth. However, there are two problems with this scenario.
For one, it fails to replicate the real issue: pre-report review is a department policy, rather than a
discretionary decision made by an individual officer (Police BWCs: A Policy Scorecard, 2017).
Moreover, it is plausible that even if pre-report review was a decision made on behalf of
individual officers, people would still not alter their beliefs about the officer’s report. Indeed, the
results from Study 1 suggest that most lay adults do not take issue with pre-report review
practices—a belief that experts did not share.
In support of another prediction and replicating results from Study 1, participants
generally rated the BWC footage more favorably than the officer’s report. Participants indicated
greater trust in the BWC footage and indicated that the BWC footage would more accurately
show what happened than the officer’s report. However, participants indicated that the officer’s
report would more accurately describe what the officer saw happen than the BWC footage,
suggesting that people believed that the officer’s report would provide insight into the officer’s
experience. However, there is a caveat to these results: Participants’ responses to these questions
were dependent upon the consistency between the officer’s report and the BWC footage. When
the officer’s report was consistent with the BWC video (i.e., the officer saw a knife and a knife
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was visible in the video), participants’ ratings of the officer’s report and the BWC footage were
more similar. This result suggests that when the consistency of the evidence is not in question,
people trust that officer memory is similar to BWC footage—a finding that is consistent with
previous literature (Jones et al., 2018) and with Study 1. This result also provides further
evidence for why people do not take issue with pre-report review. If people believe that officer
memory (and as a result, officer reports) and BWC footage are one in the same, they may fail to
consider that reviewing BWC footage could introduce new or conflicting information. Taken
together, it appears that lay adults have a limited understanding of the relevant issues and
limitations of BWC footage, and this pattern is similar to lay adults’ poor understanding of other
forensic evidence, such as their overestimation of the reliability of eyewitness evidence (Granot
et al., 2018).
When there was an inconsistency between the officer’s report and the BWC footage (i.e.,
the officer saw a knife but a knife was not visible in the video), the differences between
participant’s ratings of the BWC footage and the officer’s report were exacerbated. Participants
trusted the BWC footage more and indicated that the BWC footage would more accurately depict
what happened than the officer’s report. Interestingly, participants also rated the BWC footage as
more accurately depicting what the officer saw happen. Recall, that when the evidence was
consistent, participants rated the officer’s report as more accurately describing what the officer
saw happen. These results conform to the eyewitness literature that shows that people rely on
statement consistency as an indicator of statement accuracy (Brewer, Potter, Fisher, Bond, &
Luszcz, 1999). These results also suggest that when inconsistencies between BWC footage and
officer reports arise, people will trust the BWC footage more than an officer’s report to
accurately depict an event. An alternative explanation, however, is that because the paradigm
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stated, “The report was consistent/inconsistent with what the video showed,” it implied to
participants differences in veracity. Put differently, the paradigm could have conveyed the
message that the BWC is correct because the report did not corroborate the BWC footage. Thus,
it would be interesting to test whether participants’ judgments of the veracity of each form of
evidence would replicate if they did not learn about the consistency of the evidence.
What is particularly interesting about these results, however, is that participants did not
view the BWC video nor did they receive a description of the contents or the quality of the
video. Participants merely learned that a knife was or was not visible and that this detail was
consistent or inconsistent with what the officer said he saw. Thus, participants formed their
ratings of the BWC footage based solely on their belief that the BWC footage would provide
accurate information about the incident. This finding aligns with the belief that video footage
will more accurately and neutrally represent events compared to other types of evidence (Granot,
Balcetis, Feigenson, & Tyler, 2018). Indeed, Granot et al. (2018) describe how characteristics of
videos—that they are emotionally arousing and vivid (Bell & Loftus, 1985)—offer people the
sense that they are viewing the evidence directly and objectively (Feigenson & Spiesel, 2009).
Consequently, this seemingly direct access to the evidence means that people who view video
evidence may fail to consider information outside of the frame or how their beliefs shape their
interpretations. This is a problematic result; as illustrated in my introduction, it is well
documented that people’s visual experiences and interpretations of visual information are not
objective, but rather influenced by context information, camera perspective, social identities, and
people’s expectations influence how they see visual information.
It appears, however, that participants were unwilling to extend the same trust in their own
visual experience to the officer’s visual experience—at least when his report described a detail
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that was not visible in the video. Consistent with the results Study 1, these results indicate that
participants may have believed that the inconsistency was an indication that the officer had acted
inappropriately and was motivated to lie to justify his actions. In light of this hypothesis,
participants who learned about the inconsistency thought that the officer was being less truthful
than participants who did not learn about the inconsistency and were willing to punish the officer
more.
Yet, when participants who were randomly assigned to the Inconsistent condition ranked
their explanations for the inconsistency, the number one explanation was that the officer thought
he saw a knife; the explanation receiving the most responses for the last rank order was that the
officer was lying. These results suggest that when comparing the effect of consistency of
evidence, inconsistent evidence will lead to a stronger belief that the officer is being dishonest,
but when examining only participants who learned about the inconsistency, participants seemed
to give the officer the benefit of the doubt. An alternative explanation, however, for the results of
the rank order question is that participants believed that this question was an attention check and
consequently responded in a manner that was consistent with the text in the vignette, which
stated, “The officer thought he saw a knife.” Thus, future research should further explore the role
that inconsistencies play when people evaluate the evidentiary strength of human accounts of
critical incidents and video footage. Would an inconsistent statement produced by an uninvolved
eyewitness or inconsistencies that are irrelevant to the officer’s actions (e.g., an inaccurate
description of the suspect’s clothing) yield similar results as the ones produced here? Will people
always trust that BWC footage is more accurate when there are inconsistencies, or does the type
of inconsistency or who articulates the inconsistency matter?
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Providing support for another hypothesis, results demonstrated that some participants—
namely, individuals who more strongly identified with the police—were more tolerant of the
inconsistency between the officer’s report and BWC footage than other participants. Participants’
ratings of the officer’s report, including trust in the report, belief in the accuracy of the report to
describe what happened and what the officer saw happen, and belief in the extent to which the
report accurately represented the officer’s experience, depended upon the consistency of the
evidence and participant’s identification with the police. For each of these dependent variables,
participants provided more favorable responses of the officer’s report when it was consistent
(compared to inconsistent) with what was visible in BWC video and when participants more
strongly identified with the police. The interaction effect showed that participants who more
strongly identified with the police provided more favorable ratings of the officer’s report when
they learned about the inconsistency compared to participants who less strongly identified with
police. This finding is consistent with the extant literature showing that identification with police
impacts how people evaluate evidence (Granot et al., 2014; Jones et al., 2017; Jones et al., 2018;
Jones et al., 2020; Sommers, 2015).
Finally, as predicted, participants’ punishment decisions were dependent upon the
consistency of the evidence and their identification with the police. Significant interaction effects
showed that when the report was inconsistent with the video, participants who more strongly
identified with the police believed more in the innocence of the officer and thought the officer
should be punished less. In the exploratory question that examined people’s beliefs about the
evidence that jurors should consider when they make punishment decisions, participants
indicated that there should be a greater reliance on the BWC footage compared to the officer’s
report—again showing the persuasiveness of visual information extends to the criminal justice
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system (Dunn, Salovey, & Feigenson, 2006; Feigenson & Spiesel, 2009). This result also calls
into question whether people are aware of the fact that judgments about the reasonableness of
use of force are often determined by what an officer knew and felt in the moment of a critical
incident (Graham v. Connor, 1989). It is unlikely that BWC footage will ever supply that critical
information.
Study 2 supports the idea that pre-report review is not of concern for lay adults and
underscores the importance of perceived consistency between an officer’s report and BWC
footage. The consistency of the evidence impacted nearly every dependent measure with
discrepancies between the officer’s report and BWC footage resulting in participants rating the
BWC footage more favorably, the officer’s report less favorably, and the officer guilty. Similar
to Study 1, these results provide evidence that people attribute an ostensibly positive
characteristic to officers—that their memory ability is better than others. Yet, this unrealistic
attribution can have negative consequences: When officers make memory errors (and extant
research suggests that they will) people may be less willing to attribute these errors to memory
fallibility (Hope et al., 2016; McClure, 2019).
In addition, building upon results from Study 1, participants in Study 2 failed to consider
the effect that pre-report review would have on the consistency of officer reports. Considering
people’s beliefs in officer memory abilities, this finding provides evidence that people think that
officer memory and BWC footage will be one in the same. For if people believe that BWC
footage will replicate officer memory, then they are unlikely to think that reviewing BWC
footage will introduce new information or information that differs from the officer’s experience.
Limitations and future directions. As this is the first experimental design to test
people’s beliefs about an officer’s statement that is consistent or inconsistent with what the BWC
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footage shows, there are limitations that should be considered, many of which provide a
foundation for future research directions. One limitation is that participants did not actually
watch a BWC video or receive details about the content or quality of the video. Yet, despite this
limitation, the absence of the video provided insight into how people deem the strength of visual
information. Without seeing the BWC video, participants rated the BWC as more accurately
reflecting the encounter than the officer’s report—a finding that was exacerbated when the
officer’s report was inconsistent with what the video showed. Future research could show
participants BWC footage and manipulate the extent to which the officer’s report matches the
footage. Results from Jones et al. (2017) suggest that when an officer’s report provides details
that are not visible in the BWC footage, people do not interpret these differences as evidence of
inconsistencies. Rather, people rely on the officer’s report to make sense of what the BWC
footage shows, particularly when the BWC footage is ambiguous. Moreover, there is some
evidence to suggest, that people would mistake the source of the details, and thus misremember
inaccurate details described in the officer’s report as being shown in the BWC footage (Jones,
Crozier, Merriwether, & Strange, in prep).
In addition, there are many more factors that future research should address to better
understand the relationship between people’s trust in visual evidence versus trust in a first-hand
account. As described earlier, research should manipulate the type and source of the
inconsistency. For example, how might people’s perceptions of a detail that contradicts what the
BWC footage shows (e.g., the officer thought the civilian was carrying a gun, but it was really a
wallet) differ from a detail that is correct about the presence of a weapon but wrong in specific
details (e.g., the officer thought a civilian was carrying an axe but it was really a hammer)?
Further, how might inconsistencies that are irrelevant to the officer’s actions or motivations (e.g.,
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the officer though the civilian was wearing a black shirt but it was white) shape people’s trust in
the officer’s credibility and their trust in his report? Future research should also examine the
source of an inconsistency as it relates to their influence in the legal system. How do people
perceive an uninvolved, neutral bystander’s statement that is inconsistent with the BWC footage?
Addressing these questions will help to understand whether people will always rely more heavily
on BWC footage than a first-hand account or whether the type and source of the inconsistency
matters in people’s appraisals of the evidence. Because memories do not work like a video
camera (Loftus & Palmer, 1974) and eyewitness testimony is fallible (Pezdek, 2012), it is likely
that people will trust that a video recording will more accurately show what happened than an
eyewitness account. Moreover, because people have lower expectations of lay memory
compared to officer memory, inconsistencies may have a smaller impact on people’s perceptions
of the credibility of a statement from a neutral eyewitness.
Finally, because stress is shown to inhibit memory performance, research should examine
whether the stress of the police encounter impacts people’s responses. For example, it would be
of interest to know whether people are more willing to perceive inconsistencies as memory errors
when the officer was engaged in a more stressful scenario, compared to a less stressful scenario.
In addition, future research should explore whether a warning, explaining that memory is
malleable, would result in people being more tolerant of discrepancies between what an officer
says happened and what the BWC footage shows.
Study 3 Conclusions
The goal of Study 3 was to determine the effect that review has on people’s memory and
perceptions of events. As the first study of its kind, Study 3 employed a student sample who
completed a complex videogame, involving interactions with hostages, stealing cash from a
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facility, and engaging in a shootout. Importantly, each participant’s gameplay was screen
recorded for subsequent review. All participants completed the same videogame task that was
approximately five-minutes long, and all participants responded to the same dependent measures
designed to examine participants’ response accuracy and their perceptions of the tasks. To test
the effect of review, I manipulated when participants responded to the dependent measures: some
participants responded both before and after reviewing their screen recorded gameplay, while
some participants responded only after reviewing their screen recorded gameplay. I also
manipulated whether participants who responded to the dependent measures both before and
after reviewing of their gameplay were informed (or not) that their gameplay would be screen
recorded.
Overall, my hypotheses for Study 3 were unsupported. First, I predicted that participants
who were informed of the screen recording would be motivated to respond more accurately
because they knew that their responses would be compared to their screen recording, and a
result, their responses would more closely reflect the Correct Response. Contrary to this
hypothesis, however, participants who were informed of the recording did not respond
differently from participants who were uninformed of the recording. The one exception was that
informed participants reported being more engaged while playing the mission than uniformed
participants. However, this result may be a Type I error given the number of tests I ran and the pvalue of .02. Regardless of whether this is a true effect, it is underwhelming because the
manipulation did not result in the predicted effect of improving the accuracy of participants’
responses. Nonetheless, it is important to note that these null results do not provide conclusive
evidence that officers who know they are being recorded and do not engage in pre-report review
will not be motivated provide more accurate reports. However, given that previous studies have
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shown that BWCs have a null effect on officer behavior, it is possible that BWCs would not
yield differences in reporting accuracy (Yokum et al., 2017).
I also predicted that after participants watched their screen recording, their responses
would be more accurate, more closely aligning with the screen recording. This hypothesis was
partially supported. The within-subject comparisons of participants’ responses pre- and postreview demonstrated that participants’ post-review responses were more accurate with what the
screen recording showed. Not predicted, however, was the finding that participants’ post-review
responses were still significantly different from the screen recording. Moreover, the betweensubject comparisons of participants’ responses that were provided before review to participants’
responses that were provided after review were significantly different from the details shown in
the screen recordings. These findings suggest that although post-review may lead people to
provide responses that are more consistent with what is captured in the video, pre-report review
does not ensure perfect consistency. These findings align with Ho et al. (2017)’s study where
even paramedics who were trained in documenting information produced reports that differed
from the BWC footage. These results also call into question the belief held by many law
enforcement officers that review will enable officers to produce reports that are identical to BWC
footage.
The purpose of this study was also to test how review impacts what people felt in the
moment of an incident, and I predicted that review would lead participants to provide responses
about their state of mind during the videogame that differed from their responses before review.
Recall that this was a key prediction because according to Graham v. Connor (1989), what an
officer felt in the moment is critical to determining the reasonableness of an officer’s use of
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force. Thus, changes in participants’ perception of the event after review would indicate that
review fails to preserve perceptions for that critical point. Yet, diverging from hypotheses,
the review manipulation did not have a statistically significant impact on participants’
perceptions of their gameplays. However, review did have an effect on participants’ beliefs about
their memory performance; participants in the within-subject design who responded pre- and
post-review believed that their responses were more accurate and were more confident in their
recollections post-review. This finding, however, was not replicated in the between-subject
analysis. Thus, it appears that the significant difference in participants’ perceptions of their
memory performance in the within-subject design is a result of practice effects rather than a
byproduct of review.
As predicted, participants in the within-subject design who responded to the dependent
measures both pre- and post-review were more accurate after review. Not predicted, however,
was the finding that even after review, participants’ responses were not a perfect match with
what their screen recordings showed. Building on this finding, the between-subject comparison
of participants’ responses who engaged in pre-report review to participants who provided
responses before review showed that both types of responses were significantly different from
the screen recordings. These findings are critical to the understanding of pre-report review for a
number of reasons: For one, proponents of pre-report review posit that pre-report review is
necessary so that officers produce reports that are consistent with what the BWC footage shows
and that this consistency will enhance police-community relations. Results from Study 1 and 2
support the belief that inconsistencies between reports and BWC footage will lead people to
question the credibility and accuracy of officers’ reports. Yet, the results described in this Study
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show that the relationship between pre-report review and consistency is more complicated as
pre-report review does not result in perfect consistency.
How then would lay adults evaluate the discrepancies produced by the participants in this
Study? Results from the free response section in Study 1 suggest that lay adults believe that large
inconsistencies between reports and BWC footage are problematic and more diagnostic of
dishonesty than small inconsistencies. These beliefs beg the question of how participants would
consider the inconsistencies in this Study—are they big or small? For example, how would
people’s perceptions of a report that incorrectly described the number of hostages differ from a
report that incorrectly described the order by which various tasks were completed?
Limitations and future directions. As this study is the first to test the effect of review
using a between-subject and within-subject design, there are a number of limitations. For one, I
did not exclude participants who were inexperienced at playing videogames from participating.
Participants’ inexperience is potentially problematic for at least two reasons: Inexperienced
participants may have struggled to remember details from their gameplay because they were
fixated on how to use the controller and this increased their cognitive load. If all participants
were experienced videogame players, then perhaps, results would have exhibited smaller
differences between participants’ responses pre- and post-review, because players could have
attended to and therefore remembered more details about their gameplay. Moreover, because
some participants were inexperienced videogame players, about half failed their gameplay at
least once. Although failure resulted in the game restarting where a participant left off, it is
possible that participants’ memory for the failed event was enhanced.
Another limitation is the ecological validity of the experiment. This experiment was
designed to model officer pre-report review, but it is unlikely that a videogame reflects the
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nuances of the real issue. However, I employed a videogame task because it was stressful and
involved tasks that officers may also engage in and need to report, such as the number of shots
fired or the number of witnesses during an event. A more immersive activity that involved the
participants’ direct engagement with participants completing tasks first-hand may have produced
more stress that would have produced my predicted results. Another aspect of the experiment
that lacked ecological validity was the manipulation of participants’ knowledge of recording. It is
unlikely that this manipulation mapped onto the motivations that officer’s experience to report
information accurately. Perhaps, participants would have been motivated to report more
accurately if they were told that a group of people would compare their responses to what the
video showed and that discrepancies would result in some negative outcome.
There are many more additional cognitive consequences of review that this study did not
examine that future research should assess. For example, researchers should examine cognitive
offloading in the context of pre-report review. Here, I attempted to manipulate participants’
motivation to accurately remember details; and thus, this study was not designed to test the
impact of cognitive offloading (Henkel, 2014; Soares & Storm, 2018). In addition, this research
did not address how pre-report review could produce retrieval induced forgetting that would
have consequences for the details that people provide (Anderson & Bell, 2001). To test retrieval
induced forgetting, researchers could crop aspects of the recorded video to determine how review
of certain details may lead to the forgetting of others. Another interesting question to test is
whether people would be aware of misinformation present in their screen recording, and whether
people could accurately report the source of information. This source monitoring question is
particularly relevant to the issue of reporting because law enforcement officers believe that
officers should produce statements 24 to 48 hours after a critical incident occurred (see Study 1
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free response section). This belief runs contrary to the best practices according to scientific
evidence and could result in more source monitoring errors (Grady et al., 2016; Frost, Ingraham,
& Wilson, 2002).
Finally, with the results from Study 1 and 2 demonstrating that people expect officer
memory to be better than the general population and that consistency between officers’ reports
and BWC footage impacts how people evaluate evidence, it would be interesting to describe the
various inconsistencies revealed in this study to another set of participants, manipulating the
source of the inconsistencies. For example, how might people’s beliefs about the evidence differ
if they were to learn that a police officer was the source of the inconsistencies versus a neutral
witness?
Practical and Legal Implications
Although the results from Study 1 and 2 demonstrated that most lay adults do not take
issue with pre-report review, there was evidence that people of color agreed less with this policy.
Thus, policies that allow officers to engage in pre-report review could have a potentially negative
impact on communities of color, which is a particularly harmful consequence given the history
of their mistrust of police (Morin & Stepler, 2017). In addition, results in Study 2 revealed that
consistency between an officer’s report and the BWC footage was a key factor when people
considered the accuracy of the officer’s report and their trust in the evidence—a finding that is
consistent with the opinions of law enforcement officers who were interviewed for the PERF
Report. It is also important to note the legal consequences that inconsistencies of officers’
statements may have for officers. According to Giglio v. United States (1972), any information
that could impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness, including a police officer, falls within
the Brady rule, or the rule that the prosecution has a duty to disclose information to the defense
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information that is exculpatory to the defendant (Brady v. Maryland, 1963). Thus, police must
disclose to the prosecutor any information that impugns the credibility of an officer, such as
incidents involving untruthfulness and dishonesty, and this information could be used to impeach
the officer’s testimony in a given trial and in future trials involving the same officer. Clearly then
the consistency of officer statements has high stakes in the legal system. Interestingly however,
pre-report review might not be the solution to providing consistency between reports and videos:
Results from Study 3 showed that review did not lead people to produce reports that perfectly
matched what the video showed.
Given that communities of color appear to distrust pre-report review policies and that
pre-report review does not lead to perfectly consistent evidence, police departments may instead
benefit from a two-report review process known as “clean reporting” that has been described by
a civil liberty group (Upturn 2017). Instead of engaging in pre-report review, officers would first
produce a report, detailing their account of a given incident before they review BWC footage.
Then after filing the initial report, officers would have access to review relevant video and would
be able to file a supplemental report, detailing any information that was added after watching the
video. This policy could improve police transparency and accountability, provide independence
of evidence, and help to ensure that officers who are evaluated on what they felt in the moment
are not responsible for accounting for everything shown in the footage (Klinger & Brunson,
2009). It could also help to ensure that officers’ memories for events are free from memory
errors, as Hope, Gabbert, and Fraser (2013) found that officers who provided an initial clean
report did not incorporate any errors from discussion with other officers into their final report.
And as the San Francisco Police Departments have already implemented this type of reporting
for officer-involved shootings, in-custody deaths, and criminal matters, clean reporting is not
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prohibitively time consuming or costly. In contrast, if people deem clean reporting a fairer
procedure than pre-report review, then communities may be more trusting of officer, and this
greater trust would increase communities’ cooperation with the police (Tyler, 2005).
Though clean reporting is unlikely to reduce inconsistencies, it may help to normalize
them and help to expose the illusion of accuracy. For example, exposing lay adults to clean
reporting—allowing them to note the differences between an officer’s perspective and BWC
footage—may make people more attuned to the fact that BWC footage and officer memory are
unlikely to always align. Moreover, lay adults might be more tolerant of inconsistencies when
they receive an explanation for the discrepancy—even if the explanation is made on behalf of the
involved officer. Receiving an explanation for the inconsistency could help reduce the cognitive
dissonance that people might experience when officers who people expect to have more reliable
memories report details that are incorrect in comparison to a video. Though these are potential
positive outcomes resulting from a clean-reporting process, they remain to be empirically tested.
Final Conclusion
Taken together, these studies demonstrate that people believe in the accuracy and
objectivity of visual evidence. People also believe that officer memory is more infallible and
reliable than other people’s memory. With these two beliefs, people expect video evidence and
officer memory to provide the same information. This expectation, however, is called into
question when an officer’s report describes something different from what the BWC footage
shows, and as a result, people turn to the visual information to understand the event. This faith in
visual information when there are inconsistencies with what an officer said happened,
demonstrates that people fail to consider the factors that could limit their ability to neutrally
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interpret visual evidence, and they fail to comprehend that an officer’s report can still be a
trustworthy source of information, even when it differs from what a video depicts.
On its face, these findings appear to provide evidence for pre-report review, as they align
with proponents’ view that inconsistencies between visual information and officers’ reports will
lead people to believe that officers are lying and distrust their statements. Yet, the results from
Study 3 that tested the impact of pre-report review impugn the expectation that review will
provide a perfect match between BWC footage and an officer’s account. Even if review makes
reporting more accurate—albeit not a perfect match—this is still a problematic result because it
propagates an illusion of accuracy. By perpetuating this illusion, people are surrounded with
more evidence for the false notion that officer memory is infallible. An unfortunate possibility is
that people will be more suspicious of officers who provide information that differs from the
video—even if this differing information accurately represents their experience or is due to a
memory error. Given these consequences, it appears that pre-report review does not support the
goal of building people’s trust in the police.
In sum, consideration of BWC policies is necessary to ensure that the cameras are a netpositive for the police, communities, and the legal-system. These results highlight the
complexities inherent in BWC policy decisions by demonstrating that policy-makers must
evaluate pre-report review policies with an understanding of people’s beliefs about memory and
visual evidence. Without a full appreciation of these underlying issues, departments may
implement policies that fail to improve policing and build the police-community trust that people
had hoped for—a result that would surely guarantee that BWCs are a moral panic.
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Appendix A
Study 1 Survey Items
1. Before providing any statement about an incident, officers should review any available
body worn camera video of the incident. (F1)
2. Officer memories for incidents should be similar to body worn camera video recorded
during the incident. (F1)
3. Differences between an officer’s statement and their body worn camera video is likely a
sign of deceit. (F1)
4. Differences between an officer’s statement and their body worn camera video is likely a
sign that officers conspired to create a story about what happened. (F1)
5. Officers should be able to review their body worn camera video before producing a
statement for stressful events (i.e., events involving a physical confrontation and/or
weapon). (F2)
6. Officers should be able to review their body worn camera video before producing a
statement for less stressful events (i.e., events not involving a physical confrontation or
weapon). (F2)
7. Body worn camera video is more accurate than officers’ memories. (F1)
8. Officers’ statements will more accurately reflect what actually happened in an event after
they review camera video. (excluded from FA)
9. Reviewing a body worn camera video of an event is likely to alter how an officer
remembers the event. (F1)
10. Reviewing a body worn camera video will help officers remember more about what
happened in an event. (F2)
11. Reviewing a body worn camera video of an event is likely to result in a statement that is
consistent with the contents of the video but not the officer’s memory. (F1)
12. Officers will be able to differentiate between what they remember from an event and
what was later seen in the body worn camera video. (F2)
13. The public will distrust officers who review available body worn camera video footage
before producing a statement. (excluded from FA)
14. The public will distrust an officer’s statement if it is inconsistent with what the body
worn camera video shows. (excluded from FA)
15. The public will distrust an officer’s statement if it perfectly matches what the body worn
camera video shows. (excluded from FA)
16. When statements and body worn camera video differ, legal decision-makers should
default to what the video captured. (F1)
17. Body worn camera video is more objective than an officer’s memory. (F1)
18. Body worn camera videos might sometimes fail to show what an officer perceived during
an event. (F3)
19. Knowing exactly what happened during an event is more important than knowing what
an officer perceived during an event. (F1)
20. Police officers have better memory ability than members of the general public with no
law enforcement training. (F4)
21. Police officers’ memories are more reliable than members of the general public with no
law enforcement training. (F4)
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22. Police officers should write statements as soon as safely possible after an event has taken
place. (F1)
23. Police officers’ memories are more accurate for stressful events (i.e., events involving a
physical confrontation and/or weapon) than less stressful events (i.e., events not
involving a physical confrontation and/or weapon). (F4)
24. Police statements are often unnecessary when body worn camera video is available. (F1)
25. Because of limitations with the technology, body worn cameras might sometimes fail to
capture the full scene. (F3)
26. When determining whether an officer’s use of force was appropriate, it’s most important
to look at what was captured on body worn camera video rather than learning about the
event from the officer’s statement. (F1)
27. When determining an officer’s use of force was appropriate, it’s important to bear in
mind that the body worn camera video will not show how the officer perceived the event.
(F3)
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Appendix B
Factor Analysis Results with Medians for Missing Values and I Don’t Know Responses
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Appendix C
Study 2 Officer’s Report
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Appendix D
Recruitment Flyer for Study 3
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Appendix E
Recall Task Questions
1. How many hostages were there?
______________
2. How many times did you reload your gun?
______________
3. How many shots in total did you fire?
______________
4. How many police cars were at the final scene?
______________
5. How many police officers were at the final scene?
______________
6. How many police officers shot at you?
______________
7. How many shots in total were fired at you?
______________
8. How long was the mission? Estimate in minutes and seconds
________ minutes, and ________ seconds
9. Describe what the security guard that you shot was wearing.
_____________________________________
10. Who fired the first shot? (Circle one)
Me

The police
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11. Who fired the last shot? (Circle one)
Me

The police

12. How confident are you in the overall accuracy of your memory for the mission?
1
Not at
all confident

2

3

4
Somewhat
confident

5

6

7
Extremely
confident
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Appendix F
Sequence Task
Below is a list of things that you did in the mission. Please number (1 – 8) the order in which you
engaged in the tasks. The first and last ones are done for you.
Went to the guard

______1_______

Shot the guard.

_____________

Got to cover.

_____________

Aimed at the hostages to make them move.

_____________

Opened the shutter door.

____________

Collected the cash.

_____________

Used the phone to trigger the explosive.

_____________

Shot at the police officers.

_____8_______
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Appendix G
Rating Task
Now, think about each one of these tasks that you completed during the mission. Rate the
stressfulness of each of these moments on a scale from 1 to 7.
1
Not at
all stressful

2

3

4
Somewhat
stressful

5

6

7
Extremely
stressful

Activity
________________________________________________________________________________
Went to the guard

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Aimed at the hostages
to make them move.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Used the phone to
trigger the explosive.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Collected the cash.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Shot the guard.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Got to cover.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Opened the shutter door.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Shot at the police officers.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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Appendix H
Experience Task
Now, answer these questions on a scale from 1 to 7.
1. How likely did you think it was that the security guard was going to shoot?
1
Not at
all likely

2

3

4
Somewhat
likely

5

6

7
Extremely
likely

5

6

7
Extremely
guilty

5

6

7
Extremely
intense

2. How guilty did you feel in shooting the security guard?
1
Not at
all guilty

2

3

4
Somewhat
guilty

3. How intense was the shootout with the police?
1
Not at
all intense

2

3

4
Somewhat
intense

4. How likely did you think it was that you were going to be shot by the police during the
final scene?
1
Not at
all likely

2

3

4
Somewhat
likely

5

6

7
Extremely
likely

5. How quickly did time feel like it was moving during the mission?
1
Extremely
slowly

2

3

4

5

6

7
Extremely
quickly
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6. How accurate is your recollection of the mission?
1
Not at
all accurate

2

3

4
Somewhat
accurate

5

6

7
Extremely
accurate

7. To what extent is your memory of the mission distorted by your beliefs, motives, and
expectations rather than an accurate reflection of the event as a neutral observer would
report it?
1
100%
distorted

2

3

4

5

6

7
100%
accurate

8. If another witness to the event, who you generally trusted, existed and told you a very
different account of the event to what extent could you be persuaded that your memory
was wrong? (Scale: 1 not at all; 3 in some details; 5 in some main points; 7 completely)
1
Not at
all

2

3
In some
details

4

5
In some
main points

6

7
Completely

9. How similar do you think your responses to this questionnaire are to your responses to
the first questionnaire?
1
Not at
all similar

2

3

4
Somewhat
similar

5

6

7
Extremely
similar
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10. How stressful was playing the Grand Theft Auto prologue mission for the first time?
1
Not at
all stressful

2

3

4
Somewhat
stressful

5

6

7
Extremely
stressful

6

7
Extremely
engaged

6

7
Extremely
motivated

11. How engaged were you when you were playing the mission?
1
Not at
all engaged

2

3

4
Somewhat
engaged

5

12. How motivated were you to complete the mission?
1
Not at
all motivated

2

3

4
Somewhat
motivated

5
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Appendix I
Double Report, Informed Script
First ask, “Have you completed the screening questionnaire for this study?”
If they say YES, say, “Great. So, I just want to confirm, you’ve never played the prologue
mission of Grand Theft Auto 5 before, correct?”
If they say NO, say, “That’s okay. Before you can participate I need to check if you’ve ever
played the prologue mission of Grand Theft Auto 5 before. Have you played this before?
-

If participants confirm they’ve never played GTA 5 Prologue, then continue with the
script.
If participants say that they have played before GTA 5 Prologue, then tell them they are
ineligible to participate.

Write down on the participant sheet if they completed the screening and if they have played the
Prologue mission before.

Next, give eligible participants the consent form. Allow them to read it and ask questions.

After they read the consent form begin the Script:
Thank you for coming to the lab today to participate. As you read in the consent form, the
purpose of the study is to test people’s ability to understand and recall information—two skills
that have been shown to correlate strongly with intelligence.
To test your ability to understand and recall information and therefore your intelligence, you
will first play a videogame called Grand Theft Auto 5. In the videogame mission, you will play
the role of a criminal who is robbing a storage facility. You will have to steal money from the
facility and escape the police without being harmed.
Then after you complete the mission, you are going to answer specific questions about what you
did in the mission that will test your ability to understand and recall information. Importantly, I
will be screen recording your gameplay to this laptop (point to laptop). By recording your
gameplay, I will be able to determine your ability to recall information and recall it accurately.
Therefore, while completing the mission, you should try to remember everything that happens as
accurately as possible.
Don’t worry if you’ve never played videogames before or if you don’t consider yourself an
expert, there will be instructions throughout the mission that will appear on the top left and
bottom right of the screen (point to where the instructions will appear). To complete the mission,
you only need to follow these instructions.
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I’m also going to teach you how to use the controller for this mission. There are just a few
buttons you need to know to successfully complete the mission.
**When teaching participants, make sure the controller is off, and point to each button**
•

First, you will need to know how to move forward. To move forward, use the Left Joystick
L. The game will refer to this joystick as “L” for left joystick.

•

You will also need to know how to look around or change your viewpoint. To do that, use
the right joystick. The game will refer to this joystick as “R” for right joystick.

•

You will need to know how to aim. To aim, press the left trigger. The mission instructions
will refer to this button as LT for left trigger. When you’re aiming, a white dot will
appear to show where your gun is pointing. You can use the right joystick to move your
aim.

•

You will need to know how to shoot. To shoot, press the right trigger. The game
instructions will refer to this button as RT for right trigger.

•

You also need to know how to take cover. To take cover, you must first move behind
something and then press the right bumper—which the game refers to as RB. You can
press the right bumper again to move from cover.

•

Grand Theft Auto also has a feature where you can change characters. To change
characters, you need to press down and while holding down, move the right joystick to
the right, and then let go of the down button.

•
•

Finally, to reload your weapon, Press B.
One last thing, there will be a map on the bottom left. You should look at the map while
completing the mission and follow yellow and green dots that appear.

Don’t worry, you will get another chance to review the controller before you start the mission. I
have just two more pieces of information that will help you complete the mission successfully.
First, do not shoot a hostage, if you shoot a hostage, you will fail the mission. Second, do not
shoot one of your accomplices, if you shoot an accomplice, you will fail the mission.
Do you have any questions?
Alright to recap, you are going to complete a mission that involves robbing a facility and
evading the police, and I will be screen recording your gameplay to this laptop. After you
complete the mission, you will answer questions about your gameplay that will test your ability
to understand and recall information. By screen recording your gameplay, I will be able to
determine your level of accuracy.
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Now, before you begin, I want to make sure you remember the controls that are essential for this
mission
**Have participants point to specific parts on controller. If they get it wrong, correct them**
1. How do you aim? (LT)
2. How do you shoot? (RT)
3. How do you take cover? (RB)
4. How do you switch characters? (Hold down on directional pad, move R to the right and
then release directional pad)
5. How do you reload your weapon? (B)
6. How do you move around? (L)
7. How do you look around? (R)
Do you have any questions before we begin?

**To start a new game hit the button with three lines on it. Use the directional pad to select
Game. Select A. Then, use the directional pad to select Start a New Game. Select A again**

Instructions for when participant begins playing the mission:
1. Tell participant, “It will take a minute or two to load. Then the game will begin”
2. Make sure sound is off on the laptop!
3. Discreetly record the mission on the laptop and label the recording with the participant
number (ex: P001).
4. Then watch participants play the mission.
5. If they get stuck, you can give them a hint:
HINTS
a. If they get stuck with making the hostages move, say “Remember, aim using left
trigger and the right joystick to move your aim.”
b. If they get stuck while getting to the money, say “Remember, follow the yellow
dot on the map”
c. If they get stuck while changing characters, say “You need to press down and
while pressing down, move the right joystick to the right, then release the down
button”
d. If they get stuck while taking cover say, “You need to get behind something first,
then press right bumper”
e. If they end up accidentally changing their weapon, tell them to press the left
bumper, reselect the gun, and hit the left bumper again.
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6. Once they get to the shootout, allow them to play for 35 seconds, then end the game. Say,
“Okay, for the purposes of today’s study, you’ve completed the mission.”
7. Make sure to finish the recording. Press the controller button with the three lines to pause
the game. Try to pause the game and stop the recording as close to one another as
possible.
After playing the mission, participants complete the delay for 5-minutes:
1. Give participants the delay task. Tell participants, “Okay now I’d like you to complete
this next task. In this task, you will complete line mazes. Enter the maze at the top arrow
and try to exit the maze at the bottom arrow. I’ll let you know when it’s time to move
on.”

After complete the delay, participants answer Questionnaire A:
1. Hand participant Questionnaire A and say, “Okay that’s it for this task, now I’d like you
to answer questions about the mission. After answering the questions on one page, please
do not go back.”

After completing Questionnaire A, participants complete another 5-minute delay:
1. Give participants the delay task. Tell participants, “Okay now I’d like you to complete
this line maze task again. I’ll let you know when it’s time to move on to the next task.
You can start a new picture or pick up where you left off.”

Instructions for when participants begin the first 5-minute delay task:
1. First, make sure participants answered all of the Questionnaire questions.
2. Then, pull up the participant’s recorded gameplay, while the participant is completing the
delay task. Make sure the screen is maximized, the sound is on, and that the time isn’t
showing.

After the delay, participants watch their gameplay:
1. When participants are done with the delay …
a. Say “As I mentioned earlier, while you were playing the mission, I screen
recorded it to this laptop. So, I have a copy of your gameplay, and now I’d like
you to watch it.”
b. Switch seats with participant.
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c. Before playing the mission, say, “Please watch your gameplay carefully because
after watching your gameplay, you will answer questions about the mission.”
d. Press the space bar to allow participants to watch the gameplay.
e. Make sure they don’t touch the laptop.

After watching their gameplay, participants complete another 5-minute delay:
1. Tell participants, “Okay now I’d like you to complete the line maze task again. I’ll let
you know when it’s time to move on to the next task. You can start a new picture or pick
up where you left off.”
2. Have participants complete the delay task for 5 minutes.

After the delay, participants complete Questionnaire B:
1. Get out Questionnaire B.
2. After participants complete the 5-min delay say, “Okay now I’d like for you to answer
questions about your mission. After answering the questions on one page, please do not
go back.”
3. Hand participants Questionnaire B.

Instructions for when participants complete Questionnaire B:
1. Make sure participants answered all of the Questionnaire B questions.
2. Say, “Okay that’s all for this experiment. Here is the debriefing form with more detailed
information about the study.”
3. As they look at the debriefing form say, “Overall, we are looking to understand the effect
that review has on people’s memory for stressful events. Although we are unable to speak
directly to your ability to accurately recall information, we will have aggregate data that
will allow us to determine participants’ overall accuracy. If you’re interested in these
results, please contact Kristyn Jones at krjones@jjay.cuny.edu.
4. Then say, “It’s really important that you don’t share any information about this study
with other potential participants because that could jeopardize our results. If you’d like a
copy of the debriefing form please let me know. Otherwise you’re done for the day, and I
will give you SONA credit/pay you $15 for your time”
5. Note, if you are paying participants, they must sign the receipt.

Tasks after participant leaves:
1. Put completed Questionnaires in correct file & make sure participant number is on the
first page of all Questionnaires.
2. Make sure gameplay is saved to the hard drive with the correct number.
3. Grant participant credit on SONA/pay participant.
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Appendix J
Double Report, Uninformed Script
First ask, “Have you completed the screening questionnaire for this study?”
If they say YES, say, “Great. So, I just want to confirm, you’ve never played the prologue
mission of Grand Theft Auto 5 before, correct?”
If they say NO, say, “That’s okay. Before you can participate I need to check if you’ve ever
played the prologue mission of Grand Theft Auto 5 before. Have you played this before?
-

If participants confirm they’ve never played GTA 5 Prologue, then continue with the
script.
If participants say that they have played before GTA 5 Prologue, then tell them they are
ineligible to participate.

Write down on the participant sheet if they completed the screening and if they have played the
Prologue mission before.

Next, give eligible participants the consent form. Allow them to read it and ask questions.

After they read the consent form begin the Script:
Thank you for coming to the lab today to participate. As you read in the consent form, the
purpose of the study is to test people’s ability to understand and recall information—two skills
that have been shown to correlate strongly with intelligence.
To test your ability to understand and recall information and therefore your intelligence, you
will first play a videogame called Grand Theft Auto 5. In the videogame mission, you will play
the role of a criminal who is robbing a storage facility. You will have to steal money from the
facility and escape the police without being harmed.
Then after you complete the mission, you are going to answer specific questions about what you
did in the mission that will test your ability to understand and recall information. Therefore,
while completing the mission, you should try to remember everything that happens as accurately
as possible.
Don’t worry if you’ve never played videogames before or if you don’t consider yourself an
expert, there will be instructions throughout the mission that will appear on the top left and
bottom right of the screen (point to where the instructions will appear). To complete the mission,
you only need to follow these instructions.
I’m also going to teach you how to use the controller for this mission. There are just a few
buttons you need to know to successfully complete the mission.
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**When teaching participants, make sure the controller is off, and point to each button**
•

First, you will need to know how to move forward. To move forward, use the Left Joystick
L. The game will refer to this joystick as “L” for left joystick.

•

You will also need to know how to look around or change your viewpoint. To do that, use
the right joystick. The game will refer to this joystick as “R” for right joystick.

•

You will need to know how to aim. To aim, press the left trigger. The mission instructions
will refer to this button as LT for left trigger. When you’re aiming, a white dot will
appear to show where your gun is pointing. You can use the right joystick to move your
aim.

•

You will need to know how to shoot. To shoot, press the right trigger. The game
instructions will refer to this button as RT for right trigger.

•

You also need to know how to take cover. To take cover, you must first move behind
something and then press the right bumper—which the game refers to as RB. You can
press the right bumper again to move from cover.

•

Grand Theft Auto also has a feature where you can change characters. To change
characters, you need to press down and while holding down, move the right joystick to
the right, and then let go of the down button.

•
•

Finally, to reload your weapon, Press B.
One last thing, there will be a map on the bottom left. You should look at the map while
completing the mission and follow yellow and green dots that appear.

Don’t worry, you will get another chance to review the controller before you start the mission. I
have just two more pieces of information that will help you complete the mission successfully.
First, do not shoot a hostage, if you shoot a hostage, you will fail the mission. Second, do not
shoot one of your accomplices, if you shoot an accomplice, you will fail the mission.
Do you have any questions?
Alright to recap, you are going to complete a mission that involves robbing a facility and
evading the police. After you complete the mission, you will answer questions about your
gameplay that will test your ability to understand and recall information.
Now, before you begin, I want to make sure you remember the controls that are essential for this
mission
**Have participants point to specific parts on controller. If they get it wrong, correct them**
8.

How do you aim? (LT)
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9. How do you shoot? (RT)
10. How do you take cover? (RB)
11. How do you switch characters? (Hold down on directional pad, move R to the right and
then release directional pad)
12. How do you reload your weapon? (B)
13. How do you move around? (L)
14. How do you look around? (R)
Do you have any questions before we begin?

**To start a new game hit the button with three lines on it. Use the directional pad to select
Game. Select A. Then, use the directional pad to select Start a New Game. Select A again**

Instructions for when participant begins playing the mission:
8. Tell participant, “It will take a minute or two to load. Then the game will begin”
9. Make sure sound is off on the laptop!
10. Discreetly record the mission on the laptop and label the recording with the participant
number (ex: P001).
11. Then watch participants play the mission.
12. If they get stuck, you can give them a hint:
HINTS
a. If they get stuck with making the hostages move, say “Remember, aim using left
trigger and the right joystick to move your aim.”
b. If they get stuck while getting to the money, say “Remember, follow the yellow
dot on the map”
c. If they get stuck while changing characters, say “You need to press down and
while pressing down, move the right joystick to the right, then release the down
button”
d. If they get stuck while taking cover say, “You need to get behind something first,
then press right bumper”
e. If they end up accidentally changing their weapon, tell them to press the left
bumper, reselect the gun, and hit the left bumper again.
13. Once they get to the shootout, allow them to play for 35 seconds, then end the game. Say,
“Okay, for the purposes of today’s study, you’ve completed the mission.”
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14. Make sure to finish the recording. Press the controller button with the three lines to pause
the game. Try to pause the game and stop the recording as close to one another as
possible.

After playing the mission, participants complete the delay for 5-minutes:
2. Give participants the delay task. Tell participants, “Okay now I’d like you to complete
this next task. In this task, you will complete line mazes. Enter the maze at the top arrow
and try to exit the maze at the bottom arrow. I’ll let you know when it’s time to move
on.”

After complete the delay, participants answer Questionnaire A:
2. Hand participant Questionnaire A and say, “Okay that’s it for this task, now I’d like you
to answer questions about the mission. After answering the questions on one page, please
do not go back.”

After completing Questionnaire A, participants complete another 5-minute delay:
2. Give participants the delay task. Tell participants, “Okay now I’d like you to complete
this line maze task again. I’ll let you know when it’s time to move on to the next task.
You can start a new picture or pick up where you left off.”

Instructions for when participants begin the first 5-minute delay task:
3. First, make sure participants answered all of the Questionnaire questions.
4. Then, pull up the participant’s recorded gameplay, while the participant is completing the
delay task. Make sure the screen is maximized, the sound is on, and that the time isn’t
showing.

After the delay, participants watch their gameplay:
2. When participants are done with the delay …
a. Say “As you were playing the mission, I actually screen recorded it to this laptop.
So, I have a copy of your gameplay, and now I’d like you to watch it.”
b. Switch seats with participant.
c. Before playing the mission, say, “Please watch your gameplay carefully because
after watching your gameplay, you will answer questions about the mission.”
d. Press the space bar to allow participants to watch the gameplay.
e. Make sure they don’t touch the laptop.
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After watching their gameplay, participants complete another 5-minute delay:
3. Tell participants, “Okay now I’d like you to complete the line maze task again. I’ll let
you know when it’s time to move on to the next task. You can start a new picture or pick
up where you left off.”
4. Have participants complete the delay task for 5 minutes.

After the delay, participants complete Questionnaire B:
4. Get out Questionnaire B.
5. After participants complete the 5-min delay say, “Okay now I’d like for you to answer
questions about your mission. After answering the questions on one page, please do not
go back.”
6. Hand participants Questionnaire B.

Instructions for when participants complete Questionnaire B:
6. Make sure participants answered all of the Questionnaire B questions.
7. Say, “Okay that’s all for this experiment. Here is the debriefing form with more detailed
information about the study.”
8. As they look at the debriefing form say, “Overall, we are looking to understand the effect
that review has on people’s memory for stressful events. Although we are unable to speak
directly to your ability to accurately recall information, we will have aggregate data that
will allow us to determine participants’ overall accuracy. If you’re interested in these
results, please contact Kristyn Jones at krjones@jjay.cuny.edu.
9. Then say, “It’s really important that you don’t share any information about this study
with other potential participants because that could jeopardize our results. If you’d like a
copy of the debriefing form please let me know. Otherwise you’re done for the day, and I
will give you SONA credit/pay you $15 for your time”
10. Note, if you are paying participants, they must sign the receipt.

Tasks after participant leaves:
4. Put completed Questionnaires in correct file & make sure participant number is on the
first page of all Questionnaires.
5. Make sure gameplay is saved to the hard drive with the correct number.
6. Grant participant credit on SONA/pay participant.
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Appendix K
Single Report Script
First ask, “Have you completed the screening questionnaire for this study?”
If they say YES, say, “Great. So, I just want to confirm, you’ve never played the prologue
mission of Grand Theft Auto 5 before, correct?”
If they say NO, say, “That’s okay. Before you can participate I need to check if you’ve ever
played the prologue mission of Grand Theft Auto 5 before. Have you played this before?
-

If participants confirm they’ve never played GTA 5 Prologue, then continue with the
script.
If participants say that they have played before GTA 5 Prologue, then tell them they are
ineligible to participate.

Write down on the participant sheet if they completed the screening and if they have played the
Prologue mission before.

Next, give eligible participants the consent form. Allow them to read it and ask questions.

After they read the consent form begin the Script:
Thank you for coming to the lab today to participate. As you read in the consent form, the
purpose of the study is to test people’s ability to understand and recall information—two skills
that have been shown to correlate strongly with intelligence.
To test your ability to understand and recall information and therefore your intelligence, you
will first play a videogame called Grand Theft Auto 5. In the videogame mission, you will play
the role of a criminal who is robbing a storage facility. You will have to steal money from the
facility and escape the police without being harmed.
Then after you complete the mission, you are going to answer specific questions about what you
did in the mission that will test your ability to understand and recall information. Importantly, I
will be screen recording your gameplay to this laptop (point to laptop). By recording your
gameplay, I will be able to determine your ability to recall information and recall it accurately.
Therefore, while completing the mission, you should try to remember everything that happens as
accurately as possible.
Don’t worry if you’ve never played videogames before or if you don’t consider yourself an
expert, there will be instructions throughout the mission that will appear on the top left and
bottom right of the screen (point to where the instructions will appear). To complete the mission,
you only need to follow these instructions.
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I’m also going to teach you how to use the controller for this mission. There are just a few
buttons you need to know to successfully complete the mission.
**When teaching participants, make sure the controller is off, and point to each button**
•

First, you will need to know how to move forward. To move forward, use the Left Joystick
L. The game will refer to this joystick as “L” for left joystick.

•

You will also need to know how to look around or change your viewpoint. To do that, use
the right joystick. The game will refer to this joystick as “R” for right joystick.

•

You will need to know how to aim. To aim, press the left trigger. The mission instructions
will refer to this button as LT for left trigger. When you’re aiming, a white dot will
appear to show where your gun is pointing. You can use the right joystick to move your
aim.

•

You will need to know how to shoot. To shoot, press the right trigger. The game
instructions will refer to this button as RT for right trigger.

•

You also need to know how to take cover. To take cover, you must first move behind
something and then press the right bumper—which the game refers to as RB. You can
press the right bumper again to move from cover.

•

Grand Theft Auto also has a feature where you can change characters. To change
characters, you need to press down and while holding down, move the right joystick to
the right, and then let go of the down button.

•
•

Finally, to reload your weapon, Press B.
One last thing, there will be a map on the bottom left. You should look at the map while
completing the mission and follow yellow and green dots that appear.

Don’t worry, you will get another chance to review the controller before you start the mission. I
have just two more pieces of information that will help you complete the mission successfully.
First, do not shoot a hostage, if you shoot a hostage, you will fail the mission. Second, do not
shoot one of your accomplices, if you shoot an accomplice, you will fail the mission.
Do you have any questions?
Alright to recap, you are going to complete a mission that involves robbing a facility and
evading the police, and I will be screen recording your gameplay to this laptop. After you
complete the mission, you will answer questions about your gameplay that will test your ability
to understand and recall information. By screen recording your gameplay, I will be able to
determine your level of accuracy.
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Now, before you begin, I want to make sure you remember the controls that are essential for this
mission
**Have participants point to specific parts on controller. If they get it wrong, correct them**
15. How do you aim? (LT)
16. How do you shoot? (RT)
17. How do you take cover? (RB)
18. How do you switch characters? (Hold down on directional pad, move R to the right and
then release directional pad)
19. How do you reload your weapon? (B)
20. How do you move around? (L)
21. How do you look around? (R)
Do you have any questions before we begin?

**To start a new game hit the button with three lines on it. Use the directional pad to select
Game. Select A. Then, use the directional pad to select Start a New Game. Select A again**

Instructions for when participant begins playing the mission:
15. Tell participant, “It will take a minute or two to load. Then the game will begin”
16. Make sure sound is off on the laptop!
17. Discreetly record the mission on the laptop and label the recording with the participant
number (ex: P001).
18. Then watch participants play the mission.
19. If they get stuck, you can give them a hint:
HINTS
a. If they get stuck with making the hostages move, say “Remember, aim using left
trigger and the right joystick to move your aim.”
b. If they get stuck while getting to the money, say “Remember, follow the yellow
dot on the map”
c. If they get stuck while changing characters, say “You need to press down and
while pressing down, move the right joystick to the right, then release the down
button”
d. If they get stuck while taking cover say, “You need to get behind something first,
then press right bumper”
e. If they end up accidentally changing their weapon, tell them to press the left
bumper, reselect the gun, and hit the left bumper again.
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20. Once they get to the shootout, allow them to play for 35 seconds, then end the game. Say,
“Okay, for the purposes of today’s study, you’ve completed the mission.”
21. Make sure to finish the recording. Press the controller button with the three lines to pause
the game. Try to pause the game and stop the recording as close to one another as
possible.
After playing the mission, participants complete the delay for 5-minutes:
3. Give participants the delay task. Tell participants, “Okay now I’d like you to complete
this next task. In this task, you will complete line mazes. Enter the maze at the top arrow
and try to exit the maze at the bottom arrow. I’ll let you know when it’s time to move
on.”

Instructions for when participants begin the first 5-minute delay task:
5. Pull up the participant’s recorded gameplay, while the participant is completing the delay
task. Make sure the screen is maximized, the sound is on, and that the time isn’t showing.

After the delay, participants watch their gameplay:
3. When participants are done with the delay …
a. Say “As I mentioned earlier, while you were playing the mission, I screen
recorded it to this laptop. So, I have a copy of your gameplay, and now I’d like
you to watch it.”
b. Switch seats with participant.
c. Before playing the mission, say, “Please watch your gameplay carefully because
after watching your gameplay, you will answer questions about the mission.”
d. Press the space bar to allow participants to watch the gameplay.
e. Make sure they don’t touch the laptop.

After watching their gameplay, participants complete another 5-minute delay:
5. Tell participants, “Okay now I’d like you to complete the line maze task again. I’ll let
you know when it’s time to move on to the next task. You can start a new picture or pick
up where you left off.”
6. Have participants complete the delay task for 5 minutes.

After the delay, participants complete Single Report Questionnaire:
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7. Get out Single Report Questionnaire.
8. After participants complete the 5-min delay say, “Okay now I’d like for you to answer
questions about your mission. After answering the questions on one page, please do not
go back.
9. Hand participants the Questionnaire.

Instructions for when participants complete the Questionnaire:
11. Make sure participants answered all of the Questionnaire questions.
12. Say, “Okay that’s all for this experiment. Here is the debriefing form with more detailed
information about the study.”
13. As they look at the debriefing form say, “Overall, we are looking to understand the effect
that review has on people’s memory for stressful events. Although we are unable to speak
directly to your ability to accurately recall information, we will have aggregate data that
will allow us to determine participants’ overall accuracy. If you’re interested in these
results, please contact Kristyn Jones at krjones@jjay.cuny.edu.
14. Then say, “It’s really important that you don’t share any information about this study
with other potential participants because that could jeopardize our results. If you’d like a
copy of the debriefing form please let me know. Otherwise you’re done for the day, and I
will give you SONA credit/pay you $15 for your time”
15. Note, if you are paying participants, they must sign the receipt.

Tasks after participant leaves:
7. Put completed Questionnaires in correct file & make sure participant number is on the
first page of all Questionnaires.
8. Make sure gameplay is saved to the hard drive with the correct number.
9. Grant participant credit on SONA/pay participant.
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